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Introduction
“We don’t have much left to do, we British, except
to play our games” – Methwold [Rushdie, 1981]
Allow me to retain for a few more sentences a chatty tone, and the first person. Taking
a step back from this Thesis, there is so much more I would have liked it to be, so let us
say, while also retaining a down-to-earth sense of proportion, that it is aimed towards a
theory of interactive reasoning. Game theory is for the most part the object of its study,
and with good reason: game theory is all about interaction. But game theory needn’t
have a monopoly here. Computer scientists and philosophers are increasingly studying
aspects of interaction too, with some formality [De´gremont and Zvesper, 2010], and
something this thesis does is bring some aspects of their common ground – logic – to
the fore.2 We’re still in chatty mode (just wait until you get to Chapter 1 if you want
to see what ‘dry’ means), so we’re allowed to admit some weaknesses. Sometimes
we will get ‘bogged down’ in details of the particular disciplines we’re writing about.
We prove certain Propositions and Theorems that might leave people cold, and our
discussion could sometimes seem wide of the mark. People from game theory will
say, ‘reduction axiom what now?’, and people from logic might wonder why we care
about ‘players’ (as in real players, not ∀belard and ∃loise). Still, bear in mind that
we’re contributing to something interdisciplinary here, all with the hope that just one
truly interesting idea about interactive reasoning will eventually be squeezed out of the
confusion.
In this Introduction we will first present, with minimal technical baggage or ma-
chinery, the sort of things that are discussed in the following Chapters. So we talk a
bit about game theory, and then about interactive epistemology (slipping in a little bit
of logic). Those few pages are not intended as a guide for the details of what is in the
2A shift of focus to interaction can be said to have been brewing for several decades, as a concerted
effort to change the fact that “[t]raditional philosophy of language, like much traditional philosophy,
leaves out other people and the world” [Putnam, 1975, p. 193].
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rest of this Thesis, but rather to whet the (relatively) lay reader’s appetite. We will also
explain the so-called ‘deductive’ interpretation of game theory that we will principally
have in mind throughout this Thesis, and give some reasons why we prefer to take ‘be-
lief’ rather than ‘knowledge’ as the object of (interactive) epistemology. Then, after
we’ve mentioned a few things we find interesting from the fields of game theory and
interactive epistemology, we do endeavour to explain some of that will occur in the
Chapters, one by one.
Game theory
Game theory is the mathematical study of the interactions of largely idealised decision-
makers. Mathematical in the following sense: it abstracts from much of the detail of
those interactions qua events taking place in the real world (which “might better be
called the complex world” [Aumann, 1985]). The advantage to such an abstraction
being that game theorists can present formal models, about which they can prove the-
orems. These theorems, in turn, are supposed to tell us something about the complex
world we abstracted away from.
To quote from the opening passage of a popular textbook on game theory [Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994],
“The basic assumptions that underlie [game] theory are that decision-
makers pursue well-defined exogenous objectives (they are rational) and
take into account their knowledge or expectations of other decision-makers’
behaviour (they reason strategically).”
The Thesis you are reading uses formal tools drawn principally from work in philo-
sophical logic to explore both of these notions, rationality and strategic reasoning, fo-
cusing especially on the role of information and belief: on what are called ‘epistemic’
or sometimes ‘doxastic’ aspects.
Rationality here is taken to mean ‘instrumental’ rationality, i.e. rationality means
just that players pursue their objectives, that can be taken to represent their ‘best in-
terests’, as perceived by themselves. Players therefore function as optimisers of what
they take to be their own best interests. There is a doxastic component therefore in the
definition of this most fundamental notion in game theory:
“A person’s behaviour is rational if it is
in his best interests, given his information.”
That is the standard definition of (instrumental) rationality; the particular quotation is
from [Aumann, 2006].
Perhaps the most widely known example of a game (in the sense of game theory) is
the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma”. One formulation, from [Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994, p. 16], of the prisoner’s dilemma is the following:
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Two suspects in a crime are put into separate cells. If they both confess,
each will be sentenced to two years in prison. If only one of them confesses,
he will be freed and used as a witness against the other, who will receive
a sentence of three years. If neither confesses, they will both be convicted
of a minor offence and spend one year in prison.
We will not introduce formally the definitions of games, including of players’ pref-
erences (or ‘utilities’), until Chapter 1, but for present purposes allow us to represent
the situation using the matrix in Figure 1. This matrix represents what we will call a
Y N
Y 1, 1 3, 0
N 0, 3 2, 2
Figure 1: A matrix representing the prisoner’s dilemma game
‘strategic game’; the important point about it is that it is intended to capture the es-
sential parts of the given description of the situation the players (the prisoners) find
themselves in. One player (the ‘row player’) must choose between the top and bot-
tom rows, and the other (the ‘column player’) must choose between the left and right
columns. The numbers in the resulting entry in the matrix (e.g. 0, 3) then represent the
‘utility’ obtained by the row and column players respectively. The choice Y (the top
row for the row player; left column for the column player) represents confessing to the
crime; the choice N represents not confessing.3 The utilities written in the boxes are
made on the assumption that the only concern the players have is how much time they
will spend in prison: 0 means spending three years in prison, 1 means spending two
years, etc.
Players prefer higher utilities, which means that in this case mainstream game the-
ory makes a unique prediction: both players will play D, i.e. both players will confess.
However, there are two ways to think about that prediction, which rely respectively
on the ‘deductive’ and the ‘steady-state’ interpretations in game theory (cf. [Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994, Section 1.5]). The deductive interpretation will suit this sce-
nario better; it says that a game matrix really represents a ‘one-shot’ interaction, in
which players use only reasoning about the game, with no exogenous information.
According to the deductive interpretation, players can perform the following kind of
reasoning. The row player can say, ‘if my fellow prisoner plays Y then I would be bet-
ter off playing Y ; and if my fellow prisoner plays N then I would be better of playing
Y ; so I should play Y ’. Thus N is, to use game-theoretic jargon that we introduce in
Chapter 1, ‘strictly dominated’ by Y .
The steady-state interpretation of game theory is very different, and is the interpre-
tation that supports the notion of ‘Nash equilibrium’. A Nash equilibrium is a ‘profile’
3These ‘confessions’ need not be sincere, as nothing in the scenario says whether or not the suspects
are guilty.
4 Introduction
of strategies, i.e. one strategy for each player, such that given that those strategies are
played, no player has an incentive to deviate from the profile. To put it otherwise, a
Nash equilibrium is a best response to itself. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the unique
Nash equilibrium is again where both players play Y . – In any other entry in the ma-
trix (i.e. in any other profile) at least one player has an ‘incentive’ to deviate from that
profile. However, in a great many other games, the steady-state interpretation yields
very different answers from the deductive interpretation.
For example, in so-called ‘pure coordination games’ like that in Figure 2, the de-
ductive interpretation cannot make any prediction, since L and R are symmetric for
both players. However, only (L,L) and (R,R) are Nash equilibria. From the point of
L R
L 1, 1 0, 0
R 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 2: A pure coordination game
view of the deductive interpretation then, the steady-state interpretation makes some
kinds of additional assumptions, that arguably should be integrated into the description
of the game. The steady-state interpretation is sometimes taken to assume tacitly some
notion of repetition of the scenario being represented.4 However, repetition itself sub-
stantively changes the game5. So perhaps communications or signals of some kind, for
example those underlying Aumann’s [1974] notion of correlated equilibrium, might be
the best way to understand the steady-state interpretation of game theory.
Our interest almost throughout this work will be focused on the conceptually clearer
deductive interpretation of game theory. So we in general have in mind a ‘one-shot’
kind of interaction, in which any repetition or communication should be modelled ex-
plicitly as part of the game. (Furthermore, let us remark that we will not have anything
to say about cooperative game theory.) Within the deductive interpretation, we will
look at ‘interactive epistemology’, that is reasoning about beliefs, including about be-
liefs concerning beliefs.
Formal interactive epistemology
Alongside mathematical structures that represent the games themselves, we will con-
sider mathematical structures that are intended to formalise the notion of information
4Sometimes the assumption is made more more explicit: “as a given setting gets more and more
common and familiar, it makes [the players] act more and more rationally in that setting” [Aumann,
1985].
5The observation that an arbitrarily repeated prisoner’s dilemma yields a different outcome was
what won Aumann the Nobel prize in economics [Aumann, 2006].
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or belief, and so to get a handle on this talk of strategic reasoning, and indeed of ra-
tionality. These structures, or ‘models’, represent “knowledge or expectations” of the
players.
There is more to rationality and to strategic reasoning than simply having expec-
tations about other players’ behaviour. Those expectations themselves, e.g. player i’s
beliefs about what player j will do, are often derivable from, and must at least be con-
sistent with, some more fundamental beliefs of player i. For instance player i might
herself make the “basic assumption” mentioned in the quotation from Osborne and
Rubinstein, so that i would in particular believe (since it follows from her “assump-
tion”) that player j is rational and reasons strategically, perhaps based on a similar
assumption.
We prefer to use the term ‘belief’ rather than ‘knowledge’ for a number of reasons.
Firstly, we sometimes want to allow for the information the players have to be incor-
rect. (Or if information has by definition to be correct, then we are allowing for what
the players think is their information to be incorrect.) Furthermore, we prefer the con-
ceptual position which holds that given that the game itself somehow represents ‘real’
possibilities, the players do not know of any of the possibilities that it will not occur:
if you know that your opponent will not play a certain move, then arguably that move
should not be included.6 Using the terminology of Brandenburger [2007], we take a
belief-based approach to game theory, that he outlines as follows:
“[O]nly observables are knowable. Unobservables are subject to belief,
not knowledge. In particular, other players’ strategies are unobservables,
and only moves are observables.” (op.cit., p. 489)
However, this choice of ours need not be taken to reflect any deep philosophical
or epistemological point, and much of what we say about belief will also hold for
knowledge. One almost indisputable property of knowledge, that clearly distinguishes
it from belief, is that it is a ‘factive mental state operator’ [Williamson, 2000]: that if
one knows something, then it is true. Plato’s definition of knowledge, as justified true
belief, has been shown to be wanting by Gettier’s famous counterexamples, but it is
certainly not controversial to maintain that it is a necessary condition, for a belief to be
knowledge, that it be true.
If we were to insist that all beliefs modelled were true, perhaps we could call them
‘knowledge’. Indeed, if the reader particularly likes the term ‘knowledge’, and is un-
persuaded by the above-cited view of Brandenburger, then she can substitute it for
‘true belief’ wherever she likes. Most of the results that we establish for belief hold
for always-true belief and so, for such a reader, for knowledge. (Indeed everything in
Chapters 1 and 2 holds reading ‘knowledge’ in the place of ‘true belief’; Chapters 3
and 4 make more fundamental use of the belief-based approach.)
A formal logical approach to studying the notions of knowledge and beliefs was
instigated by Hintikka [1962], using so-called ‘modal logic’. And game theorists, most
6To fully motivate this line of argument we would have to say that if there is ‘common knowledge’
that s will not be played then there is no reason to include s in the description of the game.
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notably Aumann [1976], have independently developed formal models for knowledge
and beliefs along the same lines.
Some crucial limitations to Hintikka’s work have since been overcome. For exam-
ple, Hintikka writes that “I do not know how to characterize the notion of occasion
exhaustively” (op.cit., p. 7), whereas the semantics that were soon to be developed
for modal logic (pre-empting the epistemic models introduced in the game-theoretical
literature) furnish precisely such a characterisation. The logical approach, and the
knowledge and belief models proposed in the game theory literature, were for a long
time what we will call ‘static’. That is, “[t]here cannot be any question of increasing
one’s factual knowledge”; what is more, the only assertions about beliefs or knowledge
that are susceptible to the formal analysis proposed there are those “made on one and
the same occasion” ([Hintikka, 1962]). Yet Sorensen [2009] is able to write that
“just as it is easier for an Eskimo to observe an arctic fox when it moves,
we often get a better understanding of the knower dynamically, when he is
in the process of gaining or losing knowledge.”
Even if that quotation does describe the situation a little too colourfully (metaphorically
speaking), still the change of beliefs and knowledge is an important phenomenon, and
we will relate it to our study of games.
An important concept in interactive epistemology is that of ‘common knowledge’,
which we can think of as a special case of ‘common belief’. A fact is commonly
believed (by a group) if everybody (in that group) believes it, they all believe that they
all believe it, and so on. (Actually we will see in Chapter 1 that this ‘and so on’ hides
some subtleties.) [1976] presents a formalisation of common knowledge. The concept
had already been discussed in [Lewis, 1969] and indeed formalised in [Friedell, 1969]
(under the name ‘common opinion’).7
We just saw a very small game, prisoner’s dilemma, in which both players can, on
the basis of their rationality alone, eliminate strategies and so arrive at a conclusion
of what they will do. So in that game, any information that the players might have
concerning the rationality of the other player is entirely irrelevant for them to decide
how to play. Now consider the slightly larger game in Figure 3. Here a similar piece of
L C R
U 2, 2 0, 1 2, 0
M 1, 3 2, 2 2, 1
D 0, 0 1, 3 3, 1
Figure 3: A game where higher-order beliefs about rationality are important
reasoning as in the case of prisoner’s dilemma (Figure 1) means that the column player,
7In [Aumann, 1976] the author was apparently unaware of these earlier works, and can be credited
with bringing the importance of the concept to the attention of game-theorists. Dov Samet drew our
attention to [Friedell, 1969]; maybe it will soon be common belief who first formalised common belief.
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b, will not play R if he is rational. For no matter what his opponent a does (either U ,
M or D), he would be better off playing C than R. That is, C strictly dominates R. In
the kind of formal notation that we will use in Chapter 2, this fact, that b’s rationality
entails not playing R, might be written as:
rb → ¬R. (1)
The formula (1) is understood as being true everywhere in any model of the game,
since it does not depend on any factors exogenous to the game.
What about player a, are there any similarly ‘stupid’ moves for her? Not really:
that is, none of U , M or D are strictly dominated. However, suppose that a has the
information that b is rational. That is, in some formal notation:
arb. (2)
The formula (2) is not necessarily true everywhere in every model, since it is conceiv-
able that player a might believe that player b is not rational. But (without going into
detail of the definitions of different kinds of models, which are to be found in Chapters
1, 2 and 3), it can be true somewhere in a model, let’s say at some ‘state’. Suppose
furthermore that a is able to draw inferences so that when some implication A → B
is true everywhere in the model, and she (at some state) believes A, then she (at that
same state) believes B (technically: if her belief modality is monotonic). Then clearly,
at any state where (2) holds, we will have
a¬R (3)
That is: a has the information that b will not play R. But in this case, a’s rationality
means that she will not play D, since no matter what b plays that is compatible with
a’s information (i.e. L or C), a would be better of playing M .
So, writing ∧ for ‘and’, we have
(ra ∧arb)→ ¬D (4)
But this reasoning can go on, in the sense that if b believes that a is rational, and
that a believes b is rational, we find that b¬D, i.e. b now would have the information
that a will play U or M . In which case b’s rationality would mean not playing C.
Still we are not finished: it actually turns out that if players all are rational and
commonly believe in each other’s rationality, then in this game they can only play
outcomes that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In this
particular game that means playing according to (U,L).
This sort of result, that illustrates the connection between the deductive approach
to game theory and its epistemic analysis, has been established in [Bernheim, 1984;
Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1988].
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Contributions we will make
That brief sample of ideas from game theory and from interactive epistemology can
really only serve to whet the appetite: many more aspects to both topics are introduced
throughout the various parts of this Thesis. We now try to summarise what we will
add, in each of the Chapters that follow: what contribution each Chapter makes.
Chapter 1 In the first Chapter we will generalise some of the results from the liter-
ature we just mentioned, relating mutual belief in rationality with the iterated elimi-
nation of non-optimal strategies. Section 1.1 introduces all of the technical definitions
related to strategic games and optimality operators. Section 1.2 gives a full heuristic
treatment of the rest of the Chapter, avoiding as much as possible technical details. We
find that to be necessary because there are a number of subtleties involved. Still let us
attempt to summarise here what we will do in the technical part of the Chapter. First of
all, we generalise the result mentioned above about common belief of rationality to the
infinite case (Theorems 1.1 and 1.2). Then we consider, as did Tan and Werlang [1988]
for the finite case, arbitrary stages along the way to full common belief. This involves
employing a distinction between two different forms of common belief, and borrowing
from the literature non-standard ‘neighbourhood’ models of beliefs in order to distin-
guish for example between mutual belief to depth ω0 and to depth ω0 + 1, where ω0 is
the first infinite ordinal. We use the fact that we can make this kind of distinction in
neighbourhood models to show that there is a model where for every stage, including
the transfinite stages, of iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies, there is some
information that ‘rationalises’ it. That is Theorem 1.5, where the model we provide
is actually a topological neighbourhood model, meaning that the only difference be-
tween it and a standard model is that players might fail to put together large amounts
of information. That is, they might have many pieces of information ϕ1, ϕ2, . . ., and
thereby also have all finite implications of this information, while still failing to draw
all the conclusions that might be possible when considering all the φn’s.
More generally, neighbourhood models allow for the case where a player does not
put her information together, even finitarily. So for example she might believe that ϕ
and believe that ϕ → ψ (that ϕ entails ψ) and still not believe that ψ. Equivalently:
neighbourhood models allow for a situation where a player believes ϕ and believes
ψ without believing their conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ. Thus they are even more ‘permissive’
than topological models, which only allow that players fail to put together infinite
amounts of information. Neighbourhood models therefore provide some way to model
imperfection of reasoning, where reasoning might be constrained by the nature of the
player who for example does not have time to put together her information. In any case,
we show that under certain rather weak conditions about introspectivity of beliefs, even
this kind of neighbourhood models are enough to prove the kind of result we obtained
already for the relational model case. The two different conditions we consider yield
two Theorems: 1.3 and 1.4.
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Chapter 2 In the next Chapter we introduce formal logical languages, like those
used by Hintikka, for reasoning about beliefs. Taking as a starting point arguments
from Aumann [1999], we look at a number of reasons for using formal languages
in epistemic analysis: for making a distinction between syntax and semantics. One
of the arguments that we give in favour of using modal languages in game-theoretic
analyses, is that these languages are appropriately local. We catalogue many choices
that can be made at the level of the language, usually sticking within the realm of modal
languages, though some of them are just notational variants of for example first-order
logic. We address the question of definability of key notions from game theory, like
rationality and common belief. We also spend considerable space on a foundational
question concerning the existence of a suitably ‘large’ belief model. That is, we study
the property of ‘assumption-completeness’ introduced in [Brandenburger and Keisler,
2006]. This leads us to introduce the ‘type-space models’ used in that work, and to
show how they are related to the more standard state-space models. A two-player
type-space model is assumption-complete for a language if for every sentence of that
language that defines a set B of b’s types, there is an a type where a’s information is
precisely B. (Assumption-completeness is related to the ‘comprehension schema’ in
set theory.) We examine what assumption-completeness means in state-space models.
The principal technical contribution of the Chapter is to prove (Theorem 2.4) that for
infinitary modal languages there are assumption-complete models.
One of the arguments that we give in favour of using a logical language is that
this facilitates reasoning about events across different models, which is very useful in
introducing dynamics, in any field but in this case into the study of games. The next
two Chapters introduce dynamics into the picture.
Chapter 3 In the first of them, we discuss dynamic epistemic logic, and extend some
results to cover the case of neighbourhood models. That Chapter then returns to strate-
gic games, and explicitly formalises some interactive reasoning process that are com-
patible with the deductive interpretation of game theory. This is one role played by
belief dynamics: as a metaphor for the reasoning or computation that is involved in
arriving at conclusions about games. We can think of the game as specifying an initial
epistemic or informational state, further epistemic states being induced by reasoning
from premises saying that the players are rational, reasoning of which we also give a
logical account. We interpret this as a private but common reasoning process. This
attempt to tell a coherent story about the deductive process leads us to look not only
at the ‘hard’ information case but also at ‘soft’ information, i.e. to consider revisable
beliefs. We introduce the notion of a ‘rational equilibrium of beliefs’, by which we
mean a configuration of beliefs that is stable to further deduction, and we argue that in
general using soft information (and so revisable beliefs) is the only way to arrive at a
rational equilibrium of beliefs, at least in the case of some non-monotonic optimality
properties.
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Chapter 4 In the last Chapter we turn our attention to applying logical analyses to
epistemic aspects of extensive-form games. In an extensive form game players do
not, as in the case of strategic games, make their choices entirely independently of
the choices made by the other players. That is, an extensive-form game represents
a decision process that is extended in time, with players making choices one after
the other. The crucial difference in terms of our concerns about beliefs is that the
beliefs of the players can change as the game is played. The main contribution we
make in that Chapter is to offer an analysis of backward induction in terms of beliefs.
In backward induction, players reason about what would happen hypothetically, and
in a large class of games (including so-called ‘generic’ games in which no player is
indifferent between two different outcomes), this purely deductive reasoning will yield
a unique prediction for the game. However, it has been a thorny question exactly what
configuration of beliefs or knowledge is required in order to guarantee that players will
play according to the backward induction prediction. We offer (Theorem 4.1) such
conditions, phrased in terms of dynamics of revisable beliefs, and making crucial use
of a notion of stability of belief, and a forward-looking ‘dynamic’ rationality.
A similar notion of ‘rational equilibrium of beliefs’ arises in this context, and we
use this notion to reason about a simplified version of so-called trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium, that we call even-handed, that is a refinement of the usual notion. We
suggest that belief revision policies, in concert with lexicographic rationality, are a
useful way to think about various solution concepts. Finally, we close the last Chapter
by pointing to some limitations of our existing analysis of extensive games in terms
of dynamic epistemic logic, specifically that it does not yet give a coherent account of
strategic communication.
Origin of the material
This work integrates and builds upon some of my major collaborations over the last
three years, when it has been a privilege, as well as very enjoyable, to work with co-
authors whom I would like to thank deeply. All errors of presentation and content
naturally remain my responsibility.
• Most of the ideas from Chapter 1, and Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, are drawn from
[Apt and Zvesper, 2007]. Theorems 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 build on that collaboration
but are original contributions.
• Some parts of Section 2.3 are drawn from [Zvesper and Pacuit, 2010], including
Theorem 2.4, which is a generalisation, to the infinitary case, of (op.cit., Theo-
rem 2.6).
• Much of Section 4.2, including Theorem 4.1, is drawn from [Baltag et al., 2009];
furthermore, some of the ideas sketched in Section 4.3 are based on work in
progress with the authors of that paper.
Chapter 1
Believing Rationality in Arbitrary Games
“To infinity, and beyond!”
– Buzz Lightyear
[Lasseter, 1995]
This Chapter examines mutual belief of rationality in one-shot interaction situations.
Like all but parts of the last Chapter of this Thesis, this Chapter is concerned with
a purely deductive interpretation, rather than with any element of steady-state inter-
pretation, of game theory. So we consider what conclusions players can draw from
a relatively minimal amount of information. That information will concern just the
(instrumental) rationality of the other players, (where, recall, a player is instrumentally
rational just if she acts in her best interest according to her information), and higher-
order information about that information.
Thus we look at what it means for players to be rational, and to believe that the other
players are rational, to believe that the other players believe that the other players are
rational, etc. The most substantial contributions of this Chapter are to generalise some
standard results from the game-theoretical literature, that connect the different levels
of mutual belief in rationality with numbers of rounds of elimination of sub-optimal
strategies. That generalisation has three parts to it:
1. As we explain in a moment, our theorems cover a broad class of optimality
notions.
2. They also cover infinite games, where the results in the literature generally look
at finite games.
3. Finally, we consider a larger class of models for beliefs, which means that we
make very few assumptions about the ways players put their beliefs together. In
terminology that we introduce later in the chapter:
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(a) We allow for the case of ‘relational’ belief models in which players need
not be ‘positively or negatively introspective’.
(b) We also allow for the more general case of ‘neighbourhood’ belief models,
in which players not only lack those introspection properties, but also do
not necessarily ‘put their beliefs together’, i.e. believe all the things that
follow from their beliefs.
If everybody believes some proposition E, then we say that there is mutual belief
of E’; if everybody believes that everybody believes that E, we say there is second-
level mutual belief of E, and so on. If there is mutual belief of E on all levels, this is
called common belief of E.1 As we will see, this definition can be made formal in two
ways, depending on whether one includes only all finite levels of mutual belief, or ar-
bitrary levels of belief, including levels for transfinite ordinals. That distinction is not
usually made in the game-theoretical literature, and the models for beliefs commonly
used there do not allow for the distinction to be made. Aumann [1976] was the first to
formalise a notion of common knowledge (or as we might say: common true belief),
and in his framework of ‘partition structures’ the distinction cannot be made, nor can
it be made in the more general case of ‘relational models’. However, it is possible
to make this distinction in other, yet more general, ‘neighbourhood’ and ‘topological’
models for beliefs. We will exploit this distinction when we look at different levels of
mutual belief of rationality in infinite games.
Rationality can be defined in many different ways, depending on what notion of
‘optimality’ is used by the players. In turn those different notions of optimality induce
operators that reduce the game matrix by eliminating sub-optimal strategies. The first
way in which our results are a generalisation of existing ones is that they are phrased
not in terms of a specific optimality operator but always in more general terms.
So the results that we will prove all establish, roughly speaking, something of the
form:
(?) Rationality plus α-level mutual belief in rationality is equivalent to all players
avoiding strategies that are eliminated within 1 + α rounds of elimination of
non-optimal strategies.
The second generalisation is that we allow for the possibility that there might be
an infinite number of objects of choice for any of the players, i.e. we give results for
games with arbitrary strategy sets. Thus when we write α above, we mean it to refer
to an arbitrary (possibly infinite) ordinal.2 We will show why this entails, for one
direction of the ‘equivalence’ established by our theorems, considering neighbourhood
1What we call ‘mutual belief’ is sometimes called ‘general belief’ in the literature. Note that, ac-
cording to our terminology, mutual belief is in general not the same thing as common belief.
2Finite ordinals are just natural numbers 1, 2, . . .. Transfinite ordinals are studied in set theory [De-
vlin, 1993], and their arithmetic is not the same as that for finite ordinals, so that in particular for infinite
ordinals α = 1 + α 6= α + 1. Therefore (as we explain in Section 1.2 below) it is crucial that we write
‘1 + α’ in formulating the various theorems we prove.
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and topological models. This in turn means that we will have to define what it means, in
neighbourhood models, for a player to be rational, i.e. to extend the existing definition
from relational models.
One half of the the final generalisation involves showing that in relational (or indeed
topological) models, no further ‘introspection’ properties are required of players in
order to obtain the result. The other half again involves using neighbourhood models.
In those each player might fail to ‘put together’ her pieces of information, or indeed to
‘draw conclusions’ from her information: formally, her information neighbourhoods
need not be closed for intersection, and need not be monotonic. Here we present
two options in order to get our equivalence. The first is to introduce the new notion
of ‘co-mutual’ belief, that we show is enough on neighbourhood models to get (?)
with ‘co-mutual belief’ replacing ‘belief’ even if players do not have any introspection
properties. The second is to show that with just one minimal introspection property,
we can get the result on neighbourhood models.
Background literature
The starting point in game theory for our own small contributions here are [Bernheim,
1984; Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1988]. Those papers each show the connection
between mutual belief of rationality and the elimination of non-optimal strategies. All
of them consider only finite games, and each focuses on only one type of optimality.
The more abstract approach of arbitrary monotonic operators, and the generalisation to
infinite games, is studied in [Apt, 2007a].
On the side of interactive epistemology, there was some work on formal episte-
mology in the modal logic tradition, started by [Hintikka, 1962]. Aumann brought the
attention of game theorists to the notion of common knowledge, by providing an ele-
gant formulation of it and theorem about it [Aumann, 1976]. As we have said, it turns
out that there are different ways to define common knowledge for infinitary cases; this
fact was first established by [Barwise, 1988], and discussed further in [Heifetz, 1999;
Benthem and Sarenac, 2004].
Barwise’s ‘situation semantics’ framework was shown in [Lismont, 1994] to be
equivalent to using ‘neighbourhood models’, developed in [Scott, 1970], and discussed
in the textbook [Chellas, 1980]. A modern logical model-theoretic approach to neigh-
bourhood models is presented in [Hansen et al., 2009]. [Heifetz, 1996] also studied
common belief on neighbourhood models.
Topological models for modal logic, that we also use below, originate in the work of
McKinsey and Tarski [1944], and are studied from a contemporary logical perspective
in [Benthem and Bezhanishvili, 2007]. They are used for epistemic logic in [Ben-
them and Sarenac, 2004], where again the distinction between two different varieties
of common belief is drawn.
Finally let us remark that since players in neighbourhood models do not necessar-
ily put their information together, using neighbourhood models to represent players’
beliefs is a partial way to address the problem of ‘logical omniscience’, i.e. the prob-
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lem that players believe all logical validities. We do not pursue that connection further
here, and so do not entertain either of the two classical ways of addressing logical om-
niscience: the use of so-called ‘impossible worlds’ [Hintikka, 1975] or the distinction
between implicit knowledge, which is logically omniscient, and explicit knowledge
which is not [Fagin et al., 1995].
Organisation of the Chapter
In Section 1.1, we spend some time going over standard definitions for game theory,
including of strategic games.3 In that Section we do not yet make any novel contri-
butions. We present there the ‘optimality operator’ approach, and we show how the
optimality operators can be instantiated by a number of concepts familiar from game
theory, including avoiding strategies that are strictly dominated, and so on. Each con-
cept can induce a number of different optimality operators depending on some details,
including whether we consider pure or mixed strategies, and so on. (We also discuss
mixed strategies and the connection, sometimes made in the literature, between them
and beliefs.)
Then in Section 1.2 we give, avoiding as much as possible technical details, an ex-
planation of the theorems that we will prove in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. In Section 1.3 we
introduce formally the relational models of belief, and mention the introspection prop-
erties often attributed to players. The theorems in that Section relate common belief of
rationality to the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies. So in Section 1.3 we
consider full common belief of rationality, which corresponds to finishing the process
of iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies. But the elimination algorithm works
in a stage-wise fashion, and we are interested in finding correlates on the epistemic side
for each state in the process. In Section 1.4 we therefore look at intermediate (possibly
transfinite) stages. As we explain in more detail in the heuristic treatment in Section 1.2
leads us to use neighbourhood models for belief, this means we have to use neighbour-
hood models for belief, and we prove the mentioned correspondence between α-level
mutual belief in rationality with 1 +α rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies.
To re-iterate: Section 1.1 mainly repeats material that could be familiar to the reader
well-versed in game theory, so such a reader might prefer to skip that Section except
for looking briefly at the definition of optimality operator (Definition 1.2) and outcome
ordinal (Definition 1.3).
1.1 Strategic games and optimality operators
As a preliminary to the material in this chapter, we will make formal our talk from the
Introduction of strategic games and game reduction operations.
3The small games we looked at in the Introduction were all strategic games. Strategic games are also
sometimes called “games in normal form”, for example by von Neumann and Morgenstern [Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944] in their foundational work on game theory, to which the field owes its existence.
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Recall that strategic games are intended to represent one-shot simultaneous-choice
interactions. So there will be a set N of players, and each player i ∈ N will have a
set of ‘choices’ or ‘strategies’ denoted Ti. These will be unanalysed, primitive objects
in the definition of strategic game. The set of strategy profiles or outcomes, denoted
T , is then just the Cartesian product
∏
i∈N Ti: an outcome specifies what strategy each
player chose.
The other ingredient will be the preferences, or ‘utilities’, of the players in N over
the outcomes. We will allow strategic games to be defined with ordinal preferences
or with cardinal preferences. With ordinal preferences, we state that players have a
consistent ‘preference order’ over all possible outcomes of the game. This boils down
to saying that given two possible outcomes, they can say which one, if either, they
prefer, in such a way that we cannot catch them out as preferring a over b, b over
c and c over a. That players have consistent ordinal preferences is of course a non-
trivial statement, but it is a little less drastic than assuming that players have cardinal
preferences, which says that the players assign a particular real number (element of the
continuum) to every possible outcome of the game. Cardinal preferences over a set of
outcomes T naturally induce ordinal preferences: if the value i assigns to a is greater
than i assigns to b then i prefers a over b. But cardinal preferences are strictly more
expressive than ordinal preferences: clearly different cardinal preferences can induce
the same ordinal preferences. (For example where T is {a, b}, if i assigns 2 to a and 3
to b this is ordinally equivalent to i assigning 0 to a and 300 to b.)
Nonetheless, ordinal preferences will be sufficient for almost all of our purposes,
and are conceptually a little less questionable than cardinal preferences. Throughout
this thesis we will prefer to talk about games with ordinal preferences, though some-
times (for example in the present Chapter when we will talk about optimality operators
from the literature which involve mixed strategies) we are forced to talk of games with
cardinal preferences. Furthermore, sometimes when defining a game it is easier to
write down cardinal preferences than ordinal preferences, but they can be thought as
simply a shorthand notation for what is really an ordinal preference relation.
Definition 1.1. Fix some set of players N .
1. A strategic game with cardinal preferences for N is a tuple (Ti, pii)i∈N , where
Ti is player i’s set of ‘choices’, also called her ‘strategies’, and pii : T → R is
her ‘payoff function’.
2. a strategic game with ordinal preferences (sometimes in this Chapter and the
next just called a game), is a tuple (Ti,≥i)i∈N , where each ≥i is a total order
relation over T .4
3. T =
∏
i∈N Ti is the set of strategy profiles or outcomes.
4I.e. a total transitive antisymmetric relation. We write >i for the strict version of the relation (s >i
t iff s ≥i t & t 6≥i s).
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There are two natural ways to define subgames. Firstly, as tuples (Si)i∈N with
Si ⊆ Ti of subsets of the strategy sets in the original game; these we will call subgames
(we do not include the preference information in the definition of a subgame, so a
subgame only makes sense as a game in the context of the original game of which it is
a subgame). The second way would be to define them as subsets S ⊆ T of the strategy
profiles in the original game; these we will call restrictions. Any subgame (Si)i∈N
defines a restriction:
∏
i∈N Si. Conversely, it is only ‘rectangular’ subsets S ⊆ T
(restrictions) that are definable in this way. For example if the original strategies were
({U,D}, {L,R}), then the restriction S = {(U,L), (D,R)} clearly is not definable by
any subgame. Although in this Chapter we will mainly be interested only in rectangular
restrictions, still we often use restrictions just because they are sometimes notationally
easier.
We need to introduce a few useful pieces of standard notation for manipulating
strategies and restrictions. For any player i, we write T−i to mean
∏
j∈N−{i} Tj . And
given any si ∈ Ti and s−i ∈ T−i, by (si, s−i) we mean the relevant element in T .
Similarly, given Si ⊆ Ti and S−i ⊆ T−i, the expression Si × S−i denotes the relevant
subset of T . Given a restriction S, for any player i, we write Si to mean the set of i’s
strategies occurring in some profile in S:
Si = {si ∈ Ti | ∃s−i ∈ T−i : (si, s−i) ∈ S},
and also extend this notation to S−i in the analogous way. Sometimes we will refer in-
terchangeably to a rectangular restriction and its corresponding subgame, so we could
write for example (when the set N of players is irrelevant or clear from the context)
(T,≥) to refer to the game (Ti,≥i)i∈N .
Let us adapt a motivating example from [Morgenstern, 1928] (actually we entirely
change the story, but the message is similar). Suppose Sherlock Holmes and his neme-
sis Moriarty are on a train from London which will stop only at Canterbury and Dover.
The latter has a gun and hopes therefore to catch the former, and so wants to alight at
the same stop as him. Holmes on the other hand, who has no way to defend himself
save his cunning, wishes to evade capture, and so wants to alight at a different stop.
Apart from that, Holmes would prefer not to stay on the train very long, because if
he evades Moriarty he would like to return to London that evening. Moriarty on the
other hand hopes to escape to France, so staying on this train to Dover is his preferred
option. We can describe the game as follows:
N = {h,m}
Th = Tm = {D,C}
(C,D) >h (D,C) >h (C,C) ∼h (D,D)
(D,D) >m (C,C) >m (C,D) >m (D,C)
Here the players are h (Holmes) and m (Moriarty), the strategies for either are D
and C (Dover or Canterbury), and so the outcomes are e.g. (C,C) they both alight in
Canterbury, or (C,D) Holmes alights at Canterbury, evading Moriarty who remains on
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the train until Dover. The preferences are faithful to the story, so that for example for
Moriarty the best option is for both Holmes and he to alight at Dover so that the evil
mastermind can shoot the detective and hop aboard a ferry to the Continent.
We could also denote the situation as a game with cardinal preferences as in Fig-
ure 1.1, where Holmes is the row player (choosing the row), and Moriarty the column
player. What option will the players choose? Actually neither option for either player
C D
C 0, 2 2, 1
D 1, 0 0, 3
Figure 1.1: The game Holmes and Moriarty are playing.
would be ruled out by any of the ‘optimality’ operators we consider later; intuitively
this is because none of the options are obviously irrational. Indeed this is an example
where a one-shot analysis of the situation does not have much to say. Holmes’ fa-
mously flawless and yet insightful logic should reveal to him what is the best solution
in his dilemma: alight at Canterbury or stay on until Dover. Let us imagine a dialogue
between Holmes and Watson5.
Watson: Moriarty wants to go to Dover, therefore you should alight at
Canterbury, and live to capture that swine on a later date.
Holmes: How simple-minded you are sometimes Watson. Apparently
you have forgotten with whom we are dealing. Do you really think that
Moriarty is not able to put himself in my shoes, and to reason in precisely
that way?
W: Oh yes I see Holmes, so you mean you should alight at Dover, because
Moriarty knows that you know that he wants to go there, and so will expect
you to alight at Canterbury, and so will alight there to try to catch you.
How clever you are, to out-think him that way.
H: Again Watson you are not thinking enough. Moriarty will be able to
perform that reasoning as well. . .
W: So you mean I was correct before, but for the wrong reasons: alight at
Canterbury, also that way you can be back in time for tea!
H: (Sighs) I fear you are not getting my point.
What is Holmes’ point? The fact is that if there were some deductive reasoning that
could lead Holmes to see that C (or D) was the best option, then since Holmes’ op-
ponent is also highly intelligent, Moriarty could also follow that reasoning, thereby
alighting at C (respectively D), and shooting Holmes. In which case clearly Holmes’
reasoning did not in fact lead him to the best option.
5We mercilessly misrepresent the characters of Holmes and Watson to fit stereotype rather than their
actual nature in the books by Conan Doyle. Also, for the sake of our story, recall that the cunning
detective’s trusty side-kick is not present.
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Therefore since Holmes cannot make a decision based purely on deduction, he is
forced to throw reason to the wind and alight wherever his intuition tells him to. I.e., he
cannot actually make the decision, but, if we assume that Moriarty would be capable of
re-creating Holmes’ reasoning, the best option for Holmes appears to be that he must
randomise between the two options.
That is, Holmes should play a so-called mixed strategy. In the case of games with
ordinal preferences, mixed strategies would simply be sets of strategies; in this case
since there are only two options, {D,C} is Holmes’ mixed strategy. Mixed strategy
profiles, that specify a mixed strategy for each player i ∈ N , are in this case just sub-
games of the original game. There would be several different ways to lift the existing
preference relation over pure strategy profiles to a relation over mixed strategy pro-
files. It is not clear what grounds to use to choose among the different liftings, but
we do not pursue this matter further, since mixed strategies are generally only consid-
ered in the case of cardinal preferences, where a much more fine-grained distinction
between mixed strategies is available. Indeed the literature generally only considers
mixed strategies in terms of cardinal utility (see for example [Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994, Chapter 3]), so we will take ‘mixed strategy’ to imply that the underlying game
is one of cardinal utility.
For games with cardinal preferences, mixed strategies are more complicated enti-
ties: in these games, a mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over Ti.
(A probability distribution over Ti, for finite Ti, is a function σ : Ti → [0, 1] such that∑
si∈Ti σ(si) = 1.) There is a debate in the literature of game theory as to how to inter-
pret mixed strategies. We favour taking them simply to mean that the player literally
randomises over his choices with the relevant probabilities, but this only colours the
way we talk about them, and not the content of any theorems we prove that relate to
them.
Another common interpretation has it that mixed strategies really represent a belief
by the opponents about how a player will play. This is argued for in for example
[Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995]. While we recognise that one can represent some
elements of a player’s beliefs as a mixed strategy, still to say that the mixed strategy
that a player actually players is a belief by the opponents is a superficial treatment
of the notion of belief. If a player i plays a mixed strategy σ, it would mean that all
of the players have the same belief regarding i’s behaviour. More importantly, such
a simplistic approach means that any kind of higher-order belief (i’s belief about j’s
belief) collapses. This, as we indicate in Chapter 4, might well make sense in an
equilibrium where all beliefs become common belief. So it arguably fits with some
steady-state interpretation of game theory (and it is indeed Nash equilibrium, and so a
steady-state interpretation, that is considered in [Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995]).
However, clearly it does not suit the deductive approach that should be applied to truly
one-shot interaction situations.
To repeat: in the deductive approach, playing a mixed strategy should really mean
randomising, with the allotted probabilities, between the different options, and does not
represent a belief or ‘conjecture’ by the other players about what the one player will
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do. We do not want always to assume that the players have this option to randomise.
Indeed, if this option is available to the players then we might want to say that really
they are in a bigger game, the so-called ‘mixed extension’ of the original game, in
which the strategies are the mixed strategies from the original, and the payoffs are
given by what is called the “expected utility” function.
For finite Si, we write ∆Si to mean the set of probability distributions over Si.
Then in a game with cardinal preferences the set of mixed strategies of player i is ∆Ti,
Generally we will use σ to refer to mixed strategy profiles (yielding a mixed strategy
σi ∈ ∆Ti for each player i). The canonical way to extend a utility function over
pure strategy profiles to a utility function over mixed strategy profiles, that defines the
preferences in the mixed extension, uses the notion of “expected utility” (that might
better just be called “mixed utility”):
µi(σ) =
∑
s∈T
σ(s) · pii(s).
Note that we cannot without some other stipulation extend this definition to the case
where T is infinite. That is because examples can be constructed in which the expected
utility of a given strategy profile would be infinite. So we will assume in general, when
we talk about expected utility and mixed strategies, that there are a finite set of strate-
gies. (Another solution is to consider only probability distributions with finite support,
i.e. in which only a finite number of strategies are assigned non-zero probability, or to
place some restriction that excludes ‘badly-behaved’ utility functions, but we do not
need to go into any further detail here.)
Pure strategies are in effect simply ‘degenerate’ cases of mixed strategies, in which
all of the probability mass is assigned to a single element, and sometimes we will
write a term si denoting a pure strategy to mean the corresponding mixed strategy that
associates probability 1 to si, and 0 to all other of i’s pure strategies. (So in set-theoretic
notation it would be the function {(si, 1)} ∪ ((Ti − {si})× {0})).
The next concept we need to formalise in this Section is that of game reduction
operators, or ‘optimality operators’. An optimality operator for player i is supposed to
say which strategies i should ‘throw out’ on the grounds that they are sub-optimal. We
want our approach to be as generic as possible, and so while many specific optimality
operators exist, the results we will present in this Chapter will hold for optimality
operators that satisfy a certain condition of monotonicity. An individual optimality
operator6 for player i takes a game and a restriction and returns a set of strategies.
Definition 1.2. An individual optimality operators for player i is any (class-)function
that, given a game G = (Tj,≥j)j∈N with i ∈ N and a restriction S ⊆ T , returns a set
S ′i ⊆ Ti of i’s strategies.
6We sometimes omit the word ‘individual’, which is there to distinguish it from ‘collective’ optimal-
ity operators that we introduce shortly.
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Often it will be convenient to fix a game G and to consider optimality operators as
functions OGi : 2
T → 2Ti . (And sometimes when G is clear from the context we will
drop the superscript G.)
This definition is of course a little too abstract to really capture any notion of opti-
mality. In actual examples optimality operators will be defined in terms of the players’
preferences, and will capture the notion that optimal choices are in some sense pre-
ferred over sub-optimal choices. We will give examples of such optimality operators
later in this Section, but first let us give two important properties of optimality opera-
tors that we will consider:
An operator O is contracting if for all restrictions S, O(S) ⊆ S. And O is mono-
tonic if for all restrictions S and S ′, if S ⊆ S ′ then Oi(S) ⊆ Oi(S ′).
The idea behind the argument given to the individual optimality operator for a par-
ticular game is that it is intended to represent the restriction of the game that the player
thinks she is actually playing in. This will become more formal when we introduce
belief models in Section 1.3 to capture the idea of a player ‘thinking’ (or rather, ‘be-
lieving’) something. For now the operators remain purely algorithmic, or procedural.
We will be interested in combining them and in iterating the resulting operator, that
we will call a collective optimality operator, or sometimes (again) just an ‘optimality
operator’. So given a family of individual optimality operators (Oi)i∈N , let O denote
the operator from restrictions to restrictions, i.e. O : 2T → 2T , defined as follows:
O(S) =
∏
i∈N
Oi(S).
Clearly if each Oi is contracting or monotonic then O is contracting or, respectively,
monotonic with respect to the component-wise subset ordering.
Optimality operators actually operate only on rectangular restrictions, and collec-
tive operators return rectangular restrictions. So we could have defined them in terms
of subgames, as for example in [Apt, 2007c]. We prefer the more general formulation
in terms of restrictions simply because it fits better with the rest of our notation.
Fixing some game G, we will be interested in iterations of this collective operator,
starting with the largest restriction, that corresponds to the initial game. LetON denote
the class of all ordinals; then given some game G = (T,≥) and an optimality operator
O for α ∈ ON , Oα is the operation corresponding to α applications of O. Precisely, it
is defined as follows, where (and this is a convention we maintain throughout) β is an
arbitrary ordinal and λ a limit ordinal:
O0(T ) = T
Oβ+1(T ) = O(Oβ(T ))
Oλ(T ) =
⋂
β<λO
β(T )
To make the notation more elegant, we often, when it is clear from the context what T
in question, write simply Oα for Oα(T ).
1.1. Strategic games and optimality operators 21
A restriction S is a fixpoint of O if O(S) = S. Assume fixed some game G =
(T,<). Then for α ∈ ON with Oα(T ) a fixpoint, we call that (obviously unique)
Oα(T ) the outcome of O on G, and denote it by O∞G .7
Definition 1.3. If G = (T,<), then we call the least ordinal α such that Oα(T ) = O∞G
the O-outcome ordinal of G, and write it αOG.
For each ordinal α and optimality operator O, the result of iterating O α times is
a ‘solution concept’, to use the terminology of game theory. The most commonly-
considered such solution concept, for a given optimality operator, is its outcome. In
Section 1.3 we will be interested in the outcomes of (collective) optimality operators,
and will make appeal to Fact 1.1.2.
Fact 1.1. We are guaranteed that, for any game G:
1. If O is contracting then it has an outcome (because T is a set).
2. If O is monotonic then it has an outcome, which is the largest fixpoint
⋃{S ⊆
T | S ⊆ O(S)} (immediate corollary of [Tarski, 1955, Theorem 1]).
Note that while if an operator is contracting it need not be monotonic, or vice-versa,
still the outcome of a monotonic operator and its ‘contracting version’ coincide, in the
sense that given some monotonic operator O, and defining O(S) = S ∩ O(S) as its
contracting version, we have the following Fact (cf. [Apt, 2007b, Note 1]).
Fact 1.2. For any α ∈ ON , Oα = Oα.
We can now look at some particular instances of optimality operators from the
game-theoretical literature, where each different optimality notion has several different
specific instantiations.
The first group of operators that we will look at are those induced by the elimination
of strictly dominated strategies. A strategy si is strictly dominated by a strategy s′i in
the context of S−i if
∀s−i ∈ S−i, (s′i, s−i) >i (si, s−i).
(For cardinal utility and mixed strategies, simply replace, here and in the rest of the
Chapter, (s′i, s−i) >i (si, s−i) by µi(s
′
i, s−i) > µi(si, s−i).) We write nsdi(si, s
′
i, S−i)
to mean that si is not strictly dominated by s′i in the context of S−i. Now there are
several ways in which we can use this property to induce an operator, which will all
have the following form, with different instantiations for A and B:
OGi (S) = {si ∈ A | ∀s′i ∈ B, nsdi(si, s′i, S−i)}.
7We thus use the same word ‘outcome’ for both the outcomes of a game and the outcome of the
iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies. We do not anticipate that this will cause any confusion,
but note of course that the outcome of iterated elimination will in general not yield a single outcome in
the other sense.
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Now there appear to be eight different versions of this operator given by instantiating
A with either Si or Ti, and B with one of Si, Ti, ∆Si or ∆Ti (where, as we assume
throughout, G = (Ti,≥i)i∈N , or (Ti, pii)i∈N if it is a game with cardinal preferences).
Some of these operators coincide, but let us use them to introduce our terminology,
that we will use for all of the different optimality notions.
If A is instantiated with Si, we call the operator the contracting form (since clearly
then it will be contracting), and if A is instead instantiated with Ti we call it the non-
contracting form (even if it might in fact happen to be contracting). When B is either
Si or ∆Si then we call the resulting operator the local form, and otherwise we call it
the global form. The idea behind the local form will be that player looks only at the
possibilities given by her information about the game in order to determine whether
there is a better strategy to play, and in the global version does not ‘forget’ possibilities
that might be better. The distinction between global and local (and contracting and
non-contracting) optimality operators is due to [Apt, 2007b; 2007c]. The last piece of
terminology is not surprising: if B is either ∆Si or ∆Ti then we talk about the mixed
form, otherwise we talk about the pure form (or just drop the qualifier altogether).
The observation that the contracting form is contracting is obvious, and indeed
clearly holds no matter what property we would put for nsdi. That the global form is
monotonic is only a little less obvious, but essentially just uses the fact that it can be
defined by a formula which is positive in the argument the operator takes.
Our main interest in this Chapter will be in the global forms of the operators, be-
cause in general only the global forms are monotonic. Here and in what follows, by
Fact 1.2, as long as we are only interested in iterations of a monotonic operator from
the initial game, then it does not matter whether we consider the contracting or non-
contracting forms.
Furthermore, since we are considering only these iterations starting from the initial
game, then notice that on finite games (i.e. in which each player’s strategy set Ti is fi-
nite), there are actually only two operators. That is established by [Apt, 2007c, Lemma
2], which implies that on finite games the local and global forms of each of the con-
sidered operators coincide. Therefore the only distinction that remains is between the
mixed forms. A standard example (cf. [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Figure 61.1])
shows the pure and mixed forms do not coincide; see the game illustrated in Figure
1.2. (We read this as a game with cardinal utilities, because there is no way to make
L M R
U 1, 3 1, 0 0, 1
D 0, 0 0, 3 3, 1
Figure 1.2: A finite game distinguishing pure and mixed strict dominance.
the distinction with ordinal mixed strategies) In that game, R for the column player, b,
is not strictly dominated in the context of {U,D} by either of the pure strategies L or
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M , but is strictly dominated in the context of {U,D} by for example the mixed strat-
egy σb with σb(L) = σb(M) = 0.5, since then for any of the row player a’s strategies
sa ∈ {U,D}, we have µb(σb, sa) > µb(sb, sa).
Notice that this example illustrates that neither player actually has to end up play-
ing a mixed strategy for the possibility that they could play a mixed strategy to af-
fect the outcome. Specifically, if we remove R (because it is strictly dominated by
{(L, 0.5), (M, 0.5)}), then D becomes sub-optimal for the row player, since the oppo-
nent is going to play in {L,M}, so we can remove D, and then go on to remove M ,
since in the context of {U} it is the only undominated strategy for the column player.
So then in the outcome, neither player has a choice left, so they play L and U , both
pure strategies. However, the outcome of eliminating strategies dominated by a pure
strategy is the entire game, since no strategy is dominated.
Conditions for the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies on finite
games, in terms of the beliefs (actually they also considered knowledge) were first
given in [Tan and Werlang, 1988], and their result is one that we will generalise below.
The notion of weak dominance is a refinement of strict dominance: a strategy si
can be weakly dominated by s′i in the context of S−i even if for some s−i ∈ S−i, s′i does
not do strictly better against si, as long as it never does worse. The formal definition,
or rather the schema that defines the same forms as in the case of strict dominance, is
as follows: si is weakly dominated by s′i w.r.t S−i, denoted wdi(si, s′i, S−i), if:
∀s−i ∈ S−i, (s′i, s−i) ≥i (si, s−i)
and ∃s−i ∈ S−i, (s′i, s−i) >i (si, s−i).
Now, although weak dominance has prima facie intuitive appeal, it turns out to be a
rather less mathematically well-behaved notion than strict dominance. The first point
to notice, that disqualifies it from the scope of the theorems we will prove in this
Chapter, is that neither its local nor global forms are monotonic. For instance in the
game depicted in Figure 1.3, D is not weakly dominated in the context of {L}, yet in
the context of the larger set {L,R}, it is weakly dominated. It is precisely examples
L R
U 0, 0 1, 0
D 0, 1 0, 0
Figure 1.3: A game illustrating the non-monotonicity of weak dominance.
like this that are ruled out by the monotonicity of an operator, so such examples do not
exist for strict dominance.
In this example, the outcome is ({U}, {L}). Notice though that intuitively speaking
it is not clear why the players would play these choices, given that together they yield
a least preferred option (for both players). In terms of beliefs, the justification should
be that although e.g. the row player believes the column player will play L, still she
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should leave open the possibility that he will play R. That is not something that the
epistemic framework of this Chapter can deal with in general, and it is a topic that we
will return to in the next Chapter, when we look at counterfactual beliefs.
Although we will not consider this next issue in any detail, notice also that there
would be different ways of putting together an operator for weak dominance that would
yield different results. What we mean is that although we have defined collective
optimality operators as the intersection of individual optimality operators, there are
other possible ways of doing this. Taking an intersection effectively means applying
the individual operators simultaneously, whereas we might want instead to iterate the
individual operators. Then in our example, we might apply first the operator for the
row player, thus obtaining (sinceD is weakly dominated byU in the context of {L,R})
the restriction ({U}, {L,R}), and only then apply the operator for the column player,
which in this case will leave both strategies, so that the outcome of such an operator
will be ({U}, {L,R}), which is clearly a different outcome from the simultaneous
version.
One could even combine the individual optimality operators in more ways, by only
partially applying the individual operators. So, to take an example directly from [Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1994, Figure 63.1], in the game depicted in Figure 1.4, M and
R are both weakly dominated by L. If we first remove R, U becomes weakly domi-
nated leaving the outcome ({D}, {L,M}), but if we instead first remove M , then D
is dominated, leaving the disjoint outcome ({U}, {L,R}). Such a situation can never
arise in the case of the monotonic operators.
L M R
U 1, 1 0, 0 1, 1
D 1, 2 1, 2 0, 0
Figure 1.4: A game illustrating the order-dependence of individual weak dominance
operators.
The final kind of optimality we consider is a different strengthening of strict domi-
nance: best response. The idea here is that a strategy is only optimal if it can be justified
(‘rationalised’, to borrow the terminology of Bernheim [1984] or Pearce [1984]) by a
belief that the other players will play in such-and-such a way. Believing that play-
ers will play in such-and-such a way could mean two things: thinking that they will
play according to a given pure strategy; or thinking they will play according to a given
mixed strategy.
In the former case, we say that si is a point best response in the context of S−i and
among B (where as above B ∈ {Si, Ti} determines whether it is the local/global and
pure/mixed form of the property), written pbr(si, B, S−i), just when
∃s−i ∈ S−i : ∀s′i ∈ B(si, s−i), ≥i (s′i, s−i).
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As observed in [Benthem, 2007b], this is just a quantifier permutation of the condition
of not being strictly dominated: overloading notation we could write nsd(si, B, S−i)
to mean that si is not strictly dominated by any strategy in B in the context of S−i,
which would express the following condition:
∀s′i ∈ B∃s−i ∈ S−i : (si, s−i) ≥i (s′i, s−i).
So clearly no best response is strictly dominated, but the converse does not in general
hold; witness Figure 1.5 (cf. [Benthem, 2007b, Proposition 3]). There D is never a
W M D
Y 1, 2 1, 0 1, 1
N 0, 0 0, 2 2, 1
Figure 1.5: A game illustrating the difference between strict dominance and point never
best response.
best response to a point belief, but it is certainly not strictly dominated by any (pure
or mixed) strategy. To see that D is never a best response to a point belief, notice
that there are only two point beliefs concerning the row player’s strategy that we could
assign to the column player: Y and N . And in either case, rationality would dictate
that the player not play D; a belief in Y would mean the column player had better play
W , and a belief in N would mean the column player had better play M .
The ‘point’ case is a bit restrictive, in the sense that it is not necessarily very realis-
tic to assume that players have a definite idea of what the other players will do: indeed,
in the game in Figure 1.5, it seems reasonable to think that the column player, being
on the face of it unsure whether the row player will play Y or N , might well play D,
in order to ‘hedge her bets’. And indeed, in the cardinal utility case we can see that
playing D is now a best response, to {(Y, 0.5), (N, 0.5)}.
There are two ways to define a mixed strategy profile of one’s opponents. One can
take ∆S−i, the set of probability distributions over S−i, but notice that this assumes
some form of coordination or correlation amongst the players, which of course goes
against the spirit of this view of strategic games as representing a specific kind of
one-shot interaction (cf. [Bernheim, 1984, page 1014]). So it is only reasonable to
demand that i play best responses to a subset of these probability distributions, namely
those in which there is no coordination. These can be represented by the product∏
j∈N−{i}∆Sj . We denote this set of uncoordinated strategy profiles of i’s opponents
as ∆uS−i. (Of course for 2-player games the two coincide.)
Thus we can say that a strategy is a best response (to an uncorrelated mixed strategy
of the opponents), written ubr(si, B, S−i), if pbr(si, B,∆uS−i), and that it is a corre-
lated best response, written cbr(si, B, S−i) when pbr(si, B,∆S−i). [Pearce, 1984,
Lemma 3] shows that nsd(si, Si, S−i) if cbr(si, Si, S−i) for the case of finite games.
That is: if the game is finite, a correlated best response is the same thing as a strategy
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that is not strictly dominated. Furthermore, it is a consequence of [Apt, 2007b, The-
orem 3] that iterations of the local and global versions of those operators coincide on
finite games. There is no distinction to be made between any of those operators on
finite games. (That Lemma of Pearce is generalised to cover a certain class of infinite
games in [Zimper, 2005].)
Let us remark that mixed strategies here do take a kind of belief interpretation, and
are sometimes talked about as ‘beliefs’ in the relevant literature. This is not the same
kind of steady-state interpretation as the kind that we mentioned above when talking of
mixed strategies, that reduces all beliefs to common beliefs. That is: it does not require
that all players refer to the same mixed strategy profile of their opponents. Nonetheless,
to restrict the description of the belief state of a player to just a (correlated or uncorre-
lated) strategy profile of her opponents is still to sell short the possibilities of epistemic
analysis. Modern-day interactive epistemology uses more detailed models including
relational models [Fagin et al., 1995], Harsanyi type spaces [Harsanyi, 1968], Au-
mann structures [Aumann, 1976], (which are instances of modal logic models) and
neighbourhood models [Heifetz, 1996]. These various different kinds of models give
a richer account of what a belief state is. They all share the feature that they can be
‘unfolded’ to make statements recursively, so that they express not just whether player
i believes something, but also whether player j believes that player i believes it, and so
on. This kind of ‘higher-order’ belief – belief about belief – is crucial to understanding
many social (interactive) situations.
Back to the question that will be most relevant for the rest of the material of this
Chapter: are any of the operators induced by the notion of best response monotonic?
The answer, which suits our interests, is that once again the global versions are indeed
monotonic. This, as with the case of strict dominance, is explainable just by looking
at the logical (quantifier) form of the properties: they are all positive in the relevant
argument.
Let us briefly recall then that we have examined three different examples of what
can be meant by ‘optimality’, and have illustrated several distinctions that can be made
within these different examples. The optimality operator approach abstracts away from
all of this however, and allows us to reason about all the operators that are, for example,
contracting and monotonic. We have seen that there are several of these: strict dom-
inance by a pure or mixed strategy; and three forms of best response (one of which
collapses in most cases to strict dominance by a mixed strategy).
1.2 Heuristic treatment
In this Section we will take a brief tour and summary of the technical material and
results that we will present in full detail in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.
In the rest of this Chapter we restrict attention to that class of game reduction pro-
cedures that satisfy the property of monotonicity, and provide a unified foundation for
them in terms of beliefs about rationality. The results that we prove generalise stan-
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dard results from the literature. The first sources for such results are [Bernheim, 1984;
Pearce, 1984; Tan and Werlang, 1988]. However, our framework, when it involves
so-called ‘relational models’ for beliefs (i.e. in Section 1.3), will be closer to that in
the survey paper [Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999].
Let O denote some monotonic optimality operator, and G denote a game. Then the
first result that we prove will be the following two theorems, which are respectively
similar to (but, as we will explain, generalisations of) Propositions 3.10 and 3.11 from
[Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999].
Theorem 1.1. Common true belief inO-rationality entails players inG only choosing
strategy profiles in O∞G .
Theorem 1.2. There is a model of G in which if the players choose strategies in O∞G
then there is common true belief of O-rationality.
These theorems are together sometimes taken to mean that common true belief in O-
rationality is equivalent to not playing strategies that survive the iterated elimination
of non-O strategies (i.e. to O∞G ). Let us not shy away from emphasising that while
one direction of the implication is indeed given by Theorem 1.1, the degree to which
the second theorem indicates an equivalence is unclear. The line taken in [Battigalli
and Bonanno, 1999] is that the equivalence is established, but that it is “made even
more transparent within a universal type space, which – by definition – contains all the
conceivable hierarchies of beliefs” (op.cit. p.14 n.36). In Chapter 2 of this Thesis we
will take a modal logic perspective on universal type spaces, but let us pre-emptively
say that we do not find that universal type spaces allow a better statement of the equiv-
alence, since mathematically speaking nothing is added, and conceptually we do not
find any clarity in the notion of a universal type space. Still, we will accept that these
theorems do establish something close to an equivalence, and certainly do not yet have
a better proposal of our own, so continue to call what they establish an ‘equivalence’.8
The equivalence that we prove extends the standard result by covering various
different kinds of optimality notion. Our equivalence theorems will cover arbitrary
games, and not just finite games, as was the case in previous statements found in the
literature along the lines of these theorems.
In giving the most general form of Theorem 1.1, we will be interested to use the
smallest number of assumptions about beliefs (so, to borrow a term from the next
Chapter, the weakest (smallest) possible ‘logics’ of belief). Conversely, in proving the
most general form of Theorem 1.2, we will want to consider the smallest classes of
models of belief, where a large number of properties are respected (so the strongest
logics).
8Actually, we establish something closer to an equivalence than is established by [Battigalli and
Bonanno, 1999, Proposition 3.11], since that says ‘for every strategy such that. . . there is a model such
that . . . ’, whereas we say ‘there is a model such that for every strategy such that . . . ’. We do not make
much of our minor strengthening of the result here, but do return to this ∀∃ to ∃∀ quantifier shift below
in discussion with the later theorems where it is a little more substantial.
28 Chapter 1. Believing Rationality in Arbitrary Games
One kind of property that we will look at, in generalising Theorem 1.1, are the
‘introspection’ properties sometimes attributed to players. These say that if a player
believes something then she believes that she believes it (so-called positive introspec-
tion), and if she does not believe something then she believes that she does not believe
it (negative introspection). Partition structures [Aumann, 1976] for example entail that
players’ true beliefs are positively and negatively introspective. In fact in modal logic
terminology they are ‘S5’ models, meaning that there is positive and negative intro-
spection, and also that beliefs are always true (indeed Aumann talks about “knowl-
edge”), and finally that the players believe the consequences of their beliefs (so if they
believe E and that E implies F , then they believe F ). We show that these properties of
players’ beliefs are not needed in order to establish Theorem 1.1. This result is thus in
the spirit of [Samet, 1990], who generalises to so-called ‘S4’ models in which negative
introspection can fail, the result for partitional S5 models in which negative introspec-
tion cannot fail, established in [Aumann, 1976] (the so-called ‘agreement theorem’9).
We show that negative introspection is not needed, and nor are positive introspection
or correctness of beliefs.
We also look, in the last Section, at whether believing the consequences of one’s
beliefs is needed in order to establish a version of the result. On all relational models,
players believe the consequences of their beliefs, but this is not so on some so-called
‘neighbourhood models’, of which relational models are special cases. In neighbour-
hood models, one simply lists, for each state, the propositions that each player believes
at that state. These lists do not make any assumptions about the way in which the
player has put those pieces of information together. Neighbourhood models are very
permissive, in the sense that they make very few assumptions about the properties of
the players’ beliefs. So neighbourhood models do not in general require introspectiv-
ity, but more significantly, in a neighbourhood model a player can believe an event E,
believe that E entails F , and still not believe F . Neighbourhood models are studied
in [Chellas, 1980; Hansen et al., 2009]. and are considered as models for beliefs in
[Lismont and Mongin, 1994; Heifetz, 1996; 1999].
We prove Theorem 1.1 with respect to arbitrary relational models. But in the next
Section we also prove two forms of the same result for neighbourhood models. Con-
versely, we state Theorem 1.2, that states the existence of a model, in its strongest form,
so for the most restrictive class of models, S5 (partitional) models.
We will also see (Fact 1.7) that for every ordinal α there are games that require
precisely α rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies before there are no
longer any dominated strategies.
This motivates us to look more closely at the connection between these transfinite
eliminations and transfinite levels of mutual belief of rationality, and to ask the question
9That theorem is not directly related to any of the work we present here; it says that, in a probabilistic
context, if players have a common prior and common knowledge of their posterior beliefs (i.e. the
relativisation of their prior to the information represented by the relational structure), then the posterior
beliefs are in fact the same. Different non-probabilistic versions are presented in [Samet, 2006] and
[De´gremont and Roy, 2009].
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about intermediate stages, before full common belief is reached. We credited [Tan and
Werlang, 1988] above with establishing an equivalence between common true belief
of rationality for the case of strict dominance in finite games. They actually did more,
proving a result about intermediate stages (op.cit., Theorems 5.1 and 5.3). So they
have the following form:
Theorem ([Tan and Werlang, 1988]). Mutual true belief of orderm inNSD-rationality
is equivalent to m+ 1 rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
(Here ‘NSD-rationality’ means not playing strategies that you believe to be strictly
dominated.)
If we want to generalise this statement to the infinite case, it turns out that there is
a problem. When there is mutual belief of order ω0 in A, we say that there is finitary
common belief of A. and when there is mutual belief of order α of A for any infinite
ordinal α, this we call absolute common belief of A, or just common belief of A. In
the standard, relational, models for belief (of which, recall, S5 partition structures are
a special case), finitary common belief is the same thing as absolute common belief.
Relational models are therefore not adequate for reasoning about transfinite beliefs,
including about transfinite belief in rationality.
That observation has been made in a number of places, for example in [Barwise,
1988; Heifetz, 1999; Benthem and Sarenac, 2004]. Barwise indicates the difference
between the ‘iterative’ and the ‘fixpoint’ definitions of common knowledge, which in
our terminology correspond to finitary and absolute common belief, and shows that in
relational models they coincide but that in so-called “situation semantics” they do not.
Situation semantics turns out to be essentially a notational variant of neighbourhood
semantics; this point is made formal in [Lismont, 1994]. Heifetz [1999] studies infini-
tary axiom systems for reasoning about common belief and shows their completeness
with respect to monotonic neighbourhood models.10 This is then used to establish the
difference between the finitary and absolute forms of common belief in neighbour-
hood semantics. In [Benthem and Sarenac, 2004], the authors consider a special case
of neighbourhood models, that uses a topology to represent the information of players,
and show that there too the finitary and absolute versions of common belief can be
separated.
In Section 1.4, we show that neighbourhood models are adequate for this kind of
transfinite reasoning about games. In the context of neighbourhood models, assuming
only that the players’ beliefs respect a certain kind of introspection property, we prove
Theorem 1.4.
Theorem 1.4. Mutual true belief of order α in O-rationality entails only playing
strategies that survive 1 + α rounds of elimination of non-O strategies.
10We postpone discussing axiom systems and completeness until the next Chapter, but roughly speak-
ing: an axiom system is complete with respect to a class of models if every sentence it can prove is true
in every model, and vice-versa.
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(Note that we write 1+α because for finite ordinals α, there is one round of elimination
‘for free’, whereas this is not the case for infinite ordinals. That is to say: rationality
by itself entails not playing strategies that are eliminated immediately (in one round),
so for the case where α = 0 we clearly get α + 1 rounds of elimination. And (as
we prove formally below) this continues, so that rationality combined with m-level
belief in rationality entails m + 1 rounds of elimination, until we hit the first infinite
ordinal ω0, where rationality plus ω0-level mutual belief in rationality entails ω0 rounds
of elimination of non-optimal strategies, and so on.)
We also prove Theorem 1.3, which is a slight variant of Theorem 1.4 that does not
require the mentioned introspection property. For that we use a notion of mutual belief
that we call ‘co-mutual belief’. Co-mutual belief is equivalent to mutual belief on the
standard relational models, but diverges from it on neighbourhood semantics.
There is additionally a ‘converse’ direction to Theorem 1.4:
Theorem 1.5. There is a model of G in which for all ordinals α, the players choose
strategies in O1+αG iff there is α-level mutual true belief of O-rationality.
Indeed, it is this Theorem that does not in general hold for relational models, and so
it is here that we have recourse to neighbourhood models. We take these theorems
to mean that, as far as the framework of this chapter allows us to establish it, in the
relevant class of models, α-level mutual true belief of rationality is equivalent to 1 +α
rounds of iteration of non-optimal strategies. Theorem 1.5 does not hold for transfinite
ordinals α if we restrict our attention to relational models.
As we have said, neighbourhood models are very permissive. Topological models
are less permissive, and in them all players are positively introspective regarding their
beliefs, and, as in relational models, in topological models players do always believe
the (things they believe to be the) consequences of their beliefs. As with Theorems 1.1
and 1.2, for generality we prove Theorems 1.3 and 1.4 in the most permissive cases
of neighbourhood models. And Theorem 1.5 we prove with respect to topological
models.
The extent to which Theorems 1.4 and 1.5 really establish an equivalence is, as in
the case of common belief, not entirely clear. Nonetheless, we do state Theorem 1.5
in a stronger form than it is usually stated in the literature: that there is a model such
that for every ordinal, for every strategy. . . We can call this the ‘∃∀∀’ formulation. In
the formulation (of the finite version) in the literature, it is stated in the strictly weaker
‘∀∀∃’ version: that for every n, for every strategy. . . there is a model such that. . . 11
We prefer our formulation. Mainly this is because mathematically speaking it is a
strictly stronger result, i.e. the model no longer depends on the ordinal or the strategy.
However, it also has the advantage of some conceptual appeal: in one model we are
able in some sense to ‘rationalise’ every possible play of the game. Yet we will show
that, even in the finite case, although the ∀∀∃ version continues to hold, if we assume
that players are negatively introspective then the ∃∀∀ version does not hold.
11We make these elided phrases clearer below once we have introduce the relevant technical notation!
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1.3 Common belief in rationality
It is time to make formal our talk of beliefs and belief models. We will start in this Sec-
tion by presenting formal definitions of the standard relational models for beliefs, that
we have already mentioned informally above. These have, since the work of Kanger
[1957] and Kripke [1959], been standard in modal logic and partitional models, devel-
oped independently by Aumann for reasoning about knowledge and common knowl-
edge [Aumann, 1976], are a special case of relational models. We do not yet introduce
a formal language, and so do not make any distinction between syntax and semantics,
postponing that until Chapter 2. (Aumann in his early work does not make such a
distinction, but in more recent work [Aumann, 1999] favours an approach that does
distinguish between syntax and semantics.)
[Aumann, 1976] formalises a notion of common knowledge. Recall that we prefer
to talk of ‘common belief’; common knowledge can be seen as a special case of this,
in which beliefs are never incorrect. This is partly because we will be considering
more general classes of models than the partitional spaces, and in these more general
classes there are models in which the modalities represented do not have properties
that we would want to insist that knowledge have. (Or at least one property that should
distinguish knowledge from belief: that the former cannot be incorrect.)
We will define the introspection properties of beliefs, then look at levels of mutual
belief, see the two definitions of common belief, and that they coincide on relational
models. We also present our definition of ‘co-mutual belief’, which is equivalent, on
relational models, to mutual belief, but as we will see in the next Section diverges in the
case of neighbourhood models (that we introduce there). Another essential ingredient
will of course be the definition of rationality.
All of the different models we will look at are based on a ‘state space’, a set
of ‘states’, that might also be called ‘possible worlds’. A state or possible world
specifies which of the ‘relevant’ non-epistemic properties hold. In the context of a
game, we take the relevant non-epistemic properties to be just the choices made by
the players. The context, i.e. the model in which a state resides, in turn provides
the epistemic properties (the properties of the beliefs of the players). In Chapter 3
we will introduce more sophisticated models, essentially those from [Board, 2002;
Baltag and Smets, 2006], to represent the beliefs of players. These will have the ca-
pacity to represent conditional beliefs, which game-theoretical considerations show to
be worthy of study, for they, as we argue there and in Chapter 4, are necessary for
a correct understanding of the epistemic analysis of non-monotonic optimality opera-
tors, and the reasoning about counterfactuals implicit in the so-called ‘many-moment
interpretation’ of extensive games that we will adopt in that Chapter [Stalnaker, 1996;
Bruin, 2004]. Counterfactuals quite simply don’t matter in what we consider in the
present Chapter, where we focus on an analysis of possible justifications, in epis-
temic terms, for playing within the sets generated by iterations of monotonic operators.
Therefore we will present simpler unconditional belief models in this Chapter.
In fact it will turn out that everything we need to do in this Chapter can be done
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using a rather restricted notion of state space. Suppose that we did not consider arbi-
trary state spaces, but said that, for whatever game was being modelled, the state space
is the set of strategy profiles of that game. In fact all of the results would still hold if
we were to do this, and the only reason we avoid doing so is to avoid at the same time
the potential charge of over-simplification. Indeed, some of the results that we present
(for the record: Theorems 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4) are strictly stronger as stated in this general
form. Still, let us emphasise that the alternative approach, of letting the state space
be the space of strategy profiles, would arguably be consistent with the one-shot de-
ductive interpretation of game theory that we have in mind. (Another, more frivolous,
argument in its favour is that it would simplify notation!)
So we consider arbitrary state spaces, but not without reservations. Subsets of the
state space W , i.e. elements of 2W , are called events, or sometimes propositions. If
u ∈ E we say thatE is ‘true’ at u. (Later, in Chapter 2, when we introduce a distinction
between the syntax and semantics we will ascribe ‘truth’ to (syntactic) formulae, that
are interpreted as events, rather than to (semantic) events themselves, but for now that
distinction is auxiliary to our main concern.) We also write ¬E to mean W − E, and
we think of inclusion as implication: if E ⊆ F , it means that E implies F (in the
context of the model). The event that E implies F can thus be written F ∪ ¬E.
In what follows, the properties that we will take to be ‘relevant’ in possible worlds,
are just the strategies chosen by each player. This is entirely without loss of generality:
in principle we could include further information, but to keep things simple we stick to
just representing the strategies in the model. In order to say that a given modelM is
really a model of a particular gameM, we will require that for every strategy profile s
in the game, there is a state in the model where s is realised.
The information possessed by a player i in a relational model is represented by the
relation Ri between states. If sRit, it means that, if the actual state were s, i would
consider it possible that the state is t. As we will see, this naturally induces a ‘belief
operator’.
Definition 1.4. given a game G = (Ti,≥i)i∈N , a relational belief model for G is a
tuple (W, (Ri)i∈N , s) with W a set, each Ri ⊆ W ×W , and ξ : W → T .
If the function ξ is surjective, (i.e. ∀s ∈ T∃u ∈ W : ξ(u) = s), then we say that
the model is full for G.
We write ξi(u) to mean (ξ(u))i, and we overload notation and lift these functions
relations to the power set 2W of the domain:
ξ(E) = {ξ(u) | u ∈ E};
Ri(E) = {t ∈ W | ∃s ∈ E : sRit}.
Sometimes for clarity we use square brackets, e.g. ξ[E] for the lifted forms of these
functions. For u ∈ W , we write Ri(u) to mean Ri({u}). Ri(u) can be thought of as
the ‘core’ of i’s information at the state u, and we’ll sometimes call it i’s ‘information’
at u.
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Given an event E, we will be interested to define the proposition that player i
believes E. This is going to be given by an operator i from events to events, and the
operator is just the ‘modality’ corresponding to the relation in the model:
iE = {u ∈ W | Ri(u) ⊆ E}.
So the meaning of i, given the intended interpretation of Ri, is: iE is true when E
is true at every state that player i considers possible.
Definition 1.5. There are a number of restrictions that one sometimes places on prop-
erties of beliefs:
T. iE ⊆ E,
D. i∅ = ∅,
4. iE ⊆ i i E,
5. ¬i E ⊆ i¬i E,
mT. i(E ∪ ¬i E),
mT-. i i E ⊆ iE,
where we write ¬E to mean the complement of E in the space, i.e. ¬E = W − E =
{u ∈ W | u /∈ E}.
These properties are understood as being implicitly universally quantified (so with
a second-order quantifier over events: T for example is to be read ‘for all events E,iE ⊆ E). The property T corresponds to i’s beliefs being correct, i.e. to the factivity
of i, and so T would be a minimal requirement for us to say that we are talking about
‘knowledge’ rather than ‘belief’. D, which of course is entailed by T, just means that
the beliefs of i are always consistent. 4 and 5 on the other hand are about the ability of
a player to ‘introspect’: If 4 holds then it means that player i can ‘positively introspect’,
so that if she believes E then she believes12 that she believes it; and if 5 holds then i
can ‘negatively introspect’: if i doesn’t believe E then she believes that she doesn’t
believe it. mT expresses a kind of ‘confidence’ in beliefs, saying that a player believes
that if she believes something then it is true. It also entails a kind of introspection:
that a player is always ‘positively’ correct about her own beliefs, so that if she believes
that she believes something, then she does indeed believe it. mT- expresses a weaker
property than mT: that if player i believes that she believes something, then she does
indeed believe it. We might therefore paraphrase mT- as: ‘player i is correct about her
beliefs.’
12In cases of introspection it might be more natural or appropriate to say ‘knows’, since clearly the
relevant belief is true, but we prefer to maintain the same terminology as we use elsewhere in this
Chapter.
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Definition 1.6. The properties in Definition 1.5 are equivalent13 to properties of the
relations Ri of the underlying relation:
Tr. uRiu,
Dr. Ri(u) 6= ∅,
4r. Ri(Ri(u)) ⊆ Ri(u),
5r. {v, w} ⊆ Ri(u)⇒ w ∈ Ri(v),
mTr. uRiv ⇒ vRiv,
mT-r. uRiv ⇒ ∃w ∈ Ri(u) : wRiv.
Here the properties are again understood as universally quantified statements, with
first-order quantifiers over the variables that stand for states. What this ‘equivalence’
means is that for example T holds as a universally second-order quantified statement
about some model M if and only if Tr holds as a universally first-order quantified
statement aboutM.
The correspondences for 4,5 and mT make it easy to see that if a player is positively
and negatively introspective then she is also confident about her own beliefs. It is even
more straightforward to see that T also implies mT. Finally, it is now also easy to see
that mT implies mT-.
Fact 1.3. There are some (well-known) entailments between these properties, for ex-
ample:
• If 4r and 5r hold then mTr holds.
• If Tr holds then mTr holds.
• If mTr holds then mT-r holds.
• If 5r holds then mT-r holds.
Proof. We prove the first on the list, which is the least obvious: Suppose that 4r and 5r
hold. Then take some v ∈ Ri(u); by 5r, u ∈ Ri(v); but then v ∈ Ri(Ri(v)), so by 4r,
v ∈ Ri(v). 
The introspection property we will introduce in the next Section will be equivalent,
on relational models, to mT-.
13This equivalence would be ‘frame correspondence’ in the technical sense of [Benthem, 1976] were
we dealing with syntactic versions as in Chapter 2 below.
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When a model satisfies Tr and 4r, we say that it is ‘S4’, and when it satisfies in
addition 5r, it is called an ‘S5’ model.14 In the latter case, each relation defines a
partition of the state space, i.e.
{Ri(u) | u ∈ W}
is a partition. Therefore we also call S5 relational models ‘partitional models’. These
were the models used by Aumann [1976] in his seminal work formalising the notion
of common knowledge
We also are interested not just in formalising single-player notions of belief, but in
the more truly multi-player notions of mutual and common belief, and so these are the
next items to be formalised.
Definition 1.7. The event that it is mutual belief of E amongst the players, denotedE, is just the event that all players believe E:
E = ⋂
i∈N
iE.
If a player i is positively and negatively introspective then iterations of the (individ-
ual) belief operator i do nothing, i.e.iiE = iE. However, the interpersonal notion
of mutual belief does in general still change with iterations, irrespective of whether or
not we impose any of the conditions T , D, 4 or 5: that is, the event that everybody
believes that everybody believes that E is not the same as the event that everybody
believes that E.
Since we’ll be interested in infinite iterations in this Chapter, we define for any
arbitrary ordinal α ∈ ON the event that there is α-order mutual belief in E.
Definition 1.8. The event that there is α-order mutual belief in E is written αE, and
is defined recursively as follows:
0E = >1E = Eβ+1E = βE ∩β E for β > 0λE = ⋂α<λαE for limit ordinals λ.
Note that it might conceivably be taken to be objectionable that we here define the
α+ 1th level of mutual belief to imply the αth level. In case any defence of this should
be needed, let us say a few words. Firstly, it should be clear that in the case when we
are modelling true belief (or knowledge), taking the intersection makes no difference,
since if the α+ 1th level belief is correct (i.e. true) then it will entail the previous level,
αth level belief, since that is its object. And secondly, the only reasonable definition
of the limit case is to take the intersection of all previous levels, and if we defined the
14The names ‘S4’ and ‘S5’ are from a classification of modal logics that originated with C. I. Lewis;
some of the names for axioms are more recent.
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lower levels differently then this would be anomalous. Finally, as a step towards a def-
inition of common belief, our definition coincides with definitions from the literature,
e.g. [Heifetz, 1996, p.111].
Increasing orders of mutual belief are in a certain sense approximations of the next
notion that we introduce: common belief.Common belief in E just means arbitrary
levels of mutual belief in E. So one natural definition of common belief, a version that
we will denote ∞, is the following:
Definition 1.9.
∞E = ⋂
α∈ON
αE.
However, since clearly α ≥ β implies that αE ⊆ βE, then for any particular
modelM there is some least βM such that for any event E,
βME = βM+1E.
This in turn implies that βM in effect is the common belief operator, in this model, so
that inM, for any event E: ⋂
α∈βM
αE = ∞E.
This remark about the existence of some βM will continue to hold even with respect
to the larger class of neighbourhood models, since it does not rely on any properties of
the belief operator. More remarkably, in the case of relational models we do not need
to go beyond the first infinite ordinal ω0. That is, for relational models M, Fact 1.4
tells us that βM ≤ ω0.
Fact 1.4. For any event E and ordinal α ≥ ω0, on relational models we have the
following equivalence: αE = ω0E.
We will also define the event ∗E, that ∗ is finitary common belief.
Definition 1.10.
∗E = ⋂
m∈N
mE.
Clearly, by Fact 1.4, on relational models ∗E = ∞E: that is, there is no way
to distinguish between finitary and absolute common belief on relational models. Fact
1.4 does not hold in the more general neighbourhood models that we look at in Section
1.4, and indeed ∗E and ∞E will not be the same there. That is why we introduce
both Definitions 1.9 and 1.10
There is another characterisation of common true belief, in terms of the existence
of a so-called ‘evident’ event.
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Definition 1.11. Call an event ‘evident’ (for the players N ) if it entails that it is be-
lieved, i.e. E is evident when E ⊆ E.
Then we have another characterisation of common true belief:
Fact 1.5. For any event A ⊆ W , u ∈ ∞A iff there is an evident event E such that
u ∈ E ⊆ A.
This is roughly the form in which Aumann [1976] defined common knowledge
formally; this formulation is due to [Monderer and Samet, 1989]. The equivalence
relies essentially on the observation that ∞E is a fixpoint for the  operator, and so
depends on the monotonicity of the  operator.15
In general the models we have defined allow for the possibility that players are
not correct about their own choice of strategy; that is, they might not know what they
are doing. (We use the word ‘know’ here for purely stylistic reasons: we have not
forgotten that we prefer to reserve ‘knowledge’ to mean something stronger than ‘true
belief’ simpliciter.) We might want to rule out this case, but in order to do so we should
know what we are doing when giving a model of the players’ beliefs!
At the moment when they are first presented with the one-shot interaction situation
that the game pretends to capture, the players presumably do not know already what
they will do. Working out what they will do – what strategy choice they will make
– should require some reasoning on the part of the players (including, of course, rea-
soning about what the other players will do). Because we have in mind a deductive
interpretation of the one-shot game situation, we should say that in any model of the
initial situation, players would have no beliefs concerning what they or the other play-
ers will do, or what the beliefs of the other players are. Part of what we will do in
Chapter 3 is to look more closely at the deliberative process itself, so considering in-
termediate models representing stages of the process, and at transitions between them.
But for our present purposes we generally consider (though none of our results rely
essentially on it) that players have all made up their minds about what they will do.
In these situations, we want players to have correct beliefs about what they will do.
When the following holds for all players i ∈ N and all strategies si ∈ Ti:
ξ−1(si) = iξ−1(si),
we say that ‘players are correct about their (own) strategies’. The idea of such a model
is that it represents the beliefs of the players just before they find out what the other
players will do.
It will be convenient for us to define mutual belief in an alternative way, and show
that, on relational models, it coincides with the definition already given. Since we must
give it a name, let us call it ‘co-mutual belief’:
15Indeed, it is generalised as [Heifetz, 1996, Proposition 2.1] to the case of monotonic neighbourhood
models that we will consider in the next Section.
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Definition 1.12. The event that an eventE is α-level co-mutual belief is denotedαE,
and defined recursively as follows:
0E = >1E = Eβ+1E = (E ∩βE) for β > 0λE = ⋂α<λαE for limit ordinals λ.
We have no argument that co-mutual belief is in itself an entirely natural concept.
It is closely related to a notion of ‘common knowledge’ introduced by Lismont [1994,
p. 292]. Note also that on relational models it is equivalent to the relatively standard
mutual belief as defined above.
Fact 1.6. Take any relational model and any event E in it. Then αE = αE.
Proof. Notice first of all that by Fact 1.4, we need only to prove the equivalencemE = mE. But this first term can be written as follows:
(E ∩(E ∩(E ∩ . . . E) . . .))︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
.
And, in relational models, the following equation holds:
K. (E ∩ F ) = E ∩F.
Therefore our term can be written as:
E ∩(E ∩(E ∩ . . . E) . . .)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1 times
;
and by repeating this we arrive at
E ∩ E ∩E ∩ . . . ∩ . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
E,
which is precisely mE. 
Notice that we really do need to use the fact that the players’ belief operators do
respect the equality expressed in K. And indeed in neighbourhood models, where K.
does not in general hold, the two definitions do not in general coincide. We will only
use α-order co-mutual belief in the proof of Theorem 1.3, where this stronger notion
than α-order mutual belief is required when we make essentially no assumptions at all
about the belief operators.
The most important event that we want to define here is instrumental rationality.
Since we’re not interested here in other, more social, aspects of rationality than that
generally considered by game theorists, we’ll just talk about rationality tout court.
That fits with contemporary usage by game theorists, for example:
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“A person’s behaviour is rational if[f] it is in his best interests,
given his information.” [Aumann, 2006]
A player’s “best interests” are captured by her optimality operator, so that rational-
ity will be parametrised by whatever notion of optimality it involves. So, given that
the player’s “information” in a relational model is given by the relation Ri, we use
Definition 1.13 for rationality.
Definition 1.13. the event that a player i is rational in a relational model is ri:
ri = {u ∈ W | si(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[Ri(u)])}.
Rationality of a player is the event that the player plays optimality with respect to
her information. To repeat using slightly different words: i is rational at u if i’s choice
of strategy at u is optimal in the context of the restriction defined by i’s beliefs at u.
(Definition 1.16 below in Section 1.4 defines rationality for neighbourhood models, but
that definition will be faithful to this one, in the sense that if we think of a relational
model as its equivalent neighbourhood model, then the two definitions coincide.) The
event that all players are rational we then write r:
r =
⋂
i∈N
ri.
If each player i has some non-trivial belief about her own strategy, then the defi-
nition of rationality only really makes sense when we consider the global versions of
operators. This becomes especially clear in the particular case where players correctly
believe their own strategies, which as we have suggested is a natural assumption in
the scenario being modelled. Suppose that, in some relational model, player i plays si
and correctly believes that she plays si, and does not believe that she plays any other
strategy.16 Then in the restriction defined by her beliefs, the only strategy she plays
is si. But in the local version of any natural optimality operator (including all of the
examples we gave in Section 1.1), player i would always be rational.
What we really want rationality to mean is that the player plays optimally among
the strategies available to her in the actual game with respect to her beliefs. And this
is precisely what is delivered by considering the global version of any of the optimality
notions.
We always therefore assume, for the rest of this Chapter, that the optimality opera-
tor under consideration is ‘global’.
Definition 1.14. A global optimality operator for i, Oi, is an optimality operator for i
(a function from 2T−i to 2TTi)with the following property:
If S−i = S ′−i, then Oi(S) = Oi(S
′).
16We have to add that last clause to handle the case of some non-relational neighbourhood models.
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There might be further constraints that should be placed on global optimality oper-
ators, but this will be sufficient for our purposes.
All the pieces are now in place to state the first Theorem. Theorem 1.1 states that
common true belief of rationality entails that players will not play strategies that can
be eliminated by iterating the relevant optimality operator.
Theorem 1.1. In any relational model of a game G, and for any monotonic (global)
optimality operator:
ξ[r ∩∞r] ⊆ O∞.
Proof. Take a strategy profile s ∈ ξ[r ∩∞r]; then for some u ∈ r ∩∞r, ξ(u) = s.
Since u ∈ ∞r, then by Fact 1.5, there is some F 3 u with F ⊆ F ∩r.
We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.1. ξ(F ∩ r) is a post-fixpoint for O, i.e.
ξ(F ∩ r) ⊆ O(ξ(F ∩ r)).
So by Fact 1.1.2, we have ξ(F ∩ r) ⊆ O∞. Then since u ∈ F ∩ r, we have
s = ξ(u) ∈ O∞ as required.
It suffices then to prove the Lemma. Take any v ∈ F ∩ r and i ∈ N . Since
v ∈ r, ξi(v) ∈ Oi(ξ(Ri(v))). But F ⊆ F , so Ri(v) ⊆ F ; and F ⊆ r, so
Ri(v) ⊆ r; thus Ri(v) ⊆ F ∩ r. Therefore by the monotonicity of Oi, we have
ξi(v) ⊆ Oi(ξ(F ∩ r)). 
The ‘converse’ direction of Theorem 1.1 states that for any model G, there is a
full model of G in which wherever any strategy s that survives the iterated elimination
of non-optimal strategies is played, there is common true belief of rationality. The
Theorem states further that there is such a model in which players are correct about
their own strategies. Since we can think of this as the outcome of a process of delib-
eration and reasoning on the part of the players, it is natural that we ask that players
have made up their mind about what they are going to do. (And of course adding this
restriction only makes the Theorem stronger.) Since this Theorem also says that the
relevant model is a partitional model, in which players are positively and negatively
introspective, but moreover always correct in their ‘beliefs’, it is also compatible with
a ‘knowledge interpretation’ of , so could be read as being about knowledge and
common knowledge rather than about belief.
Theorem 1.2. For any game G, There is a full S5 (partitional) model in which players
are correct about their own strategies, and where ξ(r ∩∞r) = O∞.
Proof. We define a full model: (T,Ri, id)i∈N by setting:
Ri(s) =
{ {t ∈ T | si = ti & t−i ∈ (O∞)−i} if s ∈ O∞
{t ∈ T | si = ti & t−i ∈ T−i − (O∞)−i} otherwise.
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Note here that in this model the worlds (states) are strategy profiles, and ξ is the identity
function i.e. ξ(x) = x. We must show therefore that in this model, r ∩ ∞r = O∞.
The ⊆ inclusion is Theorem 1.1, so only the ⊇ direction remains:
First, take any s ∈ O∞; we will show that s ∈ r: For any player i, by construction
(Ri(s)))−i = (O∞)−i, so we certainly have s ∈ Oi(Ri(s)), since the operator is global
(cf. Definition 1.14).
To show that s ∈ ∞r, it will suffice, given Fact 1.4, to show that for any m-length
sequence w ∈ Nm of players,
Rw(1)(Rw(2)(. . . Rw(m)(s) . . .)) ⊆ r. (1.1)
And since, as we have just seen, O∞ ⊆ r, then it will suffice, in order to show 1.1, to
show that:
Rw(1)(Rw(2)(. . . Rw(m)(s) . . .)) ⊆ O∞.
In order to see this last inclusion, notice that for any player i, ifE ⊆ O∞ thenRi(E) ⊆
O∞. 
The weaker form in which Theorem 1.2 is usually stated is an immediate corollary
of it that we state just in case it can make some connections (with the literature and
with the contents of Section 1.4) clearer.
Corollary 1.1. For any strategy s in the game G that does survive the iterated elimi-
nation of non-optimal strategies, there is a full model of G in which at some state s is
played and there is common true belief of rationality.
1.4 Transfinite mutual belief in rationality
Tan and Werlang [1988] proved their theorem about mutual belief and rationality in
terms of (finite) stages, meaning that there is an ‘equivalence’ between the level of
mutual belief of rationality and the number of rounds of iteration of elimination of
non-optimal strategies. They in effect proved the following:
Theorem. The following are equivalent for m ∈ N:
1. The strategy profile s in the game G survives m rounds of iteration of strictly
dominated strategies;
2. There is a model of G with a state u ∈ r ∩ mr such that ξ(u) = s, where r
means the players avoid strategies they believe to be strictly dominated.
In this Section we strengthen that result. Firstly, as before, we consider other kinds
of (monotonic) optimality than just not playing a strictly dominated strategy. Secondly,
we consider the more general transfinite case. That is going to mean considering mod-
els that are not relational: so-called ‘neighbourhood models’ and a special case: ‘topo-
logical models’. Finally, we shift a quantifier, so prove a stronger result. That is, where
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the 1⇒ 2 direction of the above Theorem states that ‘for any m ∈ N and strategy pro-
file s ∈ Om, there is a model such that . . . ’, we will prove a result of the form ‘there is
a model such that, for any α ∈ ON . . . ’.
The other direction of the implication says that α-level mutual belief in rationality
entails not playing strategies that are eliminated by α rounds of elimination of non-
optimal strategies. We prove this result in two forms, since we cannot prove the result
as it stands with respect to the most general class of neighbourhood models. The first
form, Theorem 1.3 replaces ‘mutual belief’ with ‘co-mutual belief’. Therefore, given
that on relational models co-mutual belief is mutual belief, Theorem 1.1 above is a
corollary of 1.3, but we still gave a separate proof of Theorem 1.1 using fixpoints,
to illustrate its simplicity. The second form, Theorem 1.4, adds a specific kind of
introspection condition to the neighbourhood models. (That condition is satisfied on
many models, including topological models.)
In partial motivation of this Section, we will first show that there are games re-
quiring transfinite rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies. Then we introduce
neighbourhood models, show the connection with relational models, define rational-
ity on neighbourhood models, and state Theorem 1.3, that looks at the implications of
transfinite levels of co-mutual belief of rationality. After that we introduce topologi-
cal models, and state some well-known equivalences between topological models and
neighbourhood models, and between some classes of topological models and relational
models. We then give Theorem 1.4, that looks at the implications of levels of mutual
belief given a particular introspection condition.
This leads us to Theorem 1.5, the ‘converse’ to Theorem 1.4, in which we show
that there is a model in which α-level mutual belief of rationality is strictly equivalent
to α rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies. To end this Section, and the first
Chapter, we look at the case of S5 models, and remark that our strong formulation of
Theorem 1.5 does not hold with respect to S5 models.
For some games we really need to complete an infinite number of rounds of elimi-
nation of non-optimal strategies. Consider for example, in the pick-the-highest-number
game, in which two players a and b, must pick a number in ignorance of what the other
has picked. The preferences over outcomes are that each player i strictly prefers pick-
ing a (strictly) higher number than the other, and is indifferent between other factors.
Then 0 is dominated for both players, since they strictly prefer 1 in all situations. But
then they strictly prefer 2, and so one. . . Clearly there is no number that is not strictly
dominated, so that infinite rounds of elimination yield the empty restriction ∅. That
means by Theorem 1.1 that if they commonly believe each other to be rational then
there is nothing they can rationally play. (Of course, at any finite stage of iteratively
eliminating, there are still strategies left in the resulting restriction.)
We will show that there are also games which require infinite rounds of elimination
of non-optimal strategies. In particular, we show that for any ordinal α, there is a game
that requires α rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies in order to reach
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the outcome, that in addition is non-empty.17
Fact 1.7. Given an arbitrary ordinal β, we can construct a game Gβ which has out-
come ordinal β, and which is such that O∞G is nonempty, where the optimality notion
is that of strict dominance.
Proof. Let Gβ be the two-player strategic game with {0, 1, . . . , β, β+ 1} as strategies,
and preferences determined by the following payoff functions:
pii(s) =
{
0 if s−i ≥ si 6= β + 1
1 otherwise
This is a simplification and generalisation of [Chen et al., 2007, Example 1]. The
reader can check that in this game it takes precisely β rounds of iteration in order to
reach the fixpoint outcome; i.e. that αGβ = β. (On this game the local and global
operators coincide.) The idea is that in the first round, 0 is strictly dominated by β + 1
(in fact it happens to be weakly dominated by all the other strategies), but 1 is ‘safe’
even in the presence of the strictly dominating β+1 because the other player is allowed
to choose 0; β + 1 is rationalisable on the grounds that the opponent might play 0.
However, once 0 has disappeared, 1 is then strictly dominated, but 2 is not (yet) because
the opponent might play 1, and so on . . . 
Furthermore, this is no ‘special feature’ of strict dominance. Indeed, the reader
interested in playing with these things can also check that Fact 1.7 holds for the cases
of weak dominance and best response.
As we have already indicated, over relational models finitary common belief ∗
coincides with absolute common belief ∞. In the general case then, for arbitrary
(possible transfinite) ordinals α, it is not possible to give a model in which for all α,
1 + α rounds of elimination entail rationality and mutual belief in rationality. What is
more, even the weaker ∀∃ form of the implication that we might like fails.
Indeed, as soon as (strictly) more than ω0 steps are required for the game’s out-
come to be reached, there is no way to give the required model. To see this, suppose
that for some game G and (collective) optimality operator O, more than ω0 rounds of
elimination are required to reach the outcome. Then there is some s ∈ Oω0 − Oω0+1.
Now suppose that Tan and Werlang’s Theorem above held for arbitrary ordinals with
respect to relational models. Then by the 1⇒2 direction of the Theorem, there would
be a relational modelM with some state u in it such that ξ(u) = s and u ∈ r ∩ω0r.
By Fact 1.4, we know that ω0r ⊆ ω0+1r, so u ∈ r ∩ ω0+1r, in which case by
the 2⇒1 direction, would have u ∈ Oω0+1, which contradicts our initial assumption.
Therefore Tan and Werlang’s Theorem cannot be extended to arbitrary ordinals with
respect to relational models.
Recall that we said that a neighbourhood model contains a list of pieces of infor-
mation possessed by a player.
17Actually similar examples can also be constructed for all of the other optimality operators we con-
sidered in Section 1.1; we consider the case of non-strict dominance as an illustration.
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Definition 1.15. a neighbourhood model for the gameG is a structure (W, (Ni)i∈N , ξ),
with W and ξ are as in Definition 1.4 of relational models, and Ni a function associat-
ing with each state u ∈ W a set of events; so Ni : W → 22W , with the only condition
that W ∈ Ni(u) for every u ∈ W .
How does one define belief in neighbourhood models? We simply say that a player
believes the event E at u just if E ∈ Ni(u):iE = {u ∈ W | E ∈ Ni(u)}
i.e.
u ∈ iE iff E ∈ Ni(u).
Notice that the restriction that we placed on the neighbourhoods, that they must include
W , then means that iW = W (as is also the case for relational models). the levels of
mutual belief, and the two kinds of common belief, are now defined as before, given
this new definition. So α-order mutual belief of E is defined inductively, just as in
Definition 1.8, as follows:0E = >1E = Eβ+1E = βE ∩β E for β > 0λE = ⋂α<λαE for limit ordinals λ.
Common belief of E, which we will still write ∞E, is defined as in Definition 1.9:∞E = ⋂
α∈ON
αE.
And finitary common belief of E is the same as in Definition 1.10:
∗E = ⋂
m∈N
mE.
These two definitions of common belief (‘finitary’ and ‘absolute’) now do not co-
incide, given the new definition of the underlying concept of belief that we have for
neighbourhood models. This fact will be a corollary of Theorem 1.5.
The definition that we had for rationality needs also to be reworked. We now think
of the events in i’s neighbourhood of a point as i’s information at that point. We will
see later the standard results connecting neighbourhood models with relational models,
but for now notice just that there are fewer constraints on how the player has put her
information together. Still, we can define rationality on neighbourhood models: we
just say that a player is rational if she acts in her best interests according to all of her
information.
Definition 1.16. The event that player i is rational in a neighbourhood model is ri:
ri = {u ∈ W | ∀A ∈ Ni(u), ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ(A))},
and again the event that all players are rational r is just
⋂
i∈N ri.
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It is immediate from inspecting the translation we give below in Fact 1.8 from
relational models to neighbourhood models that this captures the same notion as in
relational models, so Definition 1.16 is properly speaking a generalisation of Definition
1.13 of rationality on relational models. To our knowledge, this is the first formulation
of rationality for neighbourhood models.
We will be interested, to a certain extent in this Chapter, but also in the next, in
monotonic neighbourhood models. For players’ beliefs, this would mean that if a
player believes an event A and some other event E is entailed by A (i.e. A ⊆ E), then
the player believes E as well. A monotonic neighbourhood model is a neighbour-
hood model in which each of the neighbourhood functions satisfies the monotonicity
property M:
M. If A ∈ Ni(u) and A ⊆ E then E ∈ Ni(u).
Monotonic neighbourhood models are studied from a logical perspective in [Hansen,
2003], where many model-theoretic results are established. They are also studied, with
special attention being paid to common belief in [Heifetz, 1996]. Although monotonic-
ity is a natural enough requirement, and is often technically useful (for example it will
be required for a number of results in Chapter 3), we do not require the neighbourhood
models we consider, for Theorems 1.3 or 1.4, to be monotonic.
Since neighbourhood models really are just lists of beliefs, it will be necessary, if
we are to prove much about them, to introduce a restriction on how beliefs behave.
Specifically, we will want to impose the following condition:
mT+ i(iE ∩ F ) ⊆ i(E ∩ F ).
This condition mT+ is equivalent on relational models to the condition mT-, that players
are correct about their own beliefs in the sense that if a player believes she believes
something, then she does indeed believe it. So by Fact 1.3 5 entails mT+ on relational
models. However, on monotonic neighbourhood models mT+ is a strictly stronger
condition than both mT- and 5. (On neighbourhood models mT+ is still entailed by the
condition T, that players’ beliefs are correct.)
We do not claim to have a natural way of reading the condition mT+, but it certainly
is difficult to find an argument against it, given that it says that ‘if you believe that: F
and you believe that E, then you believe E and F.’ This is the condition that will be
required to prove Theorem 1.4, which will state that rationality plus α-level mutual
belief of rationality entail not playing strategies that are eliminated by 1 + α rounds of
elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Fact 1.8 says that we can think of relational models as neighbourhood models.
Fact 1.8. For every relational model there is a neighbourhood model that is equivalent
to it, in the sense that it has the same state space W and strategy function ξ, and the
belief operators α are the same.
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Proof. Given any relational model (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N , the monotonic neighbourhood model
that is equivalent to it, in the sense just described, is simply (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N , where
Ni(u) = {E ⊆ W | Ri(u) ⊆ E}.
A quick inspection of the definitions suffices to establish the equivalence between this
model and the previous one. 
Given the existence of an equivalent monotonic neighbourhood model for every
relational model, we will sometimes (especially in the next Chapter) talk interchange-
ably about a relational model and its neighbourhood version, so that we sometimes
speak of relational models as being neighbourhood models.
The reverse translation clearly does not in general exist: there are monotonic neigh-
bourhood models for which there exists no equivalent relational model. The smallest
example is the 1-player model (W,Na, ξ) given by:
(W = {u, v},
Na(u) = {{u}, {v}, {u, v}}
Na(v) = 2W ,
ξ).
Here we have u ∈ a{u} and u ∈ a{v}. Suppose that there were some relational
model (W,Ra, ξ) equivalent to the given model. Then we would have to haveRa(u) ⊆
{u} and Ra(u) ⊆ {v}, meaning that Ra(u) = ∅. But then we’d have u ∈ a∅, which
does not hold in the original model.
Therefore, a restriction must be placed on neighbourhood models if they are to be
equivalent to relational models. That restriction is that the neighbourhoods must be
monotonic and each contains its core.
Definition 1.17. We say that the model (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N contains its core iff
∀u ∈ W,
⋂
Ni(u) ∈ Ni(u).
For any monotonic neighbourhood model that contains its core, we can define a
relational model that is equivalent to it:
Definition 1.18. Let (W,Ni, ξ) be a monotonic intersection-closed neighbourhood
model (i.e. that contains its core). Then we define the model (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N that is
(as is straightforward to see) equivalent to it as follows:
Ri(u) =
⋂
Ni(u).
This formal property of ‘containing the core’ corresponds precisely to the more in-
tuitive notion of ‘putting together one’s information’. We say that in relational models,
each player has put together her pieces of information, and by this we mean that if, at
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u, a player believes E and believes F – so u ∈ iE ∩ iF – then the player believes
E∩F , which can be read ‘E and F ’: u ∈ i(E∩F ). In fact relational models assume
more: that players are able to put together infinitely many pieces of information, so that
if they believe all of the propositions
{Eβ}β∈α,
then they will also believe the proposition⋂
β∈α
Eβ.
In neighbourhood models it is not in general the case that players put together even
only finitely many pieces of information. That is, the following equality, that, as we
saw, held for relational models18, does not hold in general on neighbourhood models.
K. (iE ∩iF ) = i(E ∩ F ).
The first result that we establish in this Section concerns the notion of co-mutual
belief (Definition 1.12). Just like Theorem 1.4 that we present immediately afterwards,
it ‘zooms in’ on the individual stages of elimination, so that rather than just saying, as
did Theorem 1.1, that the limit case of common belief of rationality entails the outcome
of eliminating non-optimal strategies, we now look at intermediate levels of (just for
this Theorem) co-mutual belief, and associate them with corresponding numbers of
rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies.
Theorem 1.3. In any neighbourhood model (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N of the game (T,≤i), for any
α ∈ ON , ξ(r ∩αr) ⊆ O1+α.
Proof. We prove this directly by transfinite induction on α.
0: We must show that ξ(r) ⊆ O1. Take any s ∈ ξ(r). Then there is some u ∈ r
such that ξ(u) = s. For each i, u ∈ ri, so by definition ∀U ∈ Ni(u), ξi(u) ∈
Oi(ξ[U ]). But becauseW ∈ Ni(u) andOi is monotonic, we have ξi(u) ∈ Oi(T ).
Repeating this for all players i ∈ N yields ξ(u) ∈ O(T ) = O1.
I: By the inductive hypothesis, ξ(r ∩ βr) ⊆ O1+β . Then take any s ∈ ξ(r ∩β+1r); there is u with ξ(u) = s such that u ∈ r ∩(r ∩βr).
Then since u ∈ r, we have: ∀U ∈ Ni(u), ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[U ]), and since u ∈(r∩βr), we have r∩βr ∈ Ni(u). So we have ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[r∩βr]), so by
the inductive hypothesis and the monotonicity ofOi, we have ξi(u) ∈ Oi(O1+β),
as required.
18Indeed, it is named in honour of Saul Kripke for his work on logical completeness involving rela-
tional models.
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Λ: The inductive hypothesis states that ∀β < λ, ξ[r ∩ βr] ⊆ O1+β . Then we
immediately have the following inclusions:
ξ[r ∩λr] = ξ[r ∩ ⋂
β<λ
βr] = ⋂
β<λ
ξ[r ∩βr] I.H.⊆ ⋂
β<λ
O1+β = Oλ.

Since, as we observed when defining it, co-mutual belief is equivalent to mutual
belief on relational models, we have the following immediate corollary of Theorem
1.3.
Corollary 1.2. On relational models of G, for any α ∈ ON , ξ(r ∩αr) ⊆ O1+α.
The case of co-mutual belief is perhaps not very instructive: although it coincides
with belief on relational models, and it might well have some intuitive appeal on neigh-
bourhood models, this remains unclear. Therefore we now give another formulation of
Theorem 1.3, this time in terms of mutual belief itself. Now however we will require
that the model satisfy the introspection-like property mT+ given above.
Theorem 1.4. In any neighbourhood model of G that satisfies mT+, ξ(r ∩ αr) ⊆
O1+α.
Proof. We again establish the claim itself by transfinite induction on α. The start and
limit cases are essentially the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.3, so we give just the
successor step:
I. The inductive hypothesis tells us that
ξ(r ∩βr) ⊆ O1+β,
and we want to show that, for any player i ∈ N :
ξ(r ∩β+1r) ⊆ Oi(O1+β).
Take any s ∈ ξ(r ∩β+1r); we have u with ξ(u) = s such that u ∈ r ∩β+1r.
Since u ∈ r, we know that ∀A ∈ Ni(u), ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[A]). Therefore, by the
inductive hypothesis and the monotonicity of Oi, if we can show that r ∩βr ∈
Ni(u), then we are done. (Because then we would have ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[r∩βr]).)
So we will use the fact that u ∈ β+1r, in order to show that r ∩βr ∈ Ni(u).
We distinguish two cases:
– If β = 0 then r ∩βr = r, so we need only to show that r ∈ Ni(u):
u ∈ β+1r = r = {v ∈ W | r ∈ Ni(v)}.
– Otherwise, β > 0. In this case, by Definition 1.8, βr ⊆ ir. That is:βr = ir∩βr. The property mT+ then applies, so that r∩βr ∈ Ni(u).
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
We have already mentioned topological models, and now is the time to introduce
them formally. We will give all the definitions needed to understand the material here,
but refer to [Munkres, 1999] for an introduction to the subject of topology.
Definition 1.19. A topology over Ω is a set τ of subsets of Ω that has the following
properties:
• for any X ⊆ τ , ⋃X ∈ τ ;
• for any finite X ⊆ τ , ⋂X ∈ τ .
The elements of τ are called the open sets, and if an event E ⊆ W is open then we
say its complement W −E is closed. The interior of an event E, written int(E) is the
largest open set contained in E, i.e. the union of all of the open sets contained in E,
which we can write
⋃
(2E ∩ τ). The closure of E is the smallest closed set containing
E.
In the multi-player topological semantics that we present, each player i is assigned
a topology τi over Ω.
Definition 1.20. A topological model for (Ti,≥i)i∈N is thus a tuple
(Ω, τi, ξ)i∈N ,
where ξ : Ω→ T , and each τi a topology over Ω.
For u ∈ Ω, we will write τi(u) to mean the set of i-open sets with u in them,
i.e. τi(u) = {U ∈ τi | u ∈ U}.i is the interior operator, i.e. iE = inti(E). Relational models for modal logic
were invented in the late 50s, but the topological semantics have been studied consider-
ably before that [McKinsey and Tarski, 1944]. The interior operator is an S4 modality,
i.e. belief is factive (so some might prefer to call it ‘knowledge’); players are positively
introspective; and each player believes the finitary implications of her beliefs. Com-
mon belief (or common knowledge) is studied on topological models in [Benthem and
Sarenac, 2004].
We use all the definitions of mutual and common belief as for relational models
(so see Section 1.3), except that i is now defined as the interior operator with respect
to the topology τi. In topological models, as in monotonic neighbourhood models,
we will see that we can distinguish between finitary absolute common belief, i.e. ∗
and ∞ also do not coincide on topological models. We will establish this by prov-
ing Theorem 1.5, the converse direction for Theorem 1.4, with respect to topological
models.
Topological models can also be thought of as neighbourhood models in which the
neighbourhood Ni(u) of any point u is the monotonic closure of the set of open sets
which have u in them, with respect to some topology τi. That is, given the topological
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model (W, τi, ξ)i∈N , we can define a neighbourhood model that is equivalent to it as
(W,Ni, ξ)i∈N , where:
Ni(u) = {E ⊆ W | ∃A ∈ τi(u) : A ⊆ E}.
To see the equivalence between this neighbourhood model and the topological model,
notice that we have the following definition of the i operators in the neighbourhood
model: iE = {u ∈ Ω | ∃U ∈ τi : u ∈ U ⊆ E}.
This is, as we wanted, equivalent to the interior operator. Therefore, just as we talk
interchangeably about a relational model and its neighbourhood version, we will also
sometimes think of topological models as monotonic neighbourhood models.
Not all topological models are (equivalent to) a relational model, but some are.
More precisely, those topological models that are Alexandroff, i.e. in which every
point has a unique smallest open set around it, are equivalent to a relational model.
Equivalently, Alexandroff topologies are those in which the set of open sets is also
closed for arbitrary (rather than just finite) intersections. That is, thinking of topolog-
ical models as monotonic neighbourhood models, Alexandroff models are those that
contain their core (Definition 1.17).
That is because the same property will clearly be carried over the topological model
thought of as a neighbourhood model, in which case the translation given above in Def-
inition 1.18 from intersection-closed (i.e. core-containing) monotonic neighbourhood
models to relational models can be used to provide an equivalent relational model.
Given a topological model, we can define the Alexandroff supplementation of it as
the smallest topological model that extends it and in which the topologies are Alexan-
droff.
Definition 1.21. Given some topological model (W, τi, ξ)i∈N , its Alexandroff supple-
mentation is the topological model (W, τ ′i , ξ)i∈N , where:
τ ′i = {E ⊆ W | ∃X ⊆ τi : E =
⋂
X}.
In the Alexandroff supplementation, each player now puts together all her infor-
mation. That is, when thought of as a neighbourhood model, the Alexandroff supple-
mentation contains its core, and so is equivalent to a relational model. In general in
topological models, players do put their information together finitarily, so that, unlike
in neighbourhood models, the equation K does hold. However, what fails is of course
its infinitary version,
K∞.
⋂
β∈αiEβ = i(⋂β∈αEβ),
and it is precisely this fact that we will exploit now.
Having defined topological models, we are in a position to be able to state our
theorem involving them, which is a strong ‘converse’ to Theorems 1.3 and 1.4.
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Theorem 1.5. For any game G, there is a full topological model of G in which players
are correct about their strategies, and where for any ordinal α, we have ξ(r ∩αr) =
O1+αG .
Proof. Let G = (Ti,≥i)i∈N . We will define a topological modelMG of G in which
ξ[r ∩αr] = O1+αG .
Given a strategy si belonging to player i, we write dpi(si) (the ‘depth’ of si) to
mean, roughly speaking, the number of rounds it takes before si will be eliminated.
More formally:
dpi(si) =
{
αOG + 1 if si ∈ Oi(O∞G )
max{α < αOG | si ∈ [Oα(T )]i} otherwise.
What this means is that those strategies that are eliminated in the first are each assigned
a depth of 0; those eliminated in the second round get a depth of 1, and so on; and those
that are never eliminated are assigned a depth of αOG. (Recall that α
O
G is the outcome
ordinal of the game for O, so that if a strategy is not eliminated by that round then it
never will be.)
This depth function has the following key property:
Lemma 1.2. If dpi(si) > δ, then si ∈ Oi({si} × [Oδ(T )]−i).
Proof. By the definition of dpi, we have si ∈ Oi(Oδ(T )). Then we use the globality
of Oi: since
[Oδ(T )]−i = [{si} × [Oδ(T )]−i]−i,
then we have (cf. Definition 1.14)
Oi([O
δ(T )) = Oi({si} × [Oδ(T )]−i).

We will use this depth function dpi to define the basis of the topology. The domain
of the model is the set of strategy profiles T ; the function ξ will be identity; and the
topology we define by the following basis for each player i:
Bi =
{
{si} × [Oβ(T )]−i
∣∣∣si ∈ Ti, β < dpi(si)}⋃ {{si} × T−i∣∣∣si ∈ Ti −Oi(T )}.
τi is then generated by taking arbitrary unions from Bi.
It can be useful to see a picture of this model, so we give in Figure 1.6 a depiction
of the basis Bi for the row player i in a two-player game. There we assume, just for the
purposes of illustration, that i has one strategy eliminated in each round until the end.
It can be verified that Bi is indeed a basis. Thus that it induces, by taking arbitrary
unions, a topology τi, meaning that (T, τi, id)i∈N is indeed a topological model of G.
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T
O(T )
O2(T )
Oα(T )
Oα+1(T )
O∞
Figure 1.6: An example of the model used to prove Theorem 1.5. We show only the
topology for one player, who is choosing which column in the space the outcome will
be in.
Then we will prove that in this model r∩αr = O1+α. The⊆ direction we have by
Theorem 1.4, given that (a) since topological models satisfy T, they also satisfy mT+;
and (b) in this model ξ is the identity function. The other direction (O1+α ⊆ r ∩αr)
is by induction:
0: Take s ∈ O(T ) and i ∈ N . We must show that s ∈ ri. Take any A ∈ τi(s).
We know that si /∈ Ti − Oi(T ), since s ∈ O(T ). So by definition of the model,
there is some δ < dpi(si) such that {si} × [Oδ(T )]−i ⊆ A. Since by the Lemma
si ∈ Oi({si} × [Oδ(T )]−i), then by monotonicity of Oi, we have si ∈ Oi(A) as
required.
I: Take s ∈ O1+β+1. For each player i ∈ N , we have by construction {si} ×
O1+β−i ∈ τi(s). Furthermore, clearly {si} × O1+β−i ⊆ O1+β , and by the inductive
hypothesis O1+β = βr. Therefore s ∈ i β r. Repeating this for each
player i ∈ N , we have s ∈  β r. But because O1+β+1(T ) ⊆ O1+β(T ), then
we have s ∈ O1+β(T ) and so the inductive hypothesis s ∈ βr. Therefore
s ∈ βr ∩β r = β+1r.
Λ: Immediate from the inductive hypothesis:
O1+λ =
⋂
β<λ
O1+β
I.H.
=
⋂
β<λ
βr = λr.

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Notice that in the finitary case (or in fact when the game’s outcome is reached after
ω0 steps), each player’s topology is finite and therefore Alexandroff, and so the model
defined is relational. Therefore the result does hold for finite ordinals α with respect to
relational models.
It is worth briefly seeing why a relational version of the model given in Theorem
1.5 does not, in the general infinitary case, have the desired property. If we were to
take the Alexandroff supplementation of that model, applying Definition 1.21, then the
reason the result fails to hold is that we would lose the rationality of the players at limit
stages: Take some state u at which player i’s strategy is eliminated at the λth stage, for
some limit ordinal λ. Then there will be a smallest neighbourhood U ∈ τi(u), in which
all players play only strategies that are eliminated by λ rounds of elimination. But in
that case, i is not rational at u.
The reason i was rational in the (non-Alexandroff) topological case was that she
had failed to put together all of her information: At u she has, for any β < λ, and any
strategy profile s ∈ Oβ , information that tells her that s−i will not be played. Yet still
she does not put together all of these pieces of information in order to conclude that
the other players will indeed play in Oλ.
In general in topological models, players are not negatively introspective, so that
there are topological models with some event E such that u /∈ iE and u /∈ i¬iE.
Indeed, for many games this is the case in the model constructed for the proof of
Theorem 1.5. Topological models in which negative introspection does hold are those
in which the players’ topologies are ‘almost discrete’; that is, in which every open set
is also a closed set; i.e. its complement is open. To get an idea of why this equivalence
holds: s /∈ ¬E iff s is in the closure of E. So if the former always implies that
s ∈ ¬¬E (as negative introspection states), it means that the closure ofE, cl(E) ⊆
int(cl(E)), which holds just if cl(E) is open.
We have already mentioned that Theorem 1.5 is stated in a stronger way than usu-
ally in the literature, and we can now show that it would not be possible to prove it as
stated, even in the finite case, with respect to S5 models. That is, to use the terminol-
ogy of [Samet, 1990], if we were, as in the case of partitional models, to require that
players do not ‘ignore their ignorance’, so that they could never not believe something
without believing that they do not believe it, then our strong formulation of the Theo-
rem does not in general hold. That is: it is important, for our strong formulation, that
the topology not be discreet.
To see this, consider the finite game depicted in Figure 1.7. Let Oi for both players
be the operator corresponding to the global version of the elimination of strategies
that are strictly dominated by a pure strategy. In this game, first L is eliminated, then
U , then C, then M . Now suppose towards a contradiction that there were some full
partitional model (W,Ra, Rb, ξ) in which players are correct about their own strategies,
and in which for all m ∈ N, we have s ∈ O1+m ⇒ s ∈ ξ(r ∩mr). Then there would
be in that model some u with ξ(u) = (D,C) ∈ O1, in which case we would by
hypothesis have u ∈ r. Then we would have D ∈ Oa(ξ(Ra(u))), which means, given
the way the preferences of player a (the row player) are arranged, and that players are
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L C R
U 2, 0 0, 2 0, 1
M 1, 0 1, 0 1, 1
D 0, 0 0, 0 2, 1
Figure 1.7: A game in which there is no partitional model such that for all m ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}, O1+m ⊆ ξ(r ∩mr).
correct about their own strategies, that ∃v ∈ Ra(u) : ξ(v) = (D,R). But then by 4r
and 5r, u ∈ Ra(v); and by hypothesis v ∈ 4r; in which case u ∈ 3r. In which case
u ∈ r ∩ 3r, but that would mean (by Theorem 1.3) that ξ(u) ∈ O4, which is clearly
false. So discreet models cannot always be given with the properties of the model in
Theorem 1.5.
Summary
If a strategic game is given, along with some monotonic notions of optimality, we
have shown that there is then a straightforward ‘epistemic foundation’ for the various,
possibly transfinite, rounds of iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies, in terms
of some equivalent level of rationality and mutual belief of rationality.
This is a generalisation of known results in that:
• It covers arbitrary monotonic optimality operators (sometimes with a condition
of globality).
• It holds for infinite games.
• Very few conditions were placed on the beliefs of the players. Notably, either
– they need not be positively or negatively introspective, or
– they have one introspection property mT+, but each player might not put
her various pieces of information together or draw any conclusions from
them.
In getting as close as possible to a sense in which O1+α is ‘equivalent’ to r ∩
Bαr, we proposed a model in which the two are equivalent for all levels α. In the
relational case this only works at finite levels, with all infinite levels collapsing. So we
suggest that some form of neighbourhood models, specifically topological models, are
appropriate for such transfinite reasoning. In topological models, a player can fail to
put together only infinitarily many pieces of her information.
In the model we constructed, players were correct about their own strategies (si =isi for all si ∈ Ti), and were positively introspective. We noted that it is not in
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general possible to give such a model if we assume also that players are negatively
introspective.
A more general point: in all of the models we gave, the states of the world were
just the strategy profiles. This might seem simplistic, but also it arguably fits with
the one-shot approach, in which we do not want to assume much concerning players’
information. We will look in Chapter 3 at a different approach to giving an epistemic
analysis of games, in which the game reduction algorithms given by the optimality
operator are simulated more directly on the side of the epistemic model as ‘public
announcements’, and the model used there will also use the strategy profiles as its state
space.

Chapter 2
Syntax and Interaction
“Le tableau, certes, est dans mon oeil.
Mais moi, je suis dans le tableau.”
– Lacan [1973]
In the previous chapter we did not explicitly introduce formal languages for reason-
ing about the models we discussed. That is, we did not make any distinction between
syntax (languages) and semantics (models). Thus we took what has been the standard
approach in the game-theoretical literature since the important early work of Aumann
[1976]. As we will see, in more recent work [Aumann, 1999], the same author has ar-
gued in favour of a syntactic approach to the epistemic analysis of games. In effect this
recommends the work of logicians who have studied similar models, but started from
the syntax side, studying formal languages and axiom systems for modal logic. Au-
mann argues for this position, that logical syntax is important in analysing games, on
the basis that the semantic approach “is conceptually not quite straightforward” [1999,
p. 264], notably begging the following question: are the various parts of the model
“themselves in some sense ‘common knowledge’?” (p. 272). This can be seen as re-
lated to a concern raised by Brandenburger and Keisler [2006]. They see a formal lan-
guage as representing in some sense the powers of representation, and formulate a con-
dition, that they call ‘completeness’ of a model with respect to a language, which they
interpret as meaning that the players have access to the language. The terms ‘complete’
and ‘universal’ are used to denote different properties in the game-theoretical literature
(cf. the classification in (ibid, Section 11)), and have yet other connotations in the logi-
cal literature, so we will use the term ‘assumption-complete’ for the property described
in (ibid). The main technical contribution of this Chapter is Theorem 2.4, that states the
existence of a model that is assumption-complete for a class of modal languages. We
leave open (Conjecture 2.1) the question whether the same holds for a richer language,
the ‘bounded fragment’ of first-order logic. Assumption-completeness is, as Branden-
burger and Keisler [2006] mention, related to Russell’s paradox; we point out that our
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Conjecture, if correct, would separate the problem of assumption-completeness from
the problem of a coherent axiom of comprehension for a given language.
One advantage of the syntactic approach is that it allows us to abstract from the
details of a particular model. This, crucially, allows comparisons between models of
the same kind (say, two different relational models), which is a pre-requisite for doing
anything interesting with logical dynamics, that we examine in Chapter 3.
Another consequence (that we do not pursue further here) is that one can make
comparisons between the different kinds of model used in game theory to represent the
beliefs and knowledge of players. Although we attributed Theorems from Chapter 1 to
Tan and Werlang [1988], properly speaking they were working with a different kind of
model. A shared syntax, with terms for belief, rationality and so on would allow for an
easy precise comparison between results.
There are two important kinds of model for representing players’ information:
state-space models, which are the only ones that we have considered so far (relational
models and neighbourhood models are both examples of state-space models), and so-
called ‘type-space’ models, which are based on the ideas of Harsanyi [1968]. In this
Chapter we will show how to translate between type-space models and a certain class of
state-space models. Brandenburger and Keisler formulated the property of assumption-
completeness with respect to two-player type-space models. Another contribution we
make here will be to show what the notion means in our familiar state-space models.
Even disregarding the various arguments that we will look at that support separating
syntax from semantics when doing formal epistemic work in games, the reader might
agree that using tools from logic, with the concomitant level of abstraction that this
gives us, is worthwhile in itself. Indeed, we will present (Theorem 2.1) a syntactic
proof of Theorem 1.1, that reveals it boils down to a very simple use of the proof rules
for fixpoint operators.
Background literature
We have mentioned as our starting point [Aumann, 1999], who presents arguments
in favour of a syntactic approach. The conceptual contributions of that paper make it
stand out, and technically there are a number of recent studies applying logical tools,
including formal languages, to the analysis of games. We do not pretend to give an even
nearly exhaustive list, but let us mention [Bonanno, 2002; Stalnaker, 1994; Benthem,
2001; Benthem et al., 2006; Bruin, 2004]. The last work for example considers a purely
syntactic approach to the epistemic analysis of games, looking at a number of solution
concepts and asking what proof rules are necessary to derive them.
A number of the formal languages we consider in Section 2.2 are studied rigorously
from a model-theoretic point of view in [Cate, 2005].
The question of assumption-completeness of a belief model is introduced in [Bran-
denburger, 2003], studied extensively in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006], and given
further formal analysis in [Pacuit, 2007].
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Organisation of the Chapter
In Section 2.1 we will define the central notions that allow us to make formal the
syntax-semantics divide, and then look at the various arguments in favour of doing so.
Then in Section 2.2 we catalogue a number of choices of specific language that one
could make, and explore some of their properties. Notably, we look at the question
of definability of the key notions of common belief and rationality in these languages.
Section 2.3 defines type-space models and shows in what sense they correspond to
(relational) state-space models. The rest of it we devote to the topic of assumption-
completeness, by showing what it means on state-space models, and proving (Theorem
2.4) the existence of an assumption-complete model for some modal languages.
2.1 Features of the syntactic approach
The syntactic approach to reasoning about games involves specifying a language L, a
class of models M, and an interpretation (class-)function J−K.
Definition 2.1. A language is a set of ‘sentences’ (sometimes called ‘formulae’) which
is, in all the examples we will consider, built up recursively, according to rules of the
form ‘si is a sentence’, and ‘if ϕ is a sentence then iϕ is a sentence’.
We have already seen some classes of models: monotonic neighbourhood models,
relational models, and partitional models for games. More generally:
Definition 2.2. a model consists of a domain (in the given examples from the previous
Chapter, the domain was the set of states), usually denoted W , and predicates and
relations on it.
Definition 2.3. An interpretation function takes as input a sentence from the language
ϕ ∈ L, and a modelM, and returns an event denoted JϕKM, which we will call the
‘interpretation of ϕ inM’.
Given a modelM, |M| denotes its domain. So for any formula ϕ, JϕKM ⊆ |M|.
Often when we talk of a ‘language’ we mean the set of sentences plus the inter-
pretation function. Just as the sentences are built up recursively in the examples we
consider, so will be the interpretation function.
Given some model, if the event E is the interpretation of some formula of the
language L, we say that E is definable by L, or just ‘L-definable’. Notice that this is
clearly not a trivial notion, in the sense that there are models with events that for some
language L are not L-definable.
This is an essential distinction between the syntactic and the semantic approaches.
The latter does not make any distinction between on the one hand ‘natural’ events
to consider, i.e. those definable according to some language, and on the other hand
arbitrary events.
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We find the greatest advantage of a syntactic approach to be that it enables one to
make inter-model comparisons, which is, in the spirit of [Gerbrandy and Groeneveld,
1997; Baltag et al., 1999; Benthem, 1996], the best way to make sense of so-called
‘dynamic’ model-changing events. What we mean by inter-model comparison is as
follows: Fix some formal language L, take a formula ϕ from it, and then take some
family of models {Mj}j∈J . Then the semantics of L specify the meaning of ϕ in each
model. This might seem like a trivial point, but each formula ϕ has some recursively-
given intended meaning, so for example in some appropriate language, ij ri means
that i believes that j believes that i is rational. Now suppose that {Mj}j∈J is some tree
representing changes that can be made to the epistemic situation. Then we are able to
say when the formula ϕ is true.
The first example of model-changing events, that we will look at in Chapter 3, is
of ‘public announcement’ (which we also call ‘relativisation’), which is a qualitative
version of Bayesian conditioning, in which the state space strictly shrinks from model
to model. So for example we will look at what happens to a model when it is an-
nounced that a certain player is rational. Interesting effects are visible in the syntactic
approach that would remain shrouded were we to consider a purely semantic approach.
For instance, it can happen that, after a formula ϕ is announced, ϕ is no longer true,
whereas this could not be captured by the semantic approach, because if the event E is
true at a certain state u (i.e. u ∈ E), then as long as the event A is also true at u, then
after relativising to A (‘announcing’ A), u will still be in (the relativised version of) E,
because that will just be E ∩ A.
Information dynamics are interesting in their own right, but we also motivate their
use in game theory further in this Thesis, partly by considering (in Chapter 3) vari-
ous kinds of announcements and seeing how those are related to the solution concepts
explored in Chapter 1, and more substantially by giving what we argue is the correct
epistemic foundation for the otherwise thorny issue of backward induction, in Chap-
ter 4.
It is also argued in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] that explicitly using a syn-
tactic approach can offer important conceptual clarity. The authors define a property
of models that they claim captures the idea of a given language L being “available”
to player i, in the sense that if a proposition is definable in L then there is some state
in which it defines the information that i has. This property is called ‘assumption-
completeness’1, and the main Theorem of the cited work is an impossibility result,
stating that for a sufficiently strong language, namely a very standard first-order lan-
guage, there are no assumption-complete models.
One of the contributions of this Chapter is to show that the basic modal language,
which is a standard language for reasoning about knowledge/beliefs, and is essentially
that used for example in [Aumann, 1999], there are assumption-complete models. In
fact, we show that infinitary modal languages have assumption-complete models. As
1In [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] it is called just ‘completeness’, but since we use that term in
this Thesis in its more standard logical sense we prefer the less ambiguous ‘assumption-completeness’.
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we will separately remark in this Chapter, infinitary modal languages might be good
candidates as languages for game theory, since they are expressive enough to be able
to express the important concepts of common belief and, given some game, to define
rationality.
In relatively recent work, Aumann has offered arguments in favour of taking a
syntactic approach.
“While the semantic formalism is the more convenient and widely used of
the two, it is conceptually not quite straightforward.” – [Aumann, 1999,
p. 264]
The main thrust of Aumann’s argument appears to be that the syntactic approach helps
to answer the question “what do the participants know about the model itself?” (op.cit.,
p. 272) by giving what he takes to be a more coherent account of what a state is. – A
state u is identified with the collection of all of those formulae of the relevant language
that are true at u. The idea is attributed by Aumann to Samet [1990]. This is taken
to have bearing upon the troubling question of whether the model itself is common
knowledge amongst the players.
The notion that a world can be identified with the set of sentences that it makes
true is familiar from modal logic literature, on both the philosophical and technical
levels. Technically, this notion is the essential ingredient to the elegant canonical model
technique that is used to prove completeness of an axiom system with respect to some
considered semantics.2 Aumann gives a completeness result for his modal language,
(cf. e.g. the textbooks [Chellas, 1980; Blackburn et al., 2001]), and argues that it then
becomes “clear from the construction itself that the knowledge operators are ‘common
knowledge’ in the appropriate sense.” (op.cit., p. 273; “the construction” here refers to
the construction of the canonical model). The worry was that otherwise another model
would have to be built on top of the given model, in order to represent uncertainty
about the model itself; and of course this could continue to a vicious infinite regress.
(Philosophically, the notion that a possible world is a set of sentences is related to a
debate concerning the nature of propositions, for example between Lewis [1973] and
Stalnaker [1976].)
There are connections between this idea of Aumann’s that concerns whether the
model can be common knowledge, and that of Brandenburger and Keisler [2006], who
worry about whether the players have access to the reasoning abilities employed by the
person who is building the model in order to analyse the situation they find themselves
in. (And indeed, we will in effect use a canonical model construction in order to prove
Theorem 2.4 giving the existence of an assumption-complete model for the modal
language.)
However, Aumann does not discuss the question whether interesting relevant events
are definable in the language he presents. For example, a rather natural event that one
2The canonical model technique was invented after Kripke’s initial completeness results, that used
systems of tableaux rather than a canonical model.
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might want to define in the context of game theoretical analysis would be the event that
a player i is rational. Another event might be common belief (or in Aumann’s terms
common knowledge) of rationality.
The language presented in [Aumann, 1999] does not include a common belief op-
erator, nor does it include any term for rationality. Common belief is not definable
in the (finitary) language in terms of belief, and indeed the modal logic completeness
argument for languages that include common belief (or knowledge) is not as straight-
forward as for the basic modal language without such operators. It can use for exam-
ple the technique of “filtration” [Blackburn et al., 2001], and there is not one single
canonical model in which sets of sentences correspond in the same meaningful way to
states.3
Furthermore, it is not clear whether rationality would be definable in the modal
language that Aumann considers. Of the various languages that we catalogue below,
one of the aspects of each that we will consider is whether rationality is definable in it.
Of course, one could simply add to the language a symbol ri that is intended to
mean that player i is rational, and that is something that we will look at below in
Section 2.2. However, we then lose the completeness result and the canonicity property
that motivated Aumann in the first place. Perhaps we can re-establish it for the given
language, but it does not come for free just from the completeness of the basic modal
language.
The point of completeness is that it is about a proof system, i.e. a set of rules
of syntactic manipulation of the form ‘If ϕ is provable then ψ is provable’, where
in natural cases ψ is some simple syntactic manipulation of ϕ, that can in principle be
used to determine the set of formulae that are valid with respect to the given semantics.
That is, if a formula ϕ is valid, i.e. true everywhere in every model, then there is some
series of legitimate syntactic manipulations, stating that ϕ is provable, i.e. a proof
of ϕ. We will call the set of sentences that are valid with respect to a given class of
models the ‘logic’ of that class of models (with respect to some given language), and
we call the elements of a logic its ‘theorems’. If the language is rich enough, then the
syntactic proof system itself could be used for proving theorems. (It can also facilitate
checking which assumptions are actually needed. Indeed, that is how we arrived at the
minimal requirements for Theorem 1.1, and we will provide a simple syntactic proof
of that theorem below in Section 2.2.)
3This is related to the fact that the resulting logic is not compact, meaning that there can be an infinite
set of sentences Γ that is not satisfiable (cannot be true) but such that each finite subset of it is satisfiable
(can be true). In this case the standard argument would for example set:
Γ = {♦∗¬p} ∪ { . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
p | m ∈ N}.
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2.2 Languages
In this Section we will catalogue a number of different formal languages with expres-
sions that will stand for aspects of the various items in the state-space models that
we have considered. This means specifying the set of sentences and the interpretation
function. All of the languages we consider will be recursively defined. We use stan-
dard compact representations for these recursively-defined objects. To give a set of
sentences, we write expressions of the following BackusNaur form:
ϕ ::= a1 | a2 . . . | f1(ϕ, . . . , ϕ) | . . . | fm(ϕ, . . . , ϕ)
This should be read as saying thatL, the language in question, is defined as the smallest
set that:
1. contains each of a1, a2, . . .; and
2. if it contains ϕ1, . . . , ϕk then it contains f(ϕ1, . . . , ϕk).
For specifying the semantics (i.e. the interpretation), we will use both the J−K nota-
tion, and also sometimes write u M ϕ to mean u ∈ JϕKM. As with the J−K notation,
for notational elegance we sometimes drop the symbol M for the model when the
model is clear from the context.
For reference purposes we give a summary table of the various language elements
at the end of this Chapter.
In the modal logic literature, one often considers a slightly more general class of
models than those given in the previous Chapter. There due to our specific aim we only
considered models for specific games G, where the only non-epistemic fact associated
with each state was a strategy profile from the game G. (And indeed, we discussed
the possibility of only considering models in which the state space is the set of strat-
egy profiles.) In this Chapter we still do not allow that other ‘atomic’ (non-epistemic)
information than just the strategy profiles can be specified for a particular state. How-
ever, this particular decision does not result in the loss of any generality: what we say
will for the most part also hold for the more general modal models, in which a model
would be parametrised by an alphabet of ‘atomic propositions’ Ψ, so that a Ψ-model
would be a structure (W,N , V )i∈N , with V : Ψ→ 2W a valuation function assigning
an event4 to each of the atomic propositions. These general models are the ones that
are considered in [Aumann, 1976] and in the modal logic literature (see e.g. [Chellas,
1980]).
The models we consider are instances of these more general models, in which for
example we set Ψ =
⋃
i∈N Si, so one option for the language, is to have an atomic
proposition for each one of each player’s strategies.
Notice though that for general modal models to be faithful to the idea of what a
strategy is supposed to represent, we also would need to impose the restriction that
4So implicitly we’re in the context of some model.
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each player chooses precisely one strategy at any given state. That is, we would need
to say that for every player i and every state u, there is an si ∈ Si such that u ∈ V (si);
and that if u ∈ V (si) with si ∈ Si, then for all s′i ∈ Si−{si}, u /∈ V (s′i). So the V (si)
would have to form a partition of the state space W .
Another way to represent the players’ strategy choices in the language is by using
a modality, writing for example [is]ϕ with the intended meaning, ‘in all states where i
plays the same strategy, ϕ holds’. Since, as we just noted, the strategy choices form a
partition of the space, this would be an S5 modality. This is in effect the choice taken
in [Benthem, 2007b], where the author specifies that the epistemic relation of each
player i in the model is determined precisely by saying that at state u she considers
state v plausible just if she chooses the same strategy at both states. (We discuss that
work further in Section 3.2.)
Since we are interested in more general epistemic relations, it makes sense for us to
consider introducing this separate modality [is] in addition to i, and we will consider
such languages briefly in what follows.
Another option is to have proposition letters for outcomes rather than individual
strategies. This will be more natural in Chapter 4, when we look at extensive games,
and want to talk about outcomes rather than strategies We will not take strategies as
primitive there, since in extensive games strategies are more complex and conceptually
loaded with counterfactuals. In the case of strategic games it might seem less natural,
though it will be easy enough, at least in the case of finite strategy sets and players, to
define strategies in terms of strategy profiles, and in the case of finite players to define
strategy profiles in terms of strategies.
Once we have specified language, we will be interested in the question whether it
can define some subset or operator on the model. For a language to be able to define an
event, for example the event of rationality, means that there must be some formula ϕ
in the language such that in every modelM, JϕKM is the event in question. Similarly,
take some unary operator F : 2W → 2W on the model. For example, common belief
would be the operator that takes an event E ⊆ W and returns the event that E is
common belief. Define a unary formula-scheme to be a formula except that it has a
place-holder for another formula. For example, ϕ(ψ) := ψ ∧ si is a definition of a
formula-scheme. Then for a language to be able to define the unary operator F means
that there is some unary formula-scheme ϕ(ψ) in the language such that in every model
M, F (JψKM) = Jϕ(ψ)KM.
There is another sort of definability, which we will not be able to cover in any detail
in this Chapter, that we call ‘axiom definability’. For a language to be able to axiomat-
ically define an event (operator) means that if we were to add some proposition letter
(modality) to the language, but not to specify its interpretation, then just by stating
certain validities (‘axioms’) in this new language, and thereby restricting the class of
models that are allowed, one can force the desired interpretation, so that the proposi-
tion (modality) is always interpreted by the event (operator). We do not devote much
time to questions of axiomatics in this Chapter. Axiom definability is not only studied
in the logic literature, but is also considered by formal epistemologists [Halpern et al.,
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2007].
In general when we talk about ‘definability’ we will mean the first kind of defin-
ability, and sometimes we say that a language can ‘express’ something to mean that it
can define the relevant event/operator.
The ‘basic modal language’ that we first present is standard from the modal logic
literature [Blackburn et al., 2001]. It is also essentially the modal language considered
in [Aumann, 1999]. The basic modal language is parametrised by a set of ‘atomic
propositions’ Ψ and a set of players N . This could in principle be anything, but in
the examples we are considering, as discussed above, it will be some subset of T ∪⋃
i∈N Ti ∪ {>}, i.e. the set of strategy profiles, the set of strategies and some constant
that will stand for ‘truth’.
Then the sentences of the basic (finitary) modal language LΨN are given as follows,
where p ∈ Ψ and i ∈ N :
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | iϕ
The interpretation of LΨN is specified with respect to a modelMG = (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N of
the game G as follows:
MG, u  >
MG, u  si iff ξi(u) = si
MG, u  s iff ξ(u) = s
MG, u  (φ ∧ ψ) iff u ∈ JϕK ∩ JψK
MG, u  ¬ϕ iff u /∈ JϕK
MG, u  iϕ iff Ri(u) ⊆ JϕK
We sometimes don’t write brackets when they’re not necessary for disambiguation,
and we use many standard abbreviations from propositional logic, writing ϕ ∨ ψ for
¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ), ϕ→ ψ for ¬(ϕ∧¬ψ) and ϕ ≡ ψ for (ϕ→ ψ)∧ (ψ → ϕ). We also use
a standard abbreviation in modal logic, writing ♦i for ¬i ¬. Where iϕ means that i
believes that ϕ, ♦iϕ means that player i does not believe that ¬ϕ, i.e. has not ruled out
the possibility that ϕ, or to put it otherwise considers it possible (or ‘plausible’) that ϕ.
The semantic clause for i yields the following version for ♦i:
MG, u  ♦iϕ iff Ri(u) ∩ JϕK 6= ∅
A number of notions that we consider involve non-finite things. One example of
this is the notion of common knowledge. However, we will also see that in the case of
arbitrary games (so with possibly infinite strategy sets), it will be convenient, in order
to define other events, for example the important event of a player’s being rational, to
consider languages with infinitely long expressions.
The kind of infinite languages we consider are those with conjunctions or disjunc-
tions taken over infinitely many sentences. Notice that the basic finitary modal lan-
guage allows for conjunctions of arbitrary finite length, meaning that for any finite set
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Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} of sentences,
∧
Φ is a sentence, where
∧
Φ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk.
However, there are instances of the finitary modal language that contain (infinite) sets
of sentences Φ, and there is no single sentence that is equivalent to the conjunction∧
Φ of all those sentences.
The size of a language is specified in terms of its cardinality. For any set X , we
write #(X) to denote the cardinality of X . A cardinal κ is called inaccessible just if
α < κ ⇒ 2α < κ. Note that the first infinite cardinal, denoted ℵ0, is inaccessible,
since for any finite n, 2n is also finite.
Given some infinite cardinal κ, the basic infinitary modal language of cardinality
κ, LΨN,κ, is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ |
∧
Φ | iϕ,
where p ∈ Ψ and Φ is a subset of sentences of LΨN,κ, of cardinality strictly less than
κ. (Remember that this notation is shorthand for a recursive definition, so this is not
circular.) Semantically we give the following natural interpretation to infinite conjunc-
tions:
MG, u 
∧
Φ iff for all ϕ ∈ Φ,MG, u  ϕ.
Thus notice that the basic finitary modal language LΨN is just (a notational variant of)
LΨN,ℵ0 . We often write φ ∧ ψ for
∧{φ, ψ}, and ∨Φ is an abbreviation of ¬∧{¬ϕ |
ϕ ∈ Φ}.
Another modality that we might consider adding is a so-called ‘global’ or ‘univer-
sal’ modality. (It is important to notice that this sense of ‘global’ is not related to the
term we use to distinguish between different versions of optimality operators.) The
global modality does not look at the current state, but looks rather at the whole model
to decide whether the statement it expresses is true. We write it Aϕ, so the language
LA with a universal modality is formed from the language L by adding the following
clause:
ϕ ::= . . . | Aϕ,
and it has the following semantics:
MG, u  Aϕ iff JϕKM = W.
This ‘modality’ does not respect what we suggest is the key property of modal lan-
guages: their locality. In order to evaluate whether a given formula of a modal lan-
guage is true at some state u, one need not look at states that are not ‘related’ to u,
As we said, we could also introduce for each player i modality [is]ϕ, that will look,
in order to determine whether it is true at some state u, only at states where the player
plays the same strategy as at u, and check whether ϕ holds there. This would mean the
language L could be extended to Lis as follows:
ϕ ::= . . . | [is]ϕ,
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and the following semantic clause would give the meaning of [is]:
M, u  [is]ϕ iff for all v ξi(u) = ξi(v)⇒M, u  ϕ
So this modality in effect introduces a new relation into the model: two states become
related to each other if the player plays the same strategy.
Notice then that the global modality A is definable, at least in case there are a finite
number of players. Let [As]ϕ be defined as follows, where w is a list of the players N :
[As]ϕ := [w0s][w1s] . . . [w#(N)−1s]ϕ.
Then Fact 2.1 states that [As] defines the global modality.
Fact 2.1. On any modelM,
J[As]ϕKM = { W if JϕKM = W∅ otherwise.
Let us look at the notion of ‘locality’ that we have mentioned. Now, historically
speaking locality is not what modality was about in the case of relational semantics:
early studies concerned S5 in the case of a single modality, in which case the modal-
ity is thought of as a global modality. However, the following quotation shows that
contemporarily the same is not true:
“Modal languages provide an internal, local perspective
on relational structures.” – [Blackburn et al., 2001]
But more importantly than whether a given language is, according to some mysterious
essentialist classification, modal, are two more serious points, both concerning the
notion of whether the language is ‘available’ to the players, for them to use to think
about the model they are in.
The first we can only express informally, by saying that we find that a global modal-
ity transcends the appealing notion that what is considered possible by the players is
really given by the relations in the case of a relational model.
The second point is a little more formal: we will see later that adding a global
modality to an otherwise ‘local’ language breaks the property of assumption-complete-
ness. However, this point is also made more flimsy by the fact that the particular local
language considered might itself not have the property of assumption-completeness.
Clearly neither of these points speak conclusively against including a global modal-
ity in a language! Indeed, both of these arguments are tenuous, and furthermore both
are predicated on the notion that the language is meant to capture some sense of what
the players can represent to themselves. Yet as we have seen at the beginning of this
Chapter, there are many other reasons to introduce a formal syntax. Nonetheless, we
do find the locality idea appealing, and take even these two partially-formed and in-
conclusive points to motivate focusing on more local languages.
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As a final point for consideration, note that if one accepts Aumann’s arguments
about the importance of the existence of a single canonical structure for a given lan-
guage, then non-local languages, at least any language in which one can define a global
modality, would also not be acceptable. This is because there is no canonical model
for a language with a global modality.5
The next addition to this basic modal language that we consider is adding optimal-
ity operators. The language LO is the language L along with the following clause,
where i ∈ N :
ϕ ::= . . . |,iϕ.
The most general interpretation we could give to this operator would be that it is
an arbitrary monotonic operator. This could be formulated in a number of different
ways, but essentially means that the optimality operator has the same monotonic neigh-
bourhood semantics as we saw before. That is, we would interpret it on a structure
(W,Ni, Oi, . . .)i∈N where each Oi, like each Ni, is a monotonic neighbourhood func-
tion. (The definition of monotonic neighbourhood models was given above in Section
1.4.)
Since rationality was defined purely in terms of information and optimality, and we
can express both of these things in this language, the question of whether rationality is
definable in the language is now not entirely trivial. If we were to follow the suggestion
we have just seen, and have a semantics in which there are no constraints placed on
the optimality operator, then the basic modal language would not be able to define
rationality.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that the semantics were to interpret the Oi as arbitrary
monotonic operators on the state space. Then there would be no L{>}N,O-formula ϕ
such that ω  ϕ⇔ ω ∈ r.
Proof. To prove this proposition, we use the notion of LΨN,O-bisimulation.
Definition 2.4. An LΨN,O-bisimulation between two relational models with monotonic
optimality operatorsM = (W,Ri, Oi, ξ)i∈N andM′ = (W ′, R′i, O′, ξ′)i∈N is a rela-
tion Z ⊆ W ×W ′ satisfying the following conditions:
1. uZu′ ⇒ (u  p⇔ u′  p), for p ∈ Ψ;
2. uZu′ ⇒ (w ∈ Ri(u)⇒ ∃w′ ∈ R′i(u′) : wZw′);
3. uZu′ ⇒ (u ∈ Oi(X)⇒ ∃X ′ ⊆ W ′ : u′ ∈ O′i(X ′) & ∀x′ ∈ X ′∃x ∈ X : xZx′);
4. uZu′ ⇒ (w′ ∈ R′i(u′)⇒ ∃w ∈ Ri(u) : wZw′);
5That is, the ‘truth lemma’ Γ  ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ cannot hold in any model containing as states the
maximally consistent (or satisfiable) sets of formulae, since bothAp andA¬p are consistent (satisfiable),
so there would be Γ, Γ′ in the model with Ap ∈ Γ and A¬p in the model, but it conflicts with the
semantics of A to have in the same model Γ  Ap and Γ′  A¬p.
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5. uZu′ ⇒ (u′ ∈ O′i(X ′)⇒ ∃X ⊆ W : u ∈ Oi(X) & ∀x ∈ X∃x′ ∈ X ′ : xZx′).
This kind of bisimulation has the following important property:
Proposition 2.2. For any LΨN,O-bisimulation Z between M and M′, any ω, ω′ such
that ωZω′, and any formula ϕ ∈ LΨN,O, the following equivalence holds:
M, ω  ϕ⇔M′, ω′  ϕ
Proof. By induction on the formula ϕ; cf. [Blackburn et al., 2001] and [Hansen, 2003,
Proposition 4.10]. 
Then to prove Proposition 2.1, consider the two modelsM andM′, given in Fig-
ures 2.1 and 2.2. (In these models, we draw the relation for just one player, and list the
values for the monotonic operator that would be interpreted as her optimality operator.)
a b
O({a}) = {b};O({b}) = O({a, b}) = {a, b}
Figure 2.1: The modelM used to prove Proposition 2.1.
a′ b′
O({a′}) = {b′};O({b′}) = O({a′, b′}) = {a′, b′}
Figure 2.2: The modelM′ used in proving Proposition 2.1.
Z = {a, b} × {a′, b′} is an L>N,O-bisimulation betweenM andM’. Then suppose
towards a contradiction that there is a formula ρi ∈ L>N,O that defines rationality of
i, i.e. such that ω  ρi ⇔ ω ∈ Oi(Ri(ω)). Then we would have a 2 ρi, since a /∈
Oi(Ri(a)) = Oi({a}) = {b}), and a′  ρi, as a′ ∈I (Ri(a′)) = Oi({a, b}) = {a, b}.
But this would contradict Proposition 2.2, because aZa′. 
Notice that the language we just considered did not have terms for the strategies or
strategy profiles of the players. Still, we could easily ensure that the same result does
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hold for a language with such terms si or s, simply by saying that at a and b in the
model, the players play the same strategies. However, that would go against the sense
of what an optimality operator should be.
Indeed, rather than interpreting,i as some arbitrary monotonic operator, it would
be more accurate to interpret it really as an optimality operator. So in particular, two
conditions we will want to impose are the following:
1. If ξi(u) = ξi(v) then u ,iϕ⇔ v ,iϕ;
2. If ξ(JϕK) = ξ(JψK) then u ,ϕ ≡,ψ.
That is: (1) if player i plays the same thing as u and v then she plays optimally with
respect to the restriction defined by ϕ at u iff she plays optimality with respect to the
restriction defined by ϕ at v. And 2 is just the truism that if the restriction defined by ϕ
is the same as the restriction defined by ψ then the players play optimally with respect
to the restriction defined by ϕ just if they play optimally with respect to that defined
by ψ. Note that if we are considering global operators then we could refine 2 further
as follows:
2’. If ξ−i(JϕK) = ξ−i(JψK) then u ,iϕ ≡,iψ.
Clearly 2’ entails 2, but is strictly stronger than it. It is unclear whether there are
further restrictions that must be placed on an abstract monotonic operator in order for
it to count as an optimality operator, but the conditions presented above are certainly
necessary, if for some particular game and optimality operator the following semantic
clause interprets the syntactic optimality operator:
MG, u ,iϕ iff ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ[JϕK]).
We therefore restrict our attention in what follows, when looking at questions of defin-
ability, to the class of models in which the two conditions above hold.
One way to reason about optimality operators, or rationality, is to define them ex-
plicitly in the language. So rather than introduce an operator ,iϕ meaning that i plays
optimally with respect to the restriction defined by ϕ, we might want a language which
for any formula ϕ has for example some formula NSDi(ϕ) that expresses that player i
plays a strategy that is not strictly dominated amongst the restriction defined by ϕ.
In order to do that the language would need some way to talk about the preferences
of the players. We will consider here ordinal preferences (inspired by a language with
terms for cardinal preferences proposed in [Bruin, 2004]), and as with strategies, we
will look at two ways of reasoning about them in the language: using proposition letters
or modalities.
One way to express preferences over outcomes is to use expressions of the form
s <i s
′, which we interpret as meaning that i prefers (strictly) the outcome s′ to the
outcome s. So if LΨ has a proposition s <i s′ ∈ Ψ for every s, s′ ∈ T , that are
interpreted in the appropriate way, we say that it has ‘propositions for preferences’.
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The ‘appropriate way’ is just that we want s <i s′ to be true just if s <i s′. Notice that
this means the valuation of each s <i s′ is going to be everywhere true or everywhere
false.
The other way to express preferences is in terms of preference modalities. [Ben-
them et al., 2006] show how, in a suitably rich ‘hybrid’ logical language – effectively
the language with ↓ that we define below – it is possible to define the important game-
theoretical notion of Nash equilibrium. In this Chapter we do not consider solution
concepts that require anything other than a deductive interpretation6, but as we shall
see, preference modalities can be used, as can preference propositions, to express some
optimality and rationality notions.
Several different preference modalities are possible, and each of the following four
clauses of a language L could be added to form, respectively, the languages L≥, L>,
L≤, and L<:
ϕ ::= . . . | 〈≥i〉ϕ | 〈>i〉ϕ | 〈≤i〉ϕ | 〈<i〉ϕ
These modalities have a natural interpretation; we give that for 〈≥〉, the rest being
analogous:
M, u  〈≥i〉ϕ iff ∃si ∈ ξi(JϕKM) : ξi(u) ≥i si
Notice then that in the language L≥,≤, the universal modality becomes definable: since
the preference order is assumed to be total, 〈≥〉ϕ ∨ 〈≤〉ϕ is true just if JϕK 6= ∅.
In any case, we will see that we need a global modality in order to define the
optimality operator corresponding to non-strict dominance. The same will not, perhaps
surprisingly, be true for defining rationality, which therefore remains in some sense a
‘local’ property.
Either of these approaches can be used, in languages with propositions for strate-
gies, and sufficient cardinality, to express both non-strict dominance, and the corre-
sponding form of rationality.
In order to express non-strict dominance we need the global modality (or, as we
have seen, enough strategy or preference modalities). Then if we have preference
propositions in the language, we define the formula scheme NSD(ϕ) as follows:
NSDi(ϕ) :=
∧
ui∈Ti
(
ui →
∧
ti∈Ti
∨
s−i∈Ti
(
E(si ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬(ui, s−i) <i (ti, s−i)
))
.
A very similar formula in LN,A,≥ can also be used:
NSD′i(ϕ) :=
∧
ui∈Ti
(
ui →
∧
ti∈Ti
∨
s−i∈Ti
(
E((si ∧ ϕ) ∧ 〈≥i〉(ti ∧ s−i))
))
.
Both of these formulae work to define the relevant optimality operator: Fact 2.2 states
that both NSD′i(ϕ) and NSDi(ϕ) are true just when player i chooses a strategy that is
not strictly dominated with respect to the restriction defined by ϕ.
6We do mention Nash equilibrium in Chapter 4; see Definition 4.7
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Fact 2.2. ξi(JNSD′i(ϕ)K) = ξi(JNSDi(ϕ)K) = {si ∈ Ti | nsd(si, Ti, ξ−i(JϕK))}
Being a potential best response which, recall from Chapter 1, is a defined by switch-
ing two quantifiers in the definition of not being strictly dominated, is definable by
switching the second conjunction and the following disjunction. And with more pref-
erence modalities, or just using the preference propositions, note that it is also possible
using this approach to define weak dominance (‘admissibility’), for example as:
NWDi(ϕ) :=
∧
ui∈Ti
(
ui →
∧
ti∈Ti
( ∨
s−i∈Ti
(E(s−i ∧ ϕ) ∧ (ti, s−i) <i (ui, s−i))
∨
∧
s−i∈Ti
(E(s−i ∧ ϕ)→ ¬(ui, s−i) <i (ti, s−i))
))
The syntactic form of NSD(ϕ) reveals that, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, since it
is indeed positive in ϕ, it corresponds to a monotonic operator. What we mean by that
is that if JϕK ⊆ JψK then JNSD(ϕ)K ⊆ JNSD(ψ)K. The same is not true of NWD(ϕ):
the second occurrence of ϕ occurs in a ‘negative’ position, in fact under the scope of a
single negation symbol (recall that ϕ→ ψ is an abbreviation of ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)).
Interestingly, in the relational case, to define rationality in this way, we do not
need a global modality. Let us again focus on the case of non-strict dominance, so
that being rational means playing a strategy that is not strictly dominated with respect
to the restriction defined by your information relation. Then the following sentence
expresses that player i is rational:∧
ui∈Ti
(
ui →
∧
ti∈Ti
∨
s−i∈Ti
(
♦i(s−i ∧ ϕ) ∧ ¬(ui, s−i) <i (ti, s−i)
))
.
Similar versions can also be given for other optimality notions.
So it can be possible to define rationality if the language is able to reason fully about
the strategies. What if the language is unable to express the strategies of the players?
It is still sensible to ask for languages that can define rationality even when they lack
proposition letters for strategies, or if they do not express preferences directly, and the
semantic restrictions (1) or (2) were not placed on the optimality operator.
The first language we will look at in which rationality is definable is a very ex-
pressive extension of the basic modal language, in which we allow for ‘second-order’
quantifiers over events. This means introducing a set of proposition letters that will
be used as variables VAR, written as X, Y, . . ., and if L is a modal language then the
propositionally quantified language L∀ based in L is given by taking the recursive
definition of L and adding the following two clauses:
ϕ ::= . . . | X | ∀X.ϕ,
where X is one of the variables. We also use the standard abbreviation ∃X.ϕ for
¬∀X.¬ϕ. In order to give the recursive definition of the semantics of this language,
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we now have to keep track of the meaning of the variables VAR. This is done using
second-order ‘assignments’ δ, which are functions assigning an event to each variable.
The semantic clauses are then given as a relation between a model a state an as-
signment and a formula, and are written as follows:
M, u δ ϕ.
Similarly, we write JϕKδM for
{u ∈ W | M, u δ ϕ}.
The assignment is effectively ‘ignored’ by the existing clauses, so we would simply
re-write them as they are with the subscript, for example:
M, u δ ¬ϕ iff u /∈ JϕKδM.
Furthermore,M, u  ϕ, where no assignment is specified, is shorthand for saying
thatM, u δ ϕ for all assignments δ. Closed formulae are those in which no variable
X occurs that is not within the scope of a quantifier ∀X; clearly for any closed formula
ϕ, it is equivalent to writeM, u  ϕ orM, u δ ϕ for some (arbitrary) assignment δ.
Given a variable X and two assignments δ and δ′, we write δ ∼−X δ′ to mean that
δ and δ′ agree on all variables except (possibly) for X . I.e. if δ and δ′ are assignments,
then
δ ∼−X δ′ iff ∀Y ∈ VAR(X 6= Y ⇒ δ(Y ) = δ′(Y )).
The new semantic clauses can now be given as follows:
M, u δ X iff u ∈ δ(X)
M, u δ ∀Xϕ iff for all δ′ ∼−X δ,M, u δ′ ϕ.
It is then straightforward to see that rationality is definable in any modal language with
monotonic operators for optimality that is supplemented with second-order quantifiers.
That is what is stated in Fact 2.3
Fact 2.3. In any language that extends L∅
N,O,∀, the event ri that player i is rational is
definable.
Proof. The sentence ∀X(iX →,iX) defines the event that i is rational: it says that
for any event X that i believes to be true, i plays optimally with respect to X . 
Second-order modal languages are very expressive. In fact, all of the possible quan-
tifiers and operators that we will discuss below can be expressed in terms of second-
order quantification. Second-order quantification was studied in modal languages by
Fine [1970], who shows undecidability with respect to the general semantics given
here (he also shows that under certain conditions on what sets can be quantified over
the logic can be better behaved).
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Second-order quantification is certainly not ‘local’ in our sense: on the contrary it
‘looks at’ every subset of the model.
In the context of relational models, there is another natural addition to the language
that one can make, which is to introduce a modality corresponding to the inverse rela-
tion for each player. Given a relation R ⊆ W ×W , its inverse, written R−1 is defined
as:
xR−1y iff yRx.
Then the modality corresponding to the inverse of i’s relation, which can write −1i ,
has the following semantics:
M, u  −1i ϕ iff R−1i (u) ⊆ JϕKM.
Intuitively speaking it is not quite clear how to read −1i , but perhaps the dual ♦−1i is
easier: that is true just when there is a state where ϕ holds, and at which i considers
the current state to be possible.
Mathematically speaking, we can also think of the inverse modality as internalising
the relation Ri into the language, in the sense made clear by Fact 2.4.
Fact 2.4. J♦−1i ϕK = Ri(JϕK).
Of course, in models where the players’ relations Ri are symmetric, for example in
S5 (partitional) models,−1i is equivalent toi, and so the expressivity of the language
would remain the same if we were to add these ‘inverse’ operators. In general though,
that is not true. In S4 models, adding the inverse modality will add expressivity, and
indeed an S5 operator can be defined there using the inverse modality: if we think ofϕ ∧−1ϕ as a single modal operator with the argument ϕ, then of course if  is S4
then the conjunction will be S5.
For any language L, we write the language with inverse belief modalities as L−1.
We can use Fact 2.4 in order to define rationality in the context of the next kind
of language we consider. Hybrid languages are modal but can also include constants
variables and various forms of quantification over points. Hybrid constants are like
standard propositional variables, except that they are true at precisely one state, so they
are names for what we might call ‘point events’. These hybrid constants are called
‘nominals’, and can be used to increase the axiom definability of a language. Hybrid
logics of all the kinds that we consider below have been studied model-theoretically
and axiomatically in [Cate, 2005].
We will not consider languages with non-variable nominals here, but will consider
only languages with quantifiers over states. The first kind of quantifier that we consider
is the standard first-order quantifier ∀. To add it to a language involves adding two
clauses reminiscent of those added to form a propositionally quantified language: we
again use a set of variables VAR, and a quantifier ∀, so we add the following two
clauses, to form L∀ from L:
ϕ ::= . . . | x | ∀x.ϕ,
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where x ∈ VAR. The semantic clauses also need to keep track of an assignment:
M, u δ ∀x.ϕ iff for all δ′ ∼−x δ,M, u δ′ ϕ.
Note that whileL∀ cannot express the fact that a given event is a singleton event, and so
is not as expressive as L∀, L∀,A can express this fact, and so is strictly more expressive
than L∀.
Another operator that is often considered in hybrid languages is the @x modality,
where @xϕ means that ‘at state x, ϕ holds.’ The language clause, to form L@ from the
hybrid language L, given some set VAR of variables, is the following:
ϕ ::= . . . | @xϕ,
where x is a variable from VAR. The semantic clause is then precisely as we said:
M, u δ @xϕ iff δ(x) = {v} &M, v δ ϕ.
Notice that if the universal modality were added to a hybrid language, then that would
already be able to express the @x modality, since in the case where x can only be
interpreted as singleton or empty events, the sentence ¬A¬x∧A(x→ ϕ) is equivalent
to @xϕ.
The @x operator in some sense ‘jumps’, but note that it is not itself non-local, since
the non-locality depends really on the values x can take. We will look in a moment at
a more local kind of quantification. First, though let us draw the reader’s attention to
the expressivity of @.
In combination with the first-order quantifier, the @x modality is expressive. In-
deed, in the case of relational models, it can express everything that an equivalent
first-order language could express over the model’s signature. The first-order formu-
lae for N players over relational models for the propositions Ψ is given as follows,
where p ∈ Ψ:
ϕ ::= p(x) | xRiy | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∀xϕ.
A first-order assignment δ is a function assigning a single state to each first-order vari-
able, the set of which we also write VAR, i.e. δ : VAR → W . Then we writeM δ ϕ to
mean that the assignment δ makes the first-order formula true, and define the relation
as follows:
M δ p(x) iff δ(x) ∈ JpKM
M δ xRiy iff δ(y) ∈
⋂Ni(δ(x))
M δ ¬ϕ iff M 2δ ϕ
M δ ϕ ∧ ψ iff M δ ϕ &M δ ψ
M δ ∀xϕ iff for all δ′ ∼−x δ,M δ′ ϕ.
A variable x is called ‘free’ in a formula if it does not occur there under the scope of a
quantification ∀x. The first-order language is the set of first-order formulae that have
one free variable, and we overload notation and write Jϕ(x)KM to refer to the set of
states that make ϕ(x) true, in the following sense:Jϕ(x)KM = {u ∈ W | δ(x) = u⇒M δ ϕ(x)}.
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(Here and in general, where ϕ(x) denotes a first-order formula, we mean that x is the
unique free variable in the formula ϕ.)
Then the language LN,∀,@ is equi-expressive with this language, in the sense that
the following are equivalent for any event X in the modelM:
1. There is a first-order formula ϕ such that JϕKM = X .
2. There is a formula ϕ ∈ LN,∀,@ such that JϕKM = X .
This is proved by showing that there is a straightforward translation between the lan-
guages. We do not give the details here; cf. [Cate, 2005].
The other kind of quantification over states that we consider is known as ‘bounded
quantification’. The hybrid ‘binder’ ↓ is used to assign a ‘name’ to the current state,
in order later to refer back to it. Logically speaking, it is a kind of quantifier. The new
clauses, to transform a language L to a binder language L↓, are the following:
ϕ ::= . . . | x |↓x.ϕ,
where x ∈ VAR. And again we relativise the semantics to an assignment function δ,
but this time the semantics of the quantifier are as follows:
M, u δ↓x.ϕ iff M, u δ[x 7→{u}] ϕ,
where the new assignment δ[x 7→ {u}] is the unique assignment δ′ such that δ′ ∼−x δ
and δ′(x) = {u}. Notice that this kind of quantification is local in our sense. In
fact, it can be characterised model-theoretically as the fragment of first-order logic that
is preserved under generated sub-models: [Areces et al., 1999] show that the binder
quantifier is equivalent to first-order bounded quantification, shown by Feferman [Fe-
ferman, 1968] to be the fragment of the first-order language that is invariant under
generated sub-models. However, if we add the universal modality, then we are again
back at the full first-order language, so the following are equivalent:
1. There is a first-order formula ϕ such that JϕKM = X .
2. There is a formula ϕ ∈ LN,↓,A such that JϕKM = X .
We can use any modal language with the binder, optimality operators and converse
modality in order to define rationality. That is what is stated by Fact 2.5.
Fact 2.5. If L ⊇ L∅N,O,↓,−1, then there is a formula in L that defines that player i is
rational on relational models.
Proof. J↓x.,i (♦−1i x)K is the event that the player i is rational. (This is immediate
given Fact 2.4.) 
Corollary 2.1. If L ⊇ L∅N,O,↓, then there is a formula in L that defines that player i is
rational on partitional models.
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An arguably more natural way to define rationality is to use the fact that the lan-
guage can express what strategies players are playing. This means that the definition
of rationality will be parametrised by the particular game being analysed, but that is
not a problem since we will nonetheless give a generic formulation of rationality in
terms of disjunctions over the strategy sets. In contrast to the previous definitions, this
will work only in the presence of the constraints that hold on optimality operators, so it
does not work for arbitrary monotonic operators ,i, but since rationality only makes
sense with respect to optimality operators that is not a problem. The final concern is
about cardinality: if the cardinality of the strategy sets exceeds the cardinality of the
language then we will not be able to define rationality in this way, and so would have
recourse to one of the previous definitions.
The idea is very straightforward, and mirrors the generic definition of rationality
in terms of second-order quantification. It relies essentially on us placing some some
constraints on optimality operators, specifically on constraint 2 that we discussed after
Proposition 2.1. That constraint says that optimality of a player’s choice with respect
to a formula depends only on the restriction defined by that formula. Therefore we do
not need to quantify over all events, but only over those events that define restrictions
of the game.7 If the language is expressive enough, in terms of its basic propositions
and its cardinality, then we can define each of those restrictions S with a formula ϕS .
Finally, if the cardinality of the language suffices then we can use these ϕS’s in order
to ‘simulate’ the universal quantification with a conjunction.
Given some restriction S ⊆ T , of cardinality less than the cardinality of the lan-
guage, then if either T ⊆ Ψ or ⋃Ti ⊆ Ψ, we can define the event that players play
according to S, simply by taking an appropriate disjunction. So in the case where
T ⊆ Ψ, we simply set
ϕS =
∨
s∈S
s.
Then, in case the cardinality of the language allows it, the following sentence would
be a formula of the language: ∧
S⊆T
(iϕS →,iϕS).
When does the cardinality of the language allow it? The ‘length’ of this sentence is
bounded by 2.#(T ) × 2#(T ). Therefore if the cardinality of the language is greater
than this then the relevant sentence is a formula of the language. So if the language has
proposition letters for strategies or for strategy profiles, and if κ, the cardinality of the
language, is inaccessible and #(T ) < κ, then the sentence is in the language.
Furthermore, as Fact 2.6 states, on monotonic models the sentence will define ra-
tionality.
7Recall that an event is an arbitrary subset of the state space, whereas a restriction is a set of strategy
profiles.
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Fact 2.6. On monotonic models, J∧S⊆T (iϕS →,iϕS)K defines the event that player
i is rational.
Proof. We show the direction where monotonicity is required: that the sentence being
true entails that the player is rational. So suppose that
MG, u 
∧
S⊆T
(iϕS →,iϕS).
Then take anyX ∈ Ni(u). We must show that ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ(X)). By the monotonicity
ofNi(u) and the fact that ξ−1(ξ(X)) ⊇ X , we have that ξ−1(ξ(X)) ∈ Ni(u). In which
case u  iϕξ(X), so by supposition u ,iϕξ(X), i.e. ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ(X)). 
Notice that we have seen different kinds of definition of rationality. In the basic
modal language (including the infinitary modal language), we had to talk specifically
about the game in the language, so this was in some sense not a ‘emphuniform’ defi-
nition, in that it is parametrised by the game. The abstract definition using a converse
modality and the hybrid binder, and the more explicit definition using second-order
quantification, were on the other hand both ‘uniform’. We do not have more to say
about this, and it is not yet clear how to make precise the difference between uniform
and non-uniform definition, and so how to establish that the less expressive modal
languages might have a non-uniform, but no uniform, definition of rationality.
Another notion that is definable via a second-order approach or by infinite conjunc-
tions is that of common belief. As long as the cardinality of the language is sufficient,
the finitary basic modal language can define mutual belief, as follows:
ϕ := ∧
i∈N
iϕ.
The language described by Aumann [1999] does not include common belief in
the language. Rather, it is only described there at the more informal semantic level
as the (countable) intersection of iterated belief operators, so in our terminology it is∗. (Recall that on relational models the countable intersection is equivalent to the
arbitrary intersection.)
The other characterisation of common belief is in terms of the existence of an
evident event (Fact 1.5 from Section 1.3). Recall that an ‘evident’ event is an event
E such that at every state in E, every player believes he or she is in E, i.e. such that
∀i ∈ N, Ri(E) ⊆ E. In any language including LN,A,∀, we can express the fact that
an event is evident: where δ(X) = E, the following is equivalent to E being evident:
M, u δ A(X → X).
So the these languages can certainly define common belief:
Fact 2.7. Any language that contains LN,A,∀ can express common belief.
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Proof. The following formula defines common belief of ϕ, and is clearly in LN,A,∀.
∃X.(X ∧ A(X → (ϕ ∧X))).

However, we do not need to go as far as this in order to define common belief. One
option would be to add the common belief operator to the language, and to ensure via
appropriate axioms that it behaves as a common belief operator, i.e. to show that it is
axiom-definable. That is a common method for including a common belief operator
in a language, but is not something we pursue further here. Cf. [Lismont and Mongin,
1994; Fagin et al., 1995; Heifetz, 1996].
Another extension to the language that we will consider is adding fixpoint quanti-
fiers, which as is known can also be used to define common belief. After all, the evident
event whose existence is asserted by the second-order formulation of quantified belief
in Fact 2.7 just is the fixpoint for a certain operation involving mutual belief (cf. Fact
1.5). That is why fixpoint quantifiers, as we will see in a moment (Fact 2.8 below), are
able to express common belief.
Fixpoint quantifiers are perhaps initially less natural to interpret than the other
quantifiers, but they provide natural ways to express iterative concepts like the two
key notions from the previous Chapter: common belief and the iterated elimination of
non-optimal strategies. To extend a language L to a fixpoint language Lν , we add this
clause:
ϕ ::= . . . | X | νX.ϕ,
where again X is a variable interpreted, by an assignment, as an event. However, we
also add the following two restrictions:
1. ϕ is positive in X , meaning that X occurs under the scope of an even number of
negation symbols ¬.
2. All operators occurring in ϕ are monotonic.
These two restrictions together mean that the function defined by ϕ(X) is monotonic,
i.e. that, in a similar way as with the case of non-strict dominance discussed above,
where ϕ(X) is a formula with X the only free variable, the following map is mono-
tonic:
Fϕ : 2
W → 2W
E 7→ JϕK{(X,E)}.
That means, as we mentioned in the previous Chapter, that as a corollary of [Tarski,
1955, Theorem 1], there are both a largest and a smallest fixpoint for the function. The
semantic clause for the fixpoint operator is the following:
M, u δ νX.ϕ iff ∃E ⊆ |M| : u ∈ E ⊆ JϕKδ[X 7→E]M
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This means that νX.ϕ(X) is interpreted by the event that is the largest fixpoint for the
map defined by ϕ(X). Which entails, given Fact 1.5, that common belief is definable.
(Actually we are using the generalisation of Fact 1.5 to monotonic neighbourhood
models given in [Heifetz, 1996, Proposition 2.1].)
Fact 2.8. The following are equivalent:
1. u ∈ ∞JϕK.
2. u  νX.(ϕ ∧X).
Recall that on relational and topological models, J(ϕ∧ψ)K = Jϕ∧ψK. Then
Corollary 2.2 is immediate:
Corollary 2.2. On relational and topological models, the following are equivalent:
1. u ∈ ∞JϕK.
2. u  νX. (ϕ ∧X).
Corollary 2.2 is tight though, in the sense that it does not in general hold for neigh-
bourhood models (monotonic or otherwise). On monotonic neighbourhood models
this second fixpoint that we have defined νX. (ϕ∧X) is related to co-mutual belief
(Definition 1.12), but this is not something we investigate further here.
The trick to proving Theorem 1.1 in a relatively simple manner was to observe that
not only is common belief a kind of fixpoint, but so is the outcome of the iterated elim-
ination of non-optimal strategies, when the optimality operator is monotonic. Indeed,
in that case, as Fact 2.9 states, we can define the outcome of elimination of non-optimal
strategies.
Fact 2.9. ξ(JνX.,XK) = O∞.
The last method we consider for defining common belief is perhaps less elegant,
but certainly does the job in a clear way. That is to define it directly as the infinite
conjunction that it is always defined as intuitively: ‘everybody believes that ϕ, every-
body believes that everybody believes that ϕ,. . . ’. As we have seen, in non-relational
neighbourhood models it is possible to separate finitary and transfinite common belief.
Cardinality considerations show us that in no LN,κ is there a sentence that expresses
‘true’ common belief in arbitrary neighbourhood models.
However, any properly infinitary version of the basic modal language can define
finitary common belief:
Fact 2.10. Any language including LN,κ, where κ > ℵ0, can define finitary common
belief ∗ϕ.
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Proof. The following formula defines common belief in ϕ, and is in LN,κ:∧
m∈N
 . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
ϕ.

For ‘bigger’ versions of common belief, note that if the cardinality of the language
is κ, then it can define α-order mutual belief for any ordinal α < κ. But we should
re-iterate that in the relational models that are used in the game theory literature, any
suitably infinitary modal language can define common belief.
Suppose that we were to have formulae r in our language, to be interpreted as:
‘player i is rational’. We have seen that this can be definable, in a suitably expressive
language. It could also be primitive. Either way, certain axioms will be valid with
respect to this formula. (Recall that validity means being true in every model.) Most
notably, an axiom similar to that considered by de Bruin [2004] will be valid:
ri → (iϕ→,iϕ) riDis
Then if we write r for
∧
i∈N ri, and similarly for  and ,, then clearly the following
statement is derivable from the axioms riDis:
r→ (ϕ→,ϕ) rDis
Furthermore, the following axiom is valid for the fixpoint operator:
νX.ϕ→ ϕ[X 7→ νX.ϕ] νDis,
where ϕ[X 7→ ψ] denotes the formula obtained by replacing all occurrences of x in
ϕ by ψ. That axiom along with the following proof rule were introduced in [Kozen,
1983].
ψ → ϕ[x 7→ ψ]
ψ → νx.ϕ νInd
It is straightforward to show that the proof rule is ‘sound’, meaning that when its
premise is valid then so is its conclusion. Furthermore, in the case of relational models,
the axiom and proof rule have been shown by Walukiewicz [1995] to generate, along
with standard axioms and rules for the language LN , the LN,ν-logic of those models.
I.e. he shows that there is a complete axiomatisation of the logic. The LN,ν-logic of
neighbourhood models does not yet have a complete axiomatisation, nor do we have
a complete axiomatisation of the ri operator. It is beyond the scope of this Chapter to
axiomatise any complete logics, but we will now show that rDis, νDis and νInd are
sufficient to give a proof of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.1 can be stated syntactically as follows:
(Th1.1) (∞r ∧ r)→ νX.,X ,
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where ∞ϕ is an abbreviation of νX. (ϕ ∧X), cf. Corollary 2.2.
Fact 2.11. (Th1.1) is true iff rationality and common belief of rationality imply that the
players will not play strategies that survive the elimination of non-optimal strategies.
(This uses Fact 2.9.)
By Fact 2.11, the validity of (Th1.1) on relational models is equivalent to Theorem
1.1.
Theorem 2.1. (Th1.1) is valid.
Proof. The following formula is an instance of the axiom rDis
(set ϕ := ∞r ∧ r):
r→ ((∞r ∧ r)→,(∞r ∧ r)),
Given that ∞r is really νX.  (r ∧X), the following is equivalent to an instance of
νDis (setting ϕ := (X ∧ r)):
∞r→ (∞r ∧ r)
Putting these two together via some simple propositional logic, we obtain:
(∞r ∧ r)→,(∞r ∧ r).
This last formula is of the right shape to apply the rule νInd
(with ψ := ∞r ∧ r and ϕ := ,X), to obtain:
(∞r ∧ r)→ νX.,X.

Notice that we say that Theorem 2.1 asserts that (Th1.1) is valid including on neigh-
bourhood models. However, recall that Corollary 2.2, that makes it sensible to abbre-
viate ∞r as νX. (r ∧X), applies only to relational and to topological models.
We do not pursue questions of axiomatising the logics of any of these languages,
i.e. of providing syntactic rules of manipulation that could be used to derive all the
formulae of them that are valid.
2.3 Complete models
Rather than taking states as primitive, early work in the epistemics of game theory was
based on the idea of so-called ‘types’ [Harsanyi, 1968], and authors are still divided
in their approaches, so ‘type space’ models are often studied, rather than state space
models. A type for a player can be thought of as the way a player might be, so it is
a ‘possible player’, where states are ‘possible worlds’. A type for a player specifies
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the beliefs of that player, defined in terms of the other players, and also specifies what
strategy that player will play.8 We will show in this Section how to interpret the differ-
ent languages we considered on type-space models, and translate between type-space
and state-space models. There is already a sort of common understanding that the two
ways of modelling are in some sense equivalent, but here we map out exactly in what
sense they are equivalent. We then turn to consider a kind of ‘fullness’ property of
models, ‘assumption-completeness’. We show what this means on state-space models,
and then turn back to look at it in the way considered in [Brandenburger and Keisler,
2006], where it is studied seriously for the first time, in order to prove a positive result
that there are, in the sense of that paper, assumption-complete models for the basic
modal language and some infinitary versions of it.
Definition 2.5. A type-space model for the game (Ti, >i)i∈N is a structure
(Wi, Ri, ξi)i∈N ,
where Wi is a set, called i’s ‘states’, or ‘types’, ξi : Wi → Ti, and Ri ⊆ Wi ×W−i.
Here we are only considering relational type-space models; as far as we are aware
neighbourhood or topological type-space models have not been considered in the lit-
erature. As with the state-space models that we have so far considered, Ri gives i’s
information, which here is taken to mean i’s information concerning the other players.
Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, there is no way to represent a player’s uncer-
tainty about her own type in these models, so players are positively and negatively
introspective.
On these many-sorted models, there are two natural ways for us to make one single-
sorted domain. The first is to take the union of the Wi’s; the other is to take the prod-
uct. We favour the latter approach, mainly because it makes the connection between
type-space and state-space models easier. However, the former approach is taken in
[Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006], in the special case of 2-player type-space models,
and so we will return to it below.
For the product case, the easiest way to see how to interpret languages is to define
a state-space model that is, intuitively, equivalent to the type-space model, and then
interpret the language on that.
Definition 2.6. Given a type-space modelM = (Wi, Ri, ξi)i∈N , we define the state-
space model
S(M) = (W =
∏
i∈N
Wi, R
′
i, ξ
′)i∈N ,
where
R′i(u) = {v ∈ W | ui = vi and v−i ∈ Ri(ui)},
8There are other formulations of type in which a type is not taken to specify a strategy, but that
difference is not of any conceptual or mathematical significance, since it is easy to translate between the
two formulations.
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and
ξ(u) = (ξi(ui))i∈N .
Now, it is not possible to give a formal statement that these models are equivalent,
but it should be intuitively clear that we have captured the type-space model in this
state-space model.
What about the reverse direction? That is, given some state-space model, can we
write down a type-space model that is equivalent to it? The problem here is that be-
cause in type-space models players are in effect certain (and correct) about their own
type, they are fully introspective.
Fact 2.12. In S(M), all players are positively and negatively introspective.
Proof. Let S = (∏i∈N Wi, Ri, ξ)i∈N . First of all notice that for any states u, v ∈ W =∏
i∈N Wi, we have the following Lemma, whose proof is immediate from Definition
2.6.
Lemma 2.1. We have the following entailments:
1. If v ∈ Ri(u) then ui = vi.
2. Ri(u) = Ri(v) iff ui = vi.
Then recall that positive introspection is the following property (see Definition
1.6.4r)
Ri(Ri(u)) ⊆ Ri(u).
So take any w ∈ Ri(Ri(u)). Then there exists v ∈ Ri(u) such that w ∈ Ri(v).
Since v ∈ Ri(u), then by Lemma 2.1.1., vi = ui, so by the Lemma 2.1.2, Ri(v) =
Ri(u). But recall that w ∈ Ri(v); so w ∈ Ri(u) as required for positive introspection.
Negative introspection (Definition 1.6.5r) is the following property:
{v, w} ⊆ Ri(u)⇒ w ∈ Ri(v).
So take any {v, w} ⊆ Ri(u). By Lemma 2.1.1, vi = ui = wi, so by Lemma 2.1.2,
w ∈ Ri(v) as required. 
This means of course that it is not possible to find a type-space model that faithfully
represents every state-space model, since there are state-space models that are not pos-
itively and negatively introspective. However, we will now describe a translation that
does faithfully represent every positively and negatively introspective relational model
as a (relational) type-space model.
So let us take a relational state-space model S = (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N .
Definition 2.7. First, we define an equivalence relation ∼i on the state space:
u ∼i v iff Ri(u) = Ri(v) & ξi(u) = ξi(v).
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The relation∼i in Definition 2.7 is supposed to capture the identity of types: u ∼i v
means that i’s ‘type’ is the same at u and at v. It is not actually necessary to use this for
the definition, but we use it to ensure that if we go back and forth, from a type model
to a state model and back again, we do not add any new types.
So we use this equivalence relation ∼i in order to give the types in the type-space
model T (S) that we will define. Given the equivalence relation ∼i, we write [u]i to
mean the equivalence class of u, i.e.
[u]i = {v ∈ W | u ∼i v}.
This allows us to define the translation T ( ).
Definition 2.8. Let T (S) = ({[u]i | u ∈ W}, R′i, ξ′i)i∈N , where
[s]iR
′
i
∏
j 6=i
[uj]j iff ∃v ∈ Ri(s) : ∀j ∈ N − {i}, vj ∈ [uj]j.
and
ξ′i([u]i) = (ξ(u))i.
The following Proposition states that the translation makes sense, in that if we
start with a type-space model, translate it to a state-space model and then translate the
resulting state-space model to a type-space model, that second translation is in effect a
‘translating back’, so that we end up with something isomorphic to the original model:
Proposition 2.3. For any type-space modelM, we have T (S(M)) isomorphic with
M.
We have formalised, then, the intuitive connection between state-space models, a
mainstay of formal epistemology, and type-space models.
A recurring issue in the literature on epistemic analysis of games involves defining
a space of all possible beliefs of the players and whether such a space exists. We will
look now in detail at one way of cashing out the notion that a model is a space of all
possible beliefs. Specifically, we consider the property of assumption-completeness,
first introduced in [Brandenburger, 2003].
Following [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006], we use the word ‘assumption’ to
refer to the content of a player’s information.
Definition 2.9. If in some type-space model,Ri(u) = JϕK, i.e. the player’s information
is determined by JϕK, then we say that ϕ is i’s assumption, or equivalently that i
assumes ϕ, at u.
This notion of assumption is closely related to the only-knowing operator stud-
ied by Levesque [Levesque, 1990] (cf. [Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]). A player’s
assumption is her strongest belief: the conjunction of all her beliefs (equivalently, a
belief that implies all her other beliefs). This definition of “assumption” might seem
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strange, and we certainly do not claim that it captures the common-sense meaning of
the English word “assumption”.
Notice that in neighbourhood models, unless the model is relational (i.e. monotonic
and contains its core, cf. Definition 1.17), there is no obvious analogue of a player’s
assumption at a given state, since the information is given not by a single formula but
by a collection of them. We therefore will only consider relational models for the rest
of this Section.
The property of assumption-completeness asserts that every definable set of i’s op-
ponents’ types corresponds to a belief somewhere of i. That is, every possible definable
configuration of i’s beliefs is represented somewhere in the model. Since it is a prop-
erty that talks about definability, it is relative to a language.
Definition 2.10. The type-space model T = (Wi, Ri, ξ) is assumption-complete for
L just if, for all players i:
∀ϕ ∈ L, ∃ui ∈ Wi : Ri(ui) = (JϕKT ) ∩W−i.
Let us say that a type-space model is “non-trivial” when, for every player i, there
is some type ti that ‘rules out’ some type of some other player j 6= i, i.e. such that
(Ri(ti))j 6= Tj .
Definition 2.11. Assumption-completeness as a property of a language just states that
there exists some non-trivial model that is assumption-complete for that language.
Conversely, if there is no non-trivial assumption-complete model for L, then we say
that L is assumption-incomplete.
We postpone discussing the significance or otherwise of assumption-completeness
until later in this Section; for now we turn attention to finding an analogue of it on
state-space models.
How are we to define assumption-completeness for state-space models? The naı¨ve
approach, based on a simplistic reading of [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006], would
be to say that a state-space model S is assumption-complete for L just if for any ϕ ∈
L, there is u ∈ W such that Ri(u) = JϕKS . Let us call this, for the purposes of
our discussion, the ‘tentative’ definition of assumption-completeness. However, it is
not difficult to see that this is not an innocent approach. For then even very simple
languages are not assumption-complete:
Fact 2.13. For the tentative definition of assumption-completeness just proposed, no
language with disjunction has an assumption-complete introspective relational model,
in which the language can define more than one event.
Proof. This is easy to see: Take any relational modelM satisfying positive and neg-
ative introspection, and two formulae ϕ and ψ of the language such that (in M)JϕK 6= JψK, JϕK 6⊂ JψK 6⊂ JϕK. Suppose towards a contradiction thatM is assumption-
complete according to the tentative definition. Then there would be a state u such that
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Ri(u) = JϕK. Since the language is closed for disjunction, there is also a state w such
that Ri(w) = JϕK ∪ JψK. Then take any x ∈ JϕK and any y ∈ JψK − JϕK. Now since
wRix and wRiy, then we know that xRiy. But then since uRix, uRiy, which is a
contradiction. So the tentative definition will not do. 
Since type-space models are fully introspective, obviously the proposed tentative
definition is not acceptable. We want a more meaningful definition of assumption-
completeness of course, one that is faithful to the definition on type-space models.
Assumption-completeness is explored in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006], where
a number of results are established, and connections to modal logic are mentioned. As
in that paper, we will henceforth restrict our attention to two-player models, fixing
N = {a, b}. There may well be further issues to be discovered in the consideration of
models with more players N , but the essential character of the issue is captured in the
two-player case. We will now give a proper definition of assumption-completeness for
models.
Definition 2.12. A model S = (W,Ra, Rb, ξ) is assumption-complete for a language
L just if for any ϕ ∈ L, for {i, j} = {a, b}, there exists y ∈ W such that the following
two conditions hold:
• ∀x ∈ JϕK,∃v ∈ Ri(y) : Rj(v) = Rj(x) & ξj(v) = ξj(x);
• ∀v ∈ Ri(y),∃x ∈ JϕK : Rj(v) = Rj(x) & ξj(v) = ξj(x).
We say that S is assumption-complete tout court when it is assumption-complete
for a and for b.
Definition 2.12 might seem more long-winded than Definition 2.10, but it is equiv-
alent to the definition for type-space models, in the following sense:
Theorem 2.2. The following equivalences hold for any type-space model T and any
state-space modelM:
• T is assumption-complete (in the sense of Definition 2.10) iff S(T ) is assump-
tion-complete (in the sense of Definition 2.12).
• M is assumption-complete iff T (M) is assumption-complete.
Thus we have found the “correct” definition of assumption-completeness for single-
sorted models.
The central result in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] is an impossibility result:
that the first-order language is assumption-incomplete.
The result that Brandenburger and Keisler prove is, in effect
Theorem 2.3 ([Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006, Theorem 5.4]). There are no assump-
tion-complete models for any language extending LN,∀,@.
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Although we refer to [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] for the proof9, let us say
that it revolves around proving that a formula expressing the following statement, or
some sub-formula of it, must be unsatisfiable on any model:
(BK) Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption
is wrong.
We will now look at how to formalise (BK) in some language for state-space mod-
els. We will see that this sentence (BK) is a sort of many-player, so interactive version
of Russell’s paradox. We therefore recommend it for further study also outside the
field of game theory. For our present purposes, the sentence (BK) is also crucial to
the proof of Theorem 2.4, so we investigate it in some detail in what follows. We will
show that the (implicit) KD45 nature of type-space models is crucial to the particular
argument used in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] to prove Theorem 2.3. In order to
do that, we first need to show how to formalise (BK) in L{a,b},↓,A, so for the time being
we return again to state-space models with two players a (Ann) and b (Bob).
The sentence ‘Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong’ can be formalised as
follows: a ↓x.b ¬x
And ‘Bob assumes that ϕ’ can be written as
↓x.A(ϕ ≡↓y.(A(x→ ♦by)))
Putting these two together, we get that the formal translation of (BK) can be written as:
a ↓x.A(a ↓z.b ¬z ≡↓y.(A(x→ ♦by)))
We will use the following Facts to reveal some hidden premises in the informal
version of Brandenburger and Keisler’s argument. Note that this does not detract from
the validity of Theorem 2.3. All that it does is to suggest that the implicit KD45 na-
ture of type-space models, most notably the positive and negative introspection aspect
(cf. Fact 2.12) might be crucial to its proof.
Fact 2.14. The formal translation of the sentence (BK) is satisfiable on some state-
space model, as long as we do not require all of D, 4 and 5 to hold.
Proof. We give counterexamples in order to prove this Fact.
D. The first and simplest example is perhaps no surprise, since Brandenburger and
Keisler explicitly add the condition D to their type-space models. The state-space
model that we use as a counterexample, where D does not hold, is
MD = ({u}, Ra = ∅, Rb = {(u, u)}, ξ),
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u
b
Figure 2.3: A model without Da
where ξ is, as in the next two models, arbitrary. A diagram of the relational
structure is given in Figure 2.3.
MD is KD45 except that Ann lacks D. Furthermore, at u, the formal translation
of (BK) holds.
4. In the modelM4, we drop transitivity for a.
M4 = ({u, v, w}, Ra = {(u, v), (v, v), (v, w), (w,w)},
Rb = {(u, u), (v, u), (w,w)}, ξ).
Figure 2.4 representsM4.
u
v
wb
a
a, ba
b a
Figure 2.4: A model in which Ann lacks positive introspection
M4 has all introspection properties except that Ann lacks 4. Furthermore, at u,
(BK) is true.
5. In this modelM5, Ann lacks negative introspection. (In fact she lacks confidence
in her own beliefs.)
M5 = ({u, v, w, x}, Ra = {(u, v), (u,w), (u, x), (v, w), (w, x), (x, x)},
Rb = {(u, v), (v, v), (w, v), (x,w)}
M5 has all introspection properties except that Ann lacks 5 (and indeed mT ).
Furthermore, at w, (BK) holds.
9A syntactic proof of [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006, Theorem 5.4], is found in [Pacuit, 2007].
Though note that the language used in [Pacuit, 2007] is LΨN,↓,A, which as we have noted is a syntactic
variant of first-order logic.
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u v w
x
a, b
a, b
b
a
a
b a
a
Figure 2.5: A model in which Ann is not negatively introspective.

That is, if introspection fails then the sentence (BK) is consistent. It might seem
puzzling that an informal argument is given in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006, Sec-
tion 1] to the effect that (BK) is not satisfiable, an argument where the word “intro-
spection” is never used, nor is any concept like it employed. Fact 2.14 illustrates that
corners were cut in the informal argument. Let us spend a moment to unpick the
threads of the argument.
Suppose towards a contradiction that (BK) is true. We quote the following argu-
ment:
“To get the impossibility, ask: Does Ann believe that Bob’s assump-
tion is wrong? If so, then in Ann’s view, Bob’s assumption, namely ‘Ann
believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong’, is right. But then Ann does not
believe that Bob’s assumption is wrong, which contradicts our starting
supposition. This leaves the other possibility, that Ann does not believe
that Bob’s assumption is wrong. If this is so, then in Ann’s view, Bob’s as-
sumption, namely ‘Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong’, is wrong.
But then Ann does believe that Bob’s assumption is wrong, so we again get
a contradiction.” – op.cit.
So (BK) must be false. Yet we have illustrated models in which, given the failure of
D, 4 or 5, (BK) is true. So let us look one-by-one at where each is implicitly used in
the argument.
If Ann is allowed to be inconsistent in her beliefs, then of course she can believe
what (BK) asserts that she believe! It is disarming to note that the quoted argument has
this unseen auxiliary premise. Where in that argument is this auxiliary premise hidden?
Notice that at u in the model in Figure 2.3, Ann does believe that Bob’s assumption
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is wrong. Call that proposition q. She also believes that Bob’s assumption is q. She
believes everything, in fact, because ∀X,Ra(u) ⊆ X! In particular, she believes that
Bob’s assumption is right. The additional step taken in the quoted argument is to infer
that this means that she does not believe that Bob’s assumption is wrong.
In the case of positive introspection it is more interesting to ask the question where
does the quoted argument hide the auxiliary premise. Again, notice that this time
u  a ↓x.b¬x; that is, Ann does believe that Bob’s assumption is wrong. We call
the proposition that Bob’s assumption is correct ‘p’. The argument quoted above drew
a contradiction from this situation:
“[. . . ] then in Ann’s view, Bob’s assumption, namely ‘Ann believes that
Bob’s assumption is wrong’, is right. But then Ann does not believe that
Bob’s assumption is wrong, which contradicts our starting supposition.”
Ann does believe that she does not believe ¬p. That is: a¬ a ¬p. And we already
have a¬p. But we do not have a a ¬p, which would (along with Ann’s consis-
tency), yield a contradiction. For that, we need positive introspection.
In the case of negative introspection, all that is needed is the property mT men-
tioned in Section 1.3, that says that if a player believes that she believes something,
then she believes it. That, recall, is entailed by 5. Again we compare this to the quoted
argument. This time, u  ¬a ↓x.b¬x: Ann does not believe that Bob’s assumption
is wrong; she considers it possible that it is right.
“If this is so, then in Ann’s view, Bob’s assumption, namely ‘Ann believes
that Bob’s assumption is wrong’, is wrong. But then Ann does believe that
Bob’s assumption is wrong, so we again get a contradiction.”
This goes a little quickly. “Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong”, certainly, is
wrong; but the movement to conclude that Ann believes that she does not believe that
Bob’s assumption is wrong involves using mT , a(aϕ → ϕ). This says that Ann
does not believe herself to have any false beliefs. In particular, it says that Ann believes
that: if she believes that Bob is correct then Bob is correct. So in any possibility that
Ann considers in which Bob is correct, she considers it possible that Bob is correct.
Otherwise put: In any possibility that she considers in which Bob’s assumption is
right, she does not believe that Bob’s assumption is wrong (a(¬p → ¬ a p)). So
any such possibility cannot be part of Bob’s assumption, which is specified by (BK)
to be precisely those possibilities at which Ann does believe that Bob’s assumption is
wrong. But if a possibility is not part of Bob’s assumption, then at that possibility,
Bob’s assumption is incorrect. Therefore there can be no possibility for Ann at which
Bob’s assumption is correct. I.e. she believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong.
So we have seen that assumption-completeness does depend on some properties of
the players’ beliefs, and shown how that fact plays out formally and informally. This
suggests that the following statement may have been made too hastily:
“our impossibility phenomenon is not affected by the players’ beliefs about
themselves.” [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006].
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Let us turn now to look at the question why we would be interested in assumption-
completeness in the first place.
The idea presented in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006] that is supposed to under-
lie assumption-completeness is that the language for non-i states should be accessible
to i. And if it is accessible to i then he should be able to assume (in this artificial sense)
any member of it. So Theorem 2.3 was taken to be a limiting result, and one that should
be of significance for game theory:
“[O]ur impossibility theorem says: If the analyst’s tools are available to
the players, there are statements that the players can think about but can-
not assume. The model must be [assumption-]incomplete. This appears to
be a kind of basic limitation in the analysis of games.” – [Brandenburger
and Keisler, 2006]
Further arguments are surely needed before we have any reason to accept that assump-
tion-completeness is a necessary condition of the language being ‘available’ to the
players in their reasoning about the model. Assumption-completeness is certainly
technically interesting, and there may be some philosophical significance to it, but
this notion of ‘availability to the players’ needs to be developed further, since it is not
clear why the presence of a certain state in the model means that players do have the
language ‘available’ to them, or that they ‘can’ assume something.
As Brandenburger and Keisler point out, the existence of assumption-complete
models is not only of theoretical interest [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006]. Epis-
temic conditions discussed in game theory sometimes involve notions of “complete-
ness” of the underlying belief model, notions that are similar in flavour to assumption-
completeness. These occur for example in two analyses: in Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s
analysis of extensive-form rationalisability [Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002] and Bran-
denburger, Friedenberg and Keisler’s analysis of iterated admissibility [Brandenburger
et al., 2008].
Let us note also that it is not clear in what sense the putative equivalence that for
example Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 were intended to establish is clearer in an assumption-
complete belief model, where all hierarchies of beliefs are present. The only argument
that might be given towards thinking that the equivalence might be clearer is simply
that as long as rationality and common belief of rationality are expressible in the model,
there will be a state in which each player assumes precisely that.
Nonetheless, let us grant that there might be some interest in finding languages that
are assumption-complete. Given the above interpretation of Theorem 2.3, a natural
question10 is: can one define instead a restricted set of “tools” which can be “avail-
able” to the players, and which are also useful for the analyst? If Theorem 2.3 shows
that the first-order language is too powerful a tool to be available, what about weaker
languages?
10This is also raised in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006, Section 2].
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We will look at one such case, showing that the infinitary modal language has
assumption-complete models. In fact, we show a slightly stronger result, that it has
“full” assumption-complete models, in the following sense (cf. Definition 1.4):
Definition 2.13. The type-space modelM = (Wi, Ri, ξi)i∈N is full for the game G =
(Ti,≥i)i∈N just when
∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Ti, ∃ui ∈ Wi : ξi(ui) = si.
In order to bring things closer to the way they are presented in [Brandenburger
and Keisler, 2006], we now slightly change our formal framework, in effect making
a notational change. Rather than think of type-space models as state-space mod-
els by taking products of the type spaces, we now think of type-space models as
two-sorted state-space models (recall that there are only two players), with a-states
and b-states forming a partition of the state-space. That is, a language is now in-
terpreted, as Brandenburger and Keisler propose, over the union of the domain of
a- and b-states. Given a type-space model (Wa,Wb, Ra, Rb, ξa, ξb), we consider the
single-sorted model (Wa ∪ Wb, Ra ∪ Rb, ξa ∪ ξb,Wa). So this model is of the form
(W,R, ξ,Wa). It is a model for a modal language with a single unary modality  for
the ‘belief’ relation, whose interpretation varies depending on whether we start in an
Ann state (an element of Wa) or a Bob state (element of W −Wa). We will assume
each language to have a nullary modality ♀ forWa, i.e. to distinguish between Ann and
Bob’s domains. Now assumption-completeness of a model of this kind with respect to
a language L is the property that for any ϕ ∈ L that defines a subset of Wa (resp. Wb),
there is a uϕ ∈ Wb (resp. Wa) such that R(uϕ) = JϕK.
Note that this really is just a notational variant of the type-space model, but it
will make proving the next Theorem more straightforward. So we interpret what are
effectively ‘one-player’ versions of the languages we presented above on this model,
the only addition being a proposition letter ♀ that is interpreted to mean the state is an
Ann type (J♀K = Wa). Since there are not several players, we now write L♦ for the
basic modal language. This might seem like an odd approach, but it is very close to the
way things are presented by Brandenburger and Keisler.11 It also allows us to prove
directly the existence of a full assumption-complete model for the infinitary modal
language:
Theorem 2.4. For any game G, there are full assumption-complete models for LΨ♦,O,κ
where for every strategy si there is a proposition letter si ∈ Ψ.
Proof. We define a semantic analogue to the ‘canonical model’ used in completeness
proofs, cf. [Chellas, 1980], and show that it is assumption-complete.
Let us write L for LΨ♦,O,κ. We also write Γ  ⊥ to mean that the set of sentences
Γ ⊆ L is not jointly satisfiable, i.e. that there is no modelM with a point u such that
11Actually, they consider a slightly different two-sorted quantification, writing ∃xaϕ(x) to mean
‘there is an Ann-type such that ϕ is true of it’. We would write this ∃x.(@x♀ ∧ ϕ(x)).
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∀γ ∈ Γ,M, u  γ. And define the maximally satisfiable sets MSS (L) as the following
set:
{Γ ⊂ L | Γ 2 ⊥ & ∀Γ′ ⊃ Γ, Γ′  ⊥}.
Finally, let the model C be (MSS (L), R,O, ξ), where:
• ΓR∆ iff ∀δ ∈ ∆,♦δ ∈ Γ,
• O(X) =
{
Γ ∈ MSS (L)
∣∣∣∃ , ϕ ∈ Γ : {∆ ∈ MSS (L) | ϕ ∈ ∆} ⊆ X},
• ξi(Γ) is the si ∈ Ti such that si ∈ Γ.
It is possible to show by induction that in this model the is an exact match between the
syntactic and the semantic structures, a fact, whose proof is standard, often referred to
as a Truth Lemma:
Lemma (Truth Lemma). C,Γ  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ Γ.
Now take any definable subset X of W a = {Γ ∈ MSS (L) | Γ  ♀}. (This is meant
to be without loss of generality; for the other case, replace here and in what follows a
with b and ♀ with ¬♀.) Then there is some formula ϕ ∈ L such that JϕKC = X . We
know that ϕ is equivalent to ϕ ∧ ♀ (because otherwise ϕ ∧ ¬♀ would be satisfiable, in
which case there would be some ∆ ∈ Jϕ ∧ ¬♀K).
Let Π = {γ ∈ L | {ϕ, ♀, γ} 2 ⊥}. Take any γ ∈ Π; there is some model
Mγ = (Wγ, Rγ, ξγ) with uγ ∈ Wγ andMγ, uγ 
∧{ϕ, ♀, γ}. In which case, there is
also a modelM whose domain is the disjoint union of the domains of theMγ’s plus
one extra point uϕ, which sees precisely the uγ’s, and where Bob plays some strategy
(doesn’t matter which) sb ∈ Tb. To put it more formally,Mϕ is (Wϕ, Rϕ, ξϕ), where:
Wϕ = {uϕ} ∪⋃γ∈Π(Wγ × {γ})
(x, γ)Rϕ(y, δ) iff xRγy and γ = δ
uϕRϕ(x, γ) iff x = uγ
ξϕ(u) =
{
ξγ(u) if u ∈ |Mγ|
sb otherwise.
This simple construction is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Then certainlyMϕ, uϕ  ϕ, and for all γ ∈ Π,Mϕ, uϕ  ♦γ. Let Γϕ = {ψ ∈
L | Mϕ, uϕ  ψ}, the modal theory of uϕ. Clearly Γϕ ∈ MSS (L). We want to show
that R(Γϕ) = {∆ ∈ MSS (L) | ϕ ∈ ∆}.
⊆: ϕ ∈ Γ, so by the Truth Lemma, C,Γ  ϕ. In which case we have ∀∆ ∈
R(Γ) C,∆  ϕ. But again by the Truth Lemma, this means that ϕ ∈ ∆.
⊇: Take any ∆ ∈ MSS (L) such that ϕ ∈ ∆. Then take any δ ∈ ∆; clearly we have
{ϕ, δ} 2 ⊥, so δ ∈ Π, in which caseMϕ, uϕ  ♦δ, i.e. ♦δ ∈ Γ. Since δ was
arbitrary, then by the definition of R (part of the model C), we have shown that
ΓR∆.
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uϕ
uγ0 uγ1 uγα
Mγ0 Mγ1 . . . Mγα . . .
Figure 2.6: The construction ofMϕ, from the proof of Theorem 2.4
(We initially proved in [Zvesper and Pacuit, 2010] a result for a finitary modal
language by giving a completeness proof for the relevant logic, which simply involved
adding axioms for ♀ to the known logic for the normal modality ♦. It might be possible
to adapt completeness proofs for infinitary modal logics, but this is not necessary.) 
This possibility Theorem 2.4 says that some of the analyst’s tools can be available
to the players. Specifically, it shows that the modal language is not too powerful, and
thus can be ‘available’ to the players being modelled. We take this to be an avatar of
the slogan quoted above from [Blackburn et al., 2001] about locality.
There is a close connection between the failure of assumption-completeness and the
impossibility of an unrestricted Comprehension axiom schema in set theory (cf. [De-
vlin, 1993]). Russell’s paradox shows that the formula x /∈ x cannot occur in a Com-
prehension axiom, on pain of inconsistency: it cannot be used to define a set. This
connection between Russell’s paradox and the “paradox” of assumption-completeness
is already remarked in [Brandenburger and Keisler, 2006]. To make that connection
precise it suffices to make the following remark: The consistency of a comprehension
schema ∃x∀z(z ∈ x ≡ ϕ(z)), for all ϕ ∈ L (with x not free in ϕ), is essentially a
single-agent assumption-completeness for the language defined by L.
[Baltag, 1998] proves a result in the context of non-wellfounded set theory that is
therefore related to Theorem 2.4, namely that in that context, an axiom of compre-
hension for infinitary modal formulae holds. There it is also shown, given some large
cardinal assumption, that an axiom of comprehension for so-called ‘generalised pos-
itive formulae’ is consistent. Generalised positive formulae are those defined by the
following recursive scheme and having one free variable:
ϕ ::= ♀(x) | si(x) | xRy |∧Φ |∨Φ | ∀xϕ | ∃xϕ | ∀x(yRx→ ϕ) | ∀x(ψ → ϕ),
where ψ can also include negation. It would be of interest to pursue this connection
with results about the comprehension scheme further, especially in view of [Branden-
burger and Keisler, 2006, Theorem 10.4], stating the assumption-completeness of a
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certain positive (negation-free) fragment of the first-order language, that is related for
example to known results in set theory, cf. [Forti and Hinnion, 1989].
What about further strengthening our possibility result? We will look briefly at
perspectives for doing exactly this.
In the details of the proof of Theorem 2.4, the only ‘modal’ behaviour we exploit,
in showing the satisfiability of a certain set of sentences, is that the truth of modal
sentences is preserved under disjoint unions and generated sub-models. So although
we do not have a proof of an analogue for Theorem 2.4 for a language with the binder
↓, (because the same MSS -based construction as that used in the proof of Theorem 2.4
would not work for LN,↓, in the sense that the Truth Lemma would fail), still we are
lead to suspect that this language also has assumption-complete models:
Conjecture 2.1. For any gameG, there are full assumption-complete models forLΨ♦,O,↓
where for every strategy si there is a proposition letter si ∈ Ψ.
An inspection of the proof of Theorem 2.3 reveals three conditions that together
are sufficient to show that a language L is not assumption-complete.
The first condition is that L can express that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is
wrong.
DM := {u ∈ Wa | ∀v ∈ Ra(u), u /∈ Rb(v)}
(C1) ∃ϕ ∈ L : ∀M, JϕKM = DM.
The second condition is that L be closed under the assumption operator, i.e.:
(C2) ϕ ∈ L ⇒ ∃ψ ∈ L : ∀M, JψKM = {u ∈ Wa | Ra(u) = JϕKM∩Wb}
If both C1 and C2 hold, then L is assumption-incomplete. In particular, L will
allow sentence (BK) to be expressed. Note that (C1) holds with respect to L♦,↓:
Fact 2.15. DM = J♀∧ ↓x.¬xKM
However, since the language is closed under generated sub-models then, impor-
tantly, the assumption operator is not expressible:
Fact 2.16. L↓ does not satisfy condition C2.
Evidence against our Conjecture 2.1 is available from the observation that the com-
prehension scheme in set theory is inconsistent with some L↓ sentences. Indeed, Rus-
sell’s paradox still has its full force, since x /∈ x is in that language (↓ x.  ¬x).
However, the absence of any way to talk about precisely one set of the other type does
lead us still to support Conjecture 2.1. We find it interesting, and worth future research,
that there might be such a language for which comprehension in set theory fails, but
which is assumption-complete. That would in our view truly highlight the interactive
nature of assumption-completeness.
We’ve looked at a language with C1; so what about C2? The easiest way to get C2
is just to add an assumption operator, ./ ϕ, meaning just that the player’s assumption is
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ϕ (cf. [Levesque, 1990; Halpern and Lakemeyer, 2001]). Clearly, adding an assump-
tion operator to L↓ will make the language assumption-incomplete, since it will then
have (C1) and (C2). (So this would be a strictly weaker language than first-order logic,
that is nonetheless assumption-incomplete.) Nonetheless, while we do not investigate
the matter further here, we conjecture that adding an assumption operator into ML
would not leave the happy realm of assumption-completeness.
Summary
More issues have been left unresolved than resolved by this Chapter, which we take to
be an indication that while many game-theorists have become interested in logic, and
logicians in game theory, there is still progress to be made. Concerning the definability
of rationality, we made some first steps by showing some languages to be expressive
enough. We know of very little work in this direction.
There is also scope, in our view, for philosophical arguments to be tightened in the
game-theoretical literature. For example, while we find the concept of assumption-
completeness technically elegant, we do not find convincing the arguments that it is
somehow intuitively justified because it corresponds to some natural notion of avail-
ability of the language to the players. Brandenburger and Keisler also cited a technical
‘need’ for it, or similar notions, to give conditions for backward induction [Battigalli
and Siniscalchi, 2002] or iterated admissibility [Brandenburger et al., 2008]. Yet we
will present later our own condition for backward induction, in Chapter 4, that does not
require any form of ‘complete’ model. For the case of admissibility we do have little
to say (though we will consider some epistemic aspects of it in the next Chapter). Still,
it is questionable how informative it is to say that the epistemic conditions for play-
ing according to the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies are somehow
elucidated by saying that the players are ‘in’ a complete belief model. Nonetheless,
we gave one substantial technical contribution in this Chapter, which was to prove that
infinitary modal languages are assumption-complete.
This was a language, recall from our extensive cataloguing, that can express com-
mon belief and rationality, two concepts that are central to game theory. In that cata-
logue of languages, we discussed various ways in which to define some notions, like
optimality and rationality, that are relevant to the analysis of games.
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Subscript Symbols and their interpretations
N
(W,Ni, . . .)i∈N , u  jϕ iff JϕK ∈ Nj(u)
(W,Ri, . . .)i∈N , u  jϕ iff Rj(u) ⊆ JϕK
Belief modalities, (W,Oi, . . .)i∈N , u ,jϕ iff u ∈ Oj(JϕK)
‘Optimality’ modalities
κ
M, u  ∧β∈α ϕβ iff ∀β ∈ α,M, u  ϕβ
Conjunctions of length < κ
is
M, u  [is]ϕ iff for all v, if ξi(u) = ξi(v) thenM, u  ϕ
Strategy modalities
A
M, u  Aϕ iff JϕK = |M|
Global modality
≥, >, ≤, < M, u  〈≥i〉ϕ iff ∃si ∈ ξi(JϕKM) : ξi(u) ≥i si
Preference modalities
∀ M, u δ ∀x.ϕ iff for all δ
′ ∼−x δ,M, u δ′ ϕ
First-order quantifiers
@
M, u δ @xϕ iff δ(x) = {v} &M, v δ ϕ
Hybrid modalities
↓ M, u δ↓x.ϕ iff M, u δ[x 7→{u}] ϕ,
Bounded first-order quantification
∀
M, u δ X iff u ∈ δ(X)
M, u δ ∀Xϕ iff for all δ′ ∼−X δ,M, u δ′
Propositional (‘second-order’) quantifiers
ν
M, u δ νX.ϕ iff ∃E ⊆ |M| : u ∈ E ⊆ JϕKδ[X 7→E]
Fixpoint quantifiers
−1 (W,Ri, . . .)i∈N , u  −1j ϕ iff R−1j (u) ⊆ JϕK
Inverse belief modalities
For reference, we provide a table listing the various components of languages that we
considered. In the right-hand column we give the formal semantics of various symbols,
and a reminder of what we called the symbols, and in the corresponding left-hand
column is the subscript we used to denote that those symbols are in a language.
Chapter 3
Dynamics
“Public announcements nurture me as I grow towards my time”.
“Public announcements have punctuated my life”.
– Saleem [Rushdie, 1981]
Let us recap two observations from Chapter 1, that we did not elaborate upon there.
Firstly, there is something suspect about the claimed ‘equivalence’ between a given
epistemic condition and its consequence O∞. And secondly, in case the optimality
operator O was not monotonic, there was a problem even with specifying what the
condition should be, that entails O∞. Part of what we do in this Chapter is related to
these two concerns: we turn our attention to where the models come from, in the sense
of looking at formalising some process of deliberation that captures some basic intu-
itions about the one-shot interaction that forms the basis of our Deductive interpretation
of game theory.
Always in the spirit of the previous Chapter and its emphasis on logical syntax,
we will therefore present some existing work on what is known as ‘dynamic epistemic
logic’ (DEL). Throughout this Thesis so far, we have used neighbourhood models,
whereas mainstream epistemic logic has usually used relational models. That holds for
the DEL too, and one minor technical contribution of this Chapter is to show how DEL
can be generalised to neighbourhood models.
Partly our concern here with dynamics of logical systems is for its own sake, and
partly it is to complete the picture of those aspects that we have studied in Chapter 1
of the deductive interpretation of strategic games.
“Logical systems as they stand are product-oriented, but Logical Dynam-
ics says that both sides of the duality should be studied to get the complete
picture.” – [Benthem, forthcoming]
We flesh out an idea given in passing in [Benthem, 2007b], that dynamic epistemic
logic can be used to reason about where the epistemic models that we described in
Chapter 1 come from.
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The idea that we will play with is the following. To begin with, take a ‘blank’
model of the game, in which in some sense nothing is believed. This model is not a
‘complete’ belief model of some kind, but a very simple model that faithfully repre-
sents the epistemic situation in a one-shot interaction before the players have started
deliberating. Then add beliefs to the players, in some systematic way, until a certain
configuration of beliefs is obtained, that respects some epistemic condition. Finally,
another epistemic action corresponds to that of the players each choosing the strategy
they will play.
The “in some systematic way” can be fleshed out differently, but revolves around
the idea of what is known as a “public announcement”. We suggest different interpreta-
tions stating how this epistemic action of public announcement should be understood,
but the one we will favour is that it represents some kind of “private but common”
reasoning process, and so is in tune with the deductive interpretation of game theory.
We do not find here an application for many of the subtleties of analysis offered by
existing dynamic epistemic logics which, as we will mention, are claimed by some to
be in a certain sense “complete” for the epistemics of social or interactive situations.
This recommends them for further application in game theory.
An interesting feature of the public announcements involved in the process we
described is that the announcement that is repeated is syntactically the same: it is an
announcement that the players are rational. Thus one repeatedly announces the same
(syntactic) sentence or formula, but the (semantic) event that is its meaning changes
each time it is announced. This feature is exhibited in other examples for which DEL
provides elegant analyses, most notably the ‘muddy children’ example analysed for
example in [Plaza, 1989]. In that example the story is that a group of n children have
been playing in a garden, with the result that k ≤ n of them have muddy foreheads.
And adult arrives and informs them that at least one has a muddy forehead. She then
repeatedly asks for a ‘show of hands’ from children who know whether they are muddy.
Since this show of hands is supposed to be simultaneous, we could model it as a single
public announcement of the conjunction of all the individual announcements. Take the
case where k = n = 3. Then the first show of hands says: ‘none of the children know
whether they are muddy’. So does the second. And yet this second announcements
conveys, in the context of the previous announcement, new information, so that all
children (assuming that it is common true belief amongst them that they are all perfect
reasoners) will after these announcements know that they have muddy foreheads.
Separately from all of that, we will also use another kind of model for belief, plau-
sibility models, that allow for the representation of conditional beliefs. The conditional
beliefs of a player specify not just the things that she believes are true, but also those
things she would believe if she were to learn that her actual beliefs were incorrect. We
will show how conditional beliefs are important in understanding non-monotonic opti-
mality operators, by arguing that relational or neighbourhood models are not adequate
for providing an explanation of why players would play the strategies indicated by the
solution algorithm. That is, in the case of non-monotonic procedures, the models ob-
tained by the epistemic actions we just mentioned are not stable, or self-enforcing; they
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do not contain what we will call a ‘rational equilibrium of beliefs’.
In the context of plausibility models, there is another kind of public announcement,
that models so-called ‘soft information’ (to use the terminology of [Benthem, 2007a]),
as opposed to the ‘hard information’ of the more standard announcement. Iterated
‘soft’ announcements, of what we call ‘lexicographic rationality’ from an appropri-
ately blank initial plausibility model, will lead to a model in which there is rational
equilibrium of beliefs. This goes some way towards explaining why the players would
play according to the algorithm of iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies, even
in some cases where the optimality operator is non-monotonic.
Background literature
Dynamic epistemic logic started with [Plaza, 1989; Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997;
Gerbrandy, 1999; Baltag et al., 1999], and is presented in the textbook [Ditmarsch et
al., 2007]. The results we present on neighbourhood semantics are related to [Ro-
driguez, 2007].
We have mentioned that we take some ideas from [Benthem, 2007b], but we should
make it clear that our considerations here are relatively superficial: that paper addresses
a number of deep questions involving logical definability that we do not touch upon
here.
Conditional beliefs and plausibility models (also sometimes called ‘conditional
doxastic models’) are developed in [Board, 2002; Benthem, 2007a; Baltag and Smets,
2006; 2008b].
On a less related note: an epistemic foundation for the iterated elimination of
weakly dominated strategies was provided in [Brandenburger et al., 2008], and while
we do not pretend to give an epistemic foundation here, it is worth mentioning that the
idea of using conditional belief models to understand the corresponding non-monotonic
optimality operator is already present there in the notion of a lexicographic probability
system [Blume et al., 1991].
Organisation of the Chapter
Section 3.1 contains essentially no discussion of game theory, but focuses on the logical
aspects of the dynamics of belief. In particular, we will present there reduction axioms
for a number of different kinds of action. First of all we look at public announcements,
and show (Propositions 3.1–3.4) that known results about completeness carry over to
neighbourhood semantics. Next we look at the more general epistemic actions from
[Baltag et al., 1999], and our contribution there is to show completeness of a modal
language with action modalities for a neighbourhood semantics. Finally, we introduce
a new announcement operator that adds information but also can introduce ‘ignorance
about ignorance’, and indeed turn a neighbourhood model that is relational into one
that is not.
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That announcement operator is the one that we use at the end of Section 3.2 in order
to show where the model in Theorem 1.5 comes from. However, it is not very intuitive,
and the earlier parts of the Section examine more intuitive announcement operators
on strategic game models. In Section 3.3 we give a brief exposition of plausibility
models and conditional beliefs. That will be used later in Chapter 4, but we introduce
it in this Chapter because in the same Section we will introduce the notion of rational
equilibrium of beliefs, and argue for the use of plausibility models in epistemic analysis
of non-monotonic solution concepts.
3.1 Dynamic epistemic logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) is the logic of models of belief as they change under
the effect of various kinds of information flow. In this Section we will go through
existing results about dynamic epistemic logic, starting with the simple logic of public
announcements, and then looking at ‘update models’. Thus rather than look just at a
single model, we will be interested in how models change, and what happens when
they do change, as the players being modelled acquire information. In the first two
parts of the Section the contribution that we make is to generalise existing results from
relational models, on which DEL has usually been studied, to neighbourhood models.
In the last part of this Section we introduce a new kind of public announcement
operator. This operator creates beliefs while at the same time creating ‘ignorance about
ignorance’, to borrow an expression from [Samet, 1990]. As we will show in Section
3.2, this new operator is the one that is needed in order to generate the model described
in Theorem 1.5.
Public announcements
A public announcement is perhaps the simplest kind of information change in a group.
In its most natural formalisation, a public announcement of A eliminates from the
model all those states in which A is false. The particular kind of information acqui-
sition that we consider here is the ‘public announcement’ kind, that is one way to
represent all players synchronously learning some piece of information. The ‘public
announcement’ metaphor need not be taken literally: it can also be a kind of joint dis-
covery of any kind. We discuss various interpretations, and look at variants of public
announcements, later in this Chapter. What is essential to public announcements is that
they are a collective action of ‘learning’.
Whether we should call this an ‘action’ is questionable, since that noun naturally
implicates some form of agency, that is absent from the formalism here. However, the
obvious alternative, that is taken in the philosophical literature [Davidson, 1980] to
indicate an agency-less ‘action’, is ‘event’, which is sadly already taken. We prefer to
avoid the ambiguity, and so use the word ‘action’ for what is sometimes in the dynamic
epistemic literature logic called ‘event’.
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We have in general shied away from calling anything ‘knowledge’, but in the case
of the kind of public announcement that we will consider in this Section, we will gen-
erally consider that they do generate knowledge. This kind of announcement models
what van Benthem [Benthem, 2007a] calls ‘hard information’, and can be thought of
as an act of observation of some absolute fact. If our models are to be able to give an
interpretation to knowledge, then surely we would want at least that the tautological
event (the whole state space) should be something the players ‘know’ themselves to be
in. Thus if announcements reduce the state space, they would generate knowledge. We
will not explicitly introduce knowledge into the language until we look in Section 3.3
at conditional belief models, where we will be able to introduce a technically and con-
ceptually significant difference between belief and knowledge. For the time being, just
note that it would be possible to introduce a knowledge operator, and that everything
we say regarding the belief operator and public announcements would also apply to a
knowledge operator.
On the level of the language, we can add a binary modality 〈!ϕ〉ψ. So given a
language L, we turn it into a language L! with hard public announcements by adding
the following clause:
ϕ ::= . . . | 〈!ϕ〉ϕ.
The semantics of the public announcement operator are given in terms of ‘relativi-
sation’. The intuitive idea is that a public announcement of ϕ rules out entirely and
irrevocably, for everybody, all states in the modelM at which ϕ does not hold. Since
the action is ‘public’, or ‘collective’, the information change brought about by it is
faithfully represented by eliminating all states at which ϕ does not hold, or to put it
another way: by relativising to JϕKM.
Definition 3.1. Given a model M = (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N , the relativisation to A ⊆ W is
just the model M!A = (A,Ni!A, ξ!A)i∈N where Ni!A and ξ!A are as follows, with
domain A:
Ni!A(u) = {U ∩ A | U ∈ Ni(u)}
ξ!A(u) = ξ(u).
It is convenient to writeM!ϕ forM!JϕKM. Then the semantic clause for the public
announcement modality is given in terms of relativisation:
M, u  〈!ϕ〉ψ M, u  ϕ &M!ϕ, u  ψ.
Public announcement modalities are already definable in many of the languages
that we have considered, since model-theoretically speaking they are closed for rela-
tivisation. That is to say, for many of the languages L, given a formula ϕ in L!, there
is a formula ψ in L such that on any modelM, JϕKM = JψKM. In order to show this
property, we can give a recursive translation from L! to L. For example, a translation
like the following one was in effect given in [Plaza, 1989], for the language LΨN,O,κ,!.
(Plaza considered the finitary case where κ = ℵ0 and considered relational, rather than
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arbitrary monotonic, modal operators; the extension to cover the more general cases is
straightforward.)
tr(〈!A〉si) = A ∧ si for si ∈ Ψ
tr(〈!A〉¬ϕ) = A ∧ ¬tr(〈!A〉ϕ)
tr(〈!A〉∧Φ) = ∧{tr(〈!A〉ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Φ}
tr(〈!A〉i ϕ) = A ∧ (i(A→ tr(〈!A〉ϕ)))
tr(〈!A〉,i ϕ) = A ∧ (,i(A→ tr(〈!A〉ϕ)))
tr(p) = p
tr(
∧
Φ) =
∧{tr(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Φ}
tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
tr(♦ϕ) = ♦tr(ϕ).
This translation removes all occurrences of 〈!A〉 from any given formula, thus it is
indeed a translation from LN,κ,! to LN,κ. Therefore it suffices, in order to prove that
there is a formula in L equivalent to any in L!, to show that Jtr(ϕ)K = JϕK. And indeed,
on monotonic models, the translation tr(·) we just gave does preserve truth:
Proposition 3.1. tr(·) preserves truth on monotonic models. That is: for any monotonic
modelM, and any ϕ ∈ LN,κ,!, Jtr(ϕ)K = JϕK.
Proof. By induction on ϕ, for a suitably defined notion of the complexity of formulae
of the language. The only interesting step is that for ϕ := 〈!A〉i ψ. We give this here
because while the relational version is known, the more general monotonic neighbour-
hood result is new. So suppose (a consequence of the inductive hypothesis) that on all
modelsM: Jtr(〈!A〉ψ)KM = J〈!A〉ψKM = JAKM ∩ JψKM!A.
Take any modelM. We want to show that Jtr(〈!A〉i ψ)KM = J〈!A〉i ψKM. That is
established by the following equivalences:
M, u  〈!A〉i ψ ⇔ M, u  A and M!A, u  iψ
⇔ JψKM!A ∈ N !Ai(u)
⇔ J〈!A〉ψKM ∈ N !Ai(u)
(I.H.)⇔ ∃X ∈ Ni(u) : X ∩ JAKM = J〈!A〉ψKM
(Mon)⇔ J〈!A〉ψKM ∪ J¬AKM ∈ Ni(u)
⇔ M, u  i(¬A ∨ 〈!A〉ψ)
⇔ M, u  A ∧ i(A→ 〈!A〉ψ).

It is easy to see that the monotonicity condition is necessary:
Fact 3.1. There is a (non-monotonic) neighbourhood model M and a formula in
L!,Nsuch that, Jtr(ϕ)KM 6= JϕKM.
3.1. Dynamic epistemic logic 105
Proof. LetM = ({a, b},N , ξ), N (b) = {b} and ξ(a) 6= ξ(b) = s. Set ϕ = 〈!s〉i s.
Then tr(ϕ) = s ∧ i(s → s). Notice then that M, a 1 tr(ϕ), since Js → sKM =
{a, b} /∈ N (a). However, M, b  s and M!p, b  is, so by the definition of the
semantics of 〈!p〉,M, b  ϕ. 
The correctness of the translation above is equivalent to the following formulae
being valid:
〈!A〉p ≡ A ∧ p
〈!A〉¬ϕ ≡ A ∧ ¬〈!A〉ϕ
〈!A〉∧Φ ≡ ∧{〈!A〉ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
〈!A〉i ϕ ≡ A ∧ (i(A→ 〈!A〉ϕ))
〈!A〉,i ϕ ≡ A ∧ (,i(A→ 〈!A〉ϕ))
Axiomatically speaking, these validities can be used as so-called reduction axioms to
prove completeness of the language LN,! by reducing it to the language LN . In giving
other forms of epistemic action in what follows, for notational ease we prefer to list
the reduction axioms than the resulting translation.
What about the case of non-monotonic modalities? The public announcement logic
of non-monotonic modalities, as we will now see, can be treated in the same was as
the public announcement logic of common belief. [Benthem et al., 2005] consider
the question of adding epistemic action modalities to a logic for common knowledge,
and show that while it is not possible to reduce a language with a common knowl-
edge modality and public announcement modalities to the language without public
announcement modalities, there is such a reduction with respect to a language includ-
ing also a relativised common knowledge modality. Thus they define, for relational
models, a binary modal operator
ϕ ::= . . . | ∞(ϕ, ψ),
Proposition 3.2. In the context of neighbourhood semantics, the semantic clause for∞(ϕ, ψ) given in [Benthem et al., 2005] is equivalent to the following, whereM =
(W,Ni, ξ)i∈N :
M, u  ∞(ϕ, ψ) iff ∃E ⊆ W : u ∈ E & ∀x ∈ E E ∈ N !JϕKM(x)
and JψKM ∈ N !JϕKM(x).
[Benthem et al., 2005] give a valid reduction axiom for this new binary operator,
that can be trivially extended to the case of belief:
Proposition 3.3. The following reduction axiom is valid on neighbourhood models:
〈!A〉∞ (ϕ, ψ) ≡ A ∧∞(〈!A〉ϕ, [!A]ψ).
This modality ∞(ϕ, ψ) is not expressible in the basic modal language LN [Ben-
them et al., 2005, Theorem 1]. It manages to make the language closed for relativisa-
tion by ‘pre-encoding’ of all the possible relativisations into the original language. So
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the same trick can be used in order to cover the case of non-monotonic modalities.1
Given some arbitrary neighbourhood modality ,ϕ, whose neighbourhood function
N might not be monotonic, we can similarly specify the binary, relativised, version,(ϕ, ψ) with the following semantics:
M, u ,(ϕ, ψ) iff JψKM ∈ N !JϕKM(u).
As we will see in the next Section, we might also want to consider a simple mod-
ification of this kind of public announcement, that is studied in [Benthem and Liu,
2007]. Public announcements add beliefs. Usually this is done by eliminating states
from the model. (This means among other things that the public announcement has
also to be true.) A slight variant of this kind of state-eliminating public announcement
changes instead the belief component of the model, actually in precisely the same way
as in the state-eliminating version, but does not eliminate the relevant states. So in the
case of relational models, this means cutting links, not removing worlds. In the gen-
eral monotonic neighbourhood semantics it means intersecting neighbourhoods, but
not removing the relevant states from the model. We call this non-eliminative (hard)
announcement, and define it as follows. (W,Ni, V )i∈N ¡A = (W,N ′i , V )i∈N with
N ′i (u) = {A ∩ E | E ∈ Ni(u)}.
Non-eliminative announcement is also easily reduced with respect to the basic
modal language; the relevant reduction axioms are given in Proposition 3.4, which
entails that there is a straightforward translation from LN,O,κ,¡ to LN,O,κ.
Proposition 3.4. The following reduction axioms are valid on monotonic models.
〈¡A〉p ≡ p
〈¡A〉¬ϕ ≡ ¬〈¡A〉ϕ
〈¡A〉∧Φ ≡ ∧{〈¡A〉ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
〈¡A〉♦iϕ ≡ ♦i(A ∧ 〈¡A〉ϕ)
〈¡A〉,i ϕ ≡ ,i(¡Aϕ)
(Cf. [Benthem and Liu, 2007, Theorem 4.3].) The same issues concerning ‘rela-
tivised belief’, for an axiomatisation of common belief or with respect to non-mono-
tonic models, arise here as in the eliminative version, and find the same resolution as
there.
Epistemic actions
In the dynamic epistemic logic studied in [Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997; Baltag et
al., 1999], epistemic actions take on the same status as epistemic models. Baltag and
Moss [2004] propose two Theses, that are spelled out in too much detail to quote them
1This observation is due to Johan van Benthem.
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here, but effectively claim that relational models can completely describe the epistemic
features of any “social situation” (op.cit. p.166), and that similarly (relational) action
models, that we will define now, also completely describe the relevant features of any
“social ‘action’” (op.cit. p.167).
Actually, since the form of DEL considered in [Baltag and Moss, 2004] does not
handle belief revision, Baltag and Moss’ Theses themselves as they stand need revising.
Revising one’s beliefs, upon acquiring ‘surprising’ information that contradicts one’s
theory of how the world is, is surely an important part of social interaction, but is
excluded by the DEL considered in that paper. So the thesis as it stands could maybe
be applied to the richer formalism of conditional doxastic models developed in [Baltag
and Smets, 2008a]. We will discuss logics for belief revision below in Section 3.3; for
now let us assume some variation of the thesis, that excludes revisable belief, which
cannot be dealt with by the DEL we present in this Section. Still, we’ll refer to the
claim that DEL is sufficient to represent all social situations and actions as the “BM
thesis”.
DEL generalises the logic of hard public announcements, by allowing many more
kinds of epistemic actions, that can be much more complicated than announcements
or observations that are commonly observed by all players. In particular, it can deal
with actions that involve subgroups of the players receiving information; the players
receiving different information; suspecting that other players are receiving information
that they are not receiving, and so on.
We devote the rest of this Section to presenting the dynamic epistemic logic frame-
work. As far as we are aware, in existing work it has always been presented in terms of
relational semantics. Since we have been interested in the more general neighbourhood
semantics, we present dynamic epistemic logic in terms of neighbourhoods rather than
relations. As with public announcements, we will restrict our attention to monotonic
neighbourhood models and will develop analogues for all of the existing notions in
DEL. We also give reduction axioms for neighbourhood DEL, and prove their correct-
ness. First, let us recall the existing, relational, dynamic epistemic logic.
In order to model all of the different kinds of informational actions that the BM the-
sis claims are modelled by DEL, it uses so-called “action models”, that are supposed
to represent actions of an epistemic character, in the same way as relational models
(which to disambiguate we will sometimes call “state models”) are supposed to repre-
sent an epistemic situation. Thus an action model A will be applied to a state model
M via an ‘update’ operation in order to yield a new state modelM⊗A, that represents
the epistemic situation after the action represented by A has occurred in the situation
represented byM.
We will first of all present the relational version of DEL action models and update.
Assume fixed some set N of players. A relational action model A = (Σ,_i, PRE)i∈N
is very much like a relational (state) model, i.e. Σ is a set, that we now call ‘actions’,
and each _i⊆ Σ × Σ is a relation over the actions. This time the interpretation of
d _i e is that if d is occurring, then i thinks that e might be occurring. Notice that
this is very similar to the interpretation of the relation Ri in a state model: uRiv means
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that if the state is u then i considers that the state might be v. The function PRE now
associates each action d ∈ Σ with a pre-condition, i.e. a formula in some language L:
PRE : Σ→ L. So the difference between state models and action models is that where
each state in a state model is associated with an outcome of a game, each action in an
action model is associated with a single sentence, that could express an outcome, or an
epistemic proposition, or indeed anything the language can define.
The idea of the precondition is that it is a condition that PRE(e) is a necessary condi-
tion for the action e to occur. So in some sense PRE(e) gives the ‘meaning’ of e, in that
it gives the truth-conditions for it. Before defining the product update operation ⊗ that
is used to apply an action model to a state model, let us use these informal descriptions
of what action models are in order to show that we can capture, intuitively, the action of
a public announcement. Public announcements are the simplest possible kind of action
model. The action model contains only one action, since all players are commonly
aware of what action is taking place: the action model ({a}, {(a, a)}, {(a, ϕ)})i∈N ,
in which there is one action a, with precondition ϕ, and where all players think a is
occurring when it occurs, is what we mean by a public announcement. We illustrate
this model in Figure 3.1. Action models can express simple variations of the public
ϕ
N
Figure 3.1: An action model for public announcement of ϕ
announcement operator, for example in the model depicted in Figure 3.2, the action a
is an announcement to the subgroup M ⊆ N that ϕ. Notice then that when e happens,
ϕ
e
M
>
f
N −M
N
Figure 3.2: A ‘private’ announcement to the subgroup M
the players in M only consider it possible that e happens, whereas the players not in
the group M believe that f is happening. And action f is the ‘null’ action: the action
without precondition and where if it happens everybody only considers it possible that
it is happening. – It is the ‘action that nothing happens’. Therefore the players in M
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¬p
i, j
>
i, j
p
i, j
j
jj
Figure 3.3: An action model representing the ‘envelope opening’ situation
think, whether e or f actually occur, that f occurs. So when e happens, the players in
M learn that ϕ was true, and also that the players not in M have not learnt anything at
all, since they were not aware of the announcement taking place.
The action model in Figure 3.3 represents another situation. Here, we can tell a
story that fits that model: player i is given an envelope that might contain the result of
her recent mathematics examination, or might be some junk mail. She is with a friend,
j, when she opens the envelope and looks at the contents, but j does not see what is
inside the envelope. Either she has passed (expressed in the language as p) or failed
(¬p), and she might find out the result, or might not.
Clearly, we could go on with more examples to back up the BM thesis, but let us
return to formal definitions. Given a state model M = (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N and an action
model A = (Σ,_i, PRE)i∈N , the update operation ⊗ should be defined in such a way
as to capture the intuitive meaning of the relations Ri and _i, and the idea that the
action model ‘happens’ to the state model. I.e.M⊗A should represent the situation
after A has occurred, so that if u was the actual state inM, and e the action in A, then
there will be a new state (that will be the pair (u, a)) that is the new actual state.
The relational product update operation is defined as follows:
(W,Ri, ξ)i∈N ⊗ (Σ,_i, PRE)i∈N = (W ⊗ Σ, Ri⊗_i, ξ ⊗ Σ),
where
W ⊗ Σ = {(u, e) ∈ W × Σ | (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N , u  PRE(e)}
(u, d)Ri⊗_i (v, e) iff uRiv and d_i e
ξ ⊗ Σ(u, d) = ξ(u).
Let us take a moment to look at this definition to see that it make sense of our intuitive
description. The new states (possibilities) are indeed all the possible combinations
of previous state and action. And at the state (u, d), i.e. where the state was u, and
the action d just occurred, the player i considers (v, e) possible just if she previously
considered v possible, and when d occurs, she considers it plausible that e is occurring.
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That makes sense for the following reasons: If i realised already that v was not the
actual state at u then she will now remember that v was not the actual state, so (v, e)
cannot possibly be the actual state. This assumes a notion of ‘perfect recall’. Similarly,
if she realises (or indeed falsely believes) that e has not just happened, then she will
not consider it plausible that (v, e) be the new state. Conversely, if she previously
considered it possible that v, and considered it possible that e just occurred, then, as
long as e is possible at v, she will now consider it possible that (v, e) is the actual
state. That is, she does not learn anything ‘miraculously’, without there being a reason
that is given in the action model. Indeed, these notions of ‘perfect recall’ and ‘no
miraculous learning’ can be formalised, and are shown in [Benthem and Pacuit, 2006]
to characterise product update within a broader temporal logic framework.
Just as we added modalities for public announcements to our modal language and
showed that they can be reduced, so we can also add modalities 〈A, e〉ϕ, meaning ‘after
e in action model A occurs, ϕ holds.’ So the language of dynamic epistemic actions
L⊗ is formed from L by adding the following clause:
ϕ ::= . . . | 〈A, e〉ϕ,
whereA is an action model, and e is an action in it. In the relational case, the semantics
is given in terms of relational update:
M, u  〈A, e〉ϕ iff M⊗A, (u, e)  ϕ.
And, again in the public announcement vein, as long as κ > #(A), ‘reduction axioms’
can be shown to be valid, thereby allowing a translation from the language LN,κ,A to
LN,κ.
Proposition 3.5 ([Baltag et al., 1999, Proposition 3.1]). The following reduction axiom
is valid for relational update:
〈A, e〉i ϕ ≡ PRE(e) ∧ ∧
d^ie
i([d]ϕ)
Note that we are dealing here with the eliminative version, in which not only are
links cut to states that are ruled out, but also those states are removed entirely from the
model. It is also possible to specify a non-eliminative version of product update, along
similar lines to non-eliminative announcements, but we leave the details for the reader
to fill in.
Let us turn our attention now to generalising relational product update to product
update for (monotonic) neighbourhood models. We again will only consider mono-
tonic models, since it will not be possible to give reduction axioms for the other case.
So given a monotonic neighbourhood model M = (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N , and a neigh-
bourhood action model A = (Σ, Ei, PRE)i∈N , we want to define the neighbourhood
product updateM  A. We again consider the eliminative version, so the new state
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space is still W ⊗ Σ as above, and the new outcome function remains ξ ⊗ Σ. The dif-
ference of course is in the definition of the new neighbourhood function. We will look
next at how to define the new neighbourhood functions that we will denote Ni  Ei,
defining them eventually in Definition 3.2. Once we have defined this, we will be able
to write (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N  (Σ, Ei, PRE)i∈N for:
(W ⊗ Σ,Ni  Ei, ξ ⊗ Σ).
Recall that the interpretation of X being a neighbourhood of u for i in a state model is
that i has the information that X . Now, when do we want to say that, at (u, e), i has
the information that X?
Let us consider first of all the simpler case where there would be no pre-conditions,
or (equivalently) where PRE(e) = > for all e ∈ Σ. Then we will add preconditions
back once the simpler case is clear. Firstly, note that if X is not a rectangular subset,
i.e. is not of the form F × E with F ⊆ W and E ⊆ Σ, then i can only have this infor-
mation on the basis of some other ‘rectangular’ information. The reason is that since
we are in a hypothetical situation where all actions are without preconditions, there
can be no ‘correlation’ between the states and actions. That is, if i has information that
entails that (v, c) is not the actual state, it is because i has information that eliminates
v or that eliminates c. (To reiterate: a ‘correlation’ of a kind does reappear when we
move back to the situation we ultimately want to consider, in which certain actions are
ruled out by certain states on the basis of preconditions.)
So for now we will consider just rectangular subsets, though since we are consider-
ing monotonic models, we will anyway want to close for supersets, so players will be
able to have information that is not ‘rectangular’, but only on the basis of some piece
of rectangular information. Take then some X ∈ W × Σ, i.e. such that X = F × E,
where F ⊆ W and E ⊆ Σ. When will i have information that X? It is only when X
had the information that F , and ‘received’ (through whatever action just occurred) the
information that E.
If i did not have the information that F , then she has learnt something ‘mirac-
ulously’, i.e. without any informational reason. Similarly, if i has not received the
information that E could have occurred, then she has no basis for the information that
F × E. For the converse direction: suppose that i had the information that F , and re-
ceived the information E. Then she has (this time legitimately!) learnt the information
that F × E.
There is a conceptual objection of a kind to be raised here: since in monotonic
neighbourhood models players are unable to ‘put together’ their pieces of information,
it might be said that while the player receives the information that E, she is unable
to put this together with her information that F . We can only say that we assume a
kind of perfection in the information-receiving capacities of the player that might be
lacking in her information-storage capacities. Nonetheless, we do not consider it an
uninteresting topic to look for generalisations of product update for agents who receive
information in an imperfect way in the same sense that neighbourhood models might
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be said to represent agents who process their existing information imperfectly, by not
putting together all the pieces of information that they have.
Still, we say that in the precondition-less case, i has the information F × E at
(u, e) just if i had the information that F at u, and received the information that E.
And for other (non-rectangular) subsets X , i has the information that X just if i has
some rectangular information F ×E ⊆ X . That is, i’s neighbourhoods at (u, e) would
be the monotonic closure of Ni(u)× Ei(e), i.e.
{X ⊆ W × Σ | ∃Y ∈ Ni(u)× Ei(u) : Y ⊆ X}.
Clearly this definition will yield a monotonic neighbourhood model. However,
it does not take the preconditions into account. Luckily, while reasoning about the
product update was simplified by removing them, still adding them back in is en-
tirely straightforward: we simply relativise the neighbourhood functions to the smaller
space! Thus we are left with the following definition:
Definition 3.2. The effect of a neighbourhood action on a neighbourhood function,
denoted Ni  Ei, is the following:
(Ni  Ei)(u.e) =
{
X ⊆ W ⊗ Σ
∣∣∣∃Y ∈ Ni(u)× Ei(u) : Y ∩ (W ⊗ Σ) ⊆ X}.
Now, Fact 3.2 states that is properly speaking a ‘generalisation’ of⊗, in the sense
that if both neighbourhood functions are relational (closed for arbitrary intersections),
then  yields the same result as ⊗.
Fact 3.2. If each Ni and Ei are equivalent respectively to the relations Ri and _i,
then (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N  (Σ, Ei, PRE)i∈N = (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N ⊗ (Σ,_i, PRE)i∈N .
Again we can define the language L as we did above for L⊗, by adding to L
operators of the form 〈A, e〉. The next question to ask is whether we can give reduc-
tion axioms, to reduce the language LN,O,κ, to the language LN,O,κ. The affirmative
answer is given in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. For any formula in LN,O,κ,, there is a formula in LN,O,κ that is equiv-
alent over monotonic neighbourhood models.
Proof. The proof involves giving a validity-preserving translation; the key step is to
show that the following reduction axiom is valid for neighbourhood product update:
〈A, e〉i ϕ ≡ PRE(e) ∧ ∨
E∈E(e)
i ∧
d∈E
[d]ϕ
To see that validity, take any monotonic neighbourhood state modelM = (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N
and monotonic neighbourhood action model A = (Σ, Ei, PRE)i∈N . Then we have the
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following chain of equivalences:
MA, (u, e)  iϕ ⇔ JϕKMA ∈ (Ni  Ei)(u, e)
⇔ {(w, d) ∈ W ⊗ Σ | MA, (w, d)  ϕ} ∈ (Ni  Ei)(u, e)
⇔ {(w, d) ∈ W × Σ | M, w  〈A, d〉ϕ} ∈ (Ni  Ei)(u, e)
⇔ ∃Y ∈ Ni(u)× Ei(e) :
Y ∩ (W ⊗ Σ) ⊆ {(w, d) ∈ W × Σ | M, w  〈A, d〉ϕ}
⇔ ∃Y ∈ Ni(u)× Ei(e) : Y ⊆ ((W × Σ)− (W ⊗ Σ)) ∪
{(w, d) ∈ W × Σ | M, w  〈A, d〉ϕ}
⇔ ∃Y ∈ Ni(u)× Ei(e) :
Y ⊆ {(w, d) ∈ W × Σ | M, w  [A, d]ϕ}
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e)∃F ∈ Ni(u) :
F × E ⊆ {(w, d) ∈ W × Σ | M, w  [A, d]ϕ}
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e)∃F ∈ Ni(u) : ∀w ∈ F ∀d ∈ E,M, w  [A, d]ϕ
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e)∃F ∈ Ni(u) : ∀w ∈ F,M, w 
∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e)∃F ∈ Ni(u) : F ⊆
r∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
z
M
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e) :
r∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
z
M
∈ Ni(u) [ ∵ Ni monotonic]
⇔ ∃E ∈ Ei(e) : M, u  i ∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
⇔ M, u 
∨
E∈E(e)
i ∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
Now we can substitute the first term for the last in the definition of the semantics of
〈A, d〉, thus obtaining
M, u  〈A, e〉i ϕ ⇔ M, u  PRE(e) &M, u  ∨
E∈E(e)
i ∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ
⇔ M, u  PRE(e) ∧
∨
E∈E(e)
i ∧
d∈E
[A, d]ϕ

Transfinite information addition
We now introduce a new kind of epistemic action: another variation on public an-
nouncement, that we think of as a kind of ‘information addition’. We will specify the
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semantics of this operator with respect to monotonic neighbourhood models (and so re-
lational models) and topological models, where the definition will have to be changed
slightly to ensure that the resulting model is topological. We also give reductions ax-
ioms for the basic modal language with a modality 〈+ϕ〉 corresponding to this operator,
and show them to be valid with respect to all three types of semantics, and which can
therefore be used to prove completeness with respect to all three semantics. We also
show that this kind of announcement is what is required in order to generate the model
described in Theorem 1.5, in which, as we indicated in Section 1.4, players’ “igno-
rance about ignorance” allows for a model in which α-level mutual belief of rationality
is equivalent to 1 + α rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies. This new oper-
ator adds information but in a manner that also creates ‘ignorance’ in the sense that for
example it will transform an S5 model into an S4 model, so that players might initially
be negatively introspective, i.e. they do not ignore any of their ignorance, but that after
the announcement they will no longer be negatively introspective.
Recall that the elements of a player’s neighbourhood of a particular model are sup-
posed to represent the pieces of information possessed by the player in the relevant
state. Then if we are to add the information that A, we simply add the event (‘fact’) A
to the neighbourhood(s). That is in effect what is done in non-eliminative announce-
ment: Ni¡A(u) = {U ∩ A | U ∈ Ni(u)}. The present kind of public announcement
that we consider is very much like this, except that it is in some sense a conditional
announcement: it is made and believed just if it is true. So the action that we are
considering works as follows:
Ni + A(u) =
{ {U ∩ A | U ∈ Ni(u)} if u ∈ A
Ni(u) otherwise.
We might therefore be tempted to define the model obtained by adding the in-
formation that A to M, where A is an event in M, as the same model M with the
neighbourhoods appropriately substituted, so that in the new model i’s neighbourhood
function is given by Ni + A. However, we want that if we are only considering re-
lational, monotonic, or topological models then the resulting model is a relational,
monotonic, or topological model.
Fact 3.3. The following are immediate:
1. If Ni is relational then Ni + A is relational.
2. If Ni is monotonic then Ni + A is monotonic.
Fact 3.3 means that we can safely set the semantic operation + on models so that
M+ A is the same asM except that Ni is substituted with Ni + A.
However, the topological case is not quite as immediate. There the analogous
construction would be to turn τ into τ ∪ {U ∩ A | U ∈ τ}. Write τ ? A for
τ ∪ {U ∩ A | U ∈ τ}; it is easy to see that τ being a topology does not guarantee
that τ ? A be a topology.
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Fact 3.4. There is a topology τ over W and an event A ⊆ W such that τ ? A is not a
topology.
Proof. Set W = {a, b, c, d} and τ = {∅, {a, b}, {c, d},W}, which is a topology over
W . Then if A = {a, c}, {U ∩A | U ∈ τ} is not a topology, since for example it should
contain {a, b, c}. 
Nonetheless, notice that in the example in the proof of Fact 3.4, {U ∩ A | U ∈ τ}
is a basis. This is not a coincidence: Fact 3.5 shows that it holds in general, and indeed
that τ ?A generates a topology (that is of course a refinement of τ ) by taking just finite
unions:
Fact 3.5. If τ is a topology then {X ∪ Y | X, Y ∈ τ ? A} is a topology.
Proof. The proof is easy but we rehearse it nevertheless:
First, we show that τ ? A is closed for finite intersections: Take X, Y ∈ τ ? A. If
X, Y ∈ τ then we are done since τ is a topology. Otherwise, without loss of generality,
we have either (1)X ∈ τ and Y = U∩Awith U ∈ τ , or (2)X = B∩A and Y = U∩A
with U,B ∈ τ . In case (1), X ∩ U ∈ τ , in which case X ∩ Y = X ∩ U ∩ A ∈ τ ? A.
Similarly, in case (2), U ∩B ∈ τ , so X ∩ Y = B ∩ U ∩ A ∈ τ ? A.
Next, we show that τ ? A is ‘almost closed’ for arbitrary unions, in the sense that
for any Ξ ⊆ τ ? A, there are X, Y ∈ τ ? A such that X ∪ Y = ⋃Ξ. To show this,
take any Ξ ⊆ τ ? A. Then we know that Ξ = P ∪ Q where P ⊆ τ and there is some
R ⊆ τ such that Q = {U ∩ A | U ⊆ R}. Let X = ⋃P , Y = ⋃Q and Z = ⋃R.
Then since τ is closed for arbitrary unions, we know that X ∈ τ ⊆ τ ? A, and Z ∈ τ ,
so that Z ∩ A ∈ τ ? A. But Z ∩ A = Y , so we are done. 
Fact 3.5 means that we can safely define τi + A as follows:
τi + A = {X ∪ Y | X, Y ∈ τi ? A}.
Then given a topological modelM, we define the modelM+A to be the same model
except that each player i’s topology is now given by τi + A rather than τi.
In all cases, we write +ϕ, where ϕ is a formula, to meanM+ JϕKM.
On the syntactic level, we can enrich the language with a binary modality 〈+ϕ〉ψ.
As with other public announcement operators, this is a model-changing modality, so
has the following semantics:
M, u  〈+ϕ〉ψ iffM+ ϕ, u  ψ.
We would like to give reduction axioms for this modality, showing that the language
with the modality has exactly the same expressivity as the original language. This
again also means that given an axiomatisation of the rest of the language, we can obtain
completeness for the language enriched with the 〈+〉 modality. Proposition 3.6 gives
the correct reduction axioms for this modality, that again lead to a truth-preserving
translation.
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Proposition 3.6. The following reduction axiom is valid on monotonic neighbourhood
models and on topological models.
〈+A〉♦ϕ ≡ ♦〈+A〉ϕ ∧ (A→ ♦(A ∧ 〈+A〉ϕ)
And, as in Proposition 3.7, the reduction axioms from Proposition 3.4 yield valid ana-
logues for the non-epistemic parts of the language.
As we noted in Fact 3.3, ifM is relational thenM+Awill be relational. However,
the same does not hold in the limit. That is, it is possible to keep on announcing a
fact and thereby transform an intersection-closed neighbourhood model into a model
that is no longer intersection-closed, i.e. into a model that is no longer equivalent to
a relational model. A simple example can be used to illustrate this phenomenon: Let
N = {a}, TaW = N ∪ {ω0}; set Na(u) = W for all u ∈ W , and ξ(u) = u. Then
clearly M = (W,Na, ξ) is an intersection-closed model, equivalent to the relational
model (W,W ×W, ξ).
Consider the following model, generated by an infinite sequence of conditional
announcements
M+ ¬0+ ¬1+ . . .+ ¬m+ . . .
Although at each stage of building this model it is relational, in the limit it is no longer
relational. Let α> = {n ∈ N ∪ {ω0} | n > α}, and then define N α recursively:
N 0 = Na
N α+1 = N α + α>
N λ =
⋃
α<λ
N α.
Then by Fact 3.3, for every m ∈ N, Nm is relational. However, there will also be a
point, in the transfinite case, where we are in a model that is not intersection-closed.
Notably, we have the following:
{m> | m ∈ N} = N ω0(ω0),
Yet we also have ⋂
{m> | m ∈ N} = {ω0},
but clearly {ω0} /∈ N ω0(ω0).
Remember that we needed to move to non-relational models in order to give a
correct foundation for α rounds of iteration of non-optimal strategies for transfinite α
(cf. Theorem 1.5), and the initial model for a game, as defined in Section 3.2, will be
relational. So this fact that the + announcement operator can, with enough iterations,
turn a ‘relational’ neighbourhood model into a non-relational model will be useful
when we look, as we do in the next Section, at what information flows can create the
models like those in Theorem 1.5.
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Definition 3.3. We will write M +α ϕ to mean the model generated by repeatedly
applying +ϕ, α times, where α is an arbitrary ordinal. For the limit case, we use
essentially the same definition as the one we just gave: suppose that
∀β < λ,M+β ϕ = (W,N βi , ξ)i∈N
is defined; then set
M+λ ϕ = (W,
⋃
β<λ
N βi , ξ)i∈N .
This definition allows us to consider the effects of transfinite announcements.
3.2 Epistemic actions on games
Just as the optimality operators considered in Chapter 1 in effect reduce the game, so
do public announcements reduce the game model. Starting with an initial model IG of
a game G, if one makes an announcement that has the effect of saying that the players
will only play according to the subgame S, then one obtains a modelMGS of the game
GS that has the strategies in S, with the preferences over them being the same as the
preferences over them in the original game G. It seems reasonable to ask that that
modelMGS be the initial model IGS of the smaller game GS .
This idea is taken direction from [Benthem, 2007b]. We will not touch upon the
main technical contributions of that paper however. So all we do is use it as a spring-
board for discussion, and so although we mention it frequently, what we say should
certainly not be taken as in any sense summarising it.
There are many ways to interpret what a public announcement of optimality or
rationality in the game might be. Let us first consider the interpretation suggested in
[Apt and Zvesper, 2007], that public announcements can be made by players, to the
effect that they will not play such-and-such strategies. Then each public announce-
ment is associated with a player i, and can only eliminate strategies of player i. We
will call these public announcements individual public announcements. Thus if the
language can express strategies, an individual public announcement by player i could,
syntactically speaking, be of the form [!¬∧Si], where Si ⊆ Ti.
However, as in the rest of this Chapter, we will be interested in generating restric-
tions in an homogeneous way. That is to say, we want to consider the case in which the
public announcements are syntactically the same between different rounds. In particu-
lar, the natural choices for our immediate concerns will be that each player announces
her own rationality, or that she is playing optimally. Therefore rather than considering
only announcements of the form [!¬∧Si], we will look at the more general class of an-
nouncements of the form [!ϕ] where, in the model being considered, ϕ defines a subset
of the model which is the interpretation of some sentence
∨
Si, where Si ⊆ Ti. (More
strictly we should say, ‘would be equivalent were that last sentence in the language’,
for we will not assume that it is in the language.)
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Definition 3.4. An individual public announcement by i in the the model M is an
announcement [!ϕ] where ϕ is an arbitrary formula and, for some Si ⊆ Ti, JϕKM =J∧SiKM. To put it otherwise: ξ(JϕKM) = Si × T−i for some Si ⊆ Ti.
The relational model that is taken in [Benthem, 2007b] to represent the initial situ-
ation before any announcements have taken place uses the strategy profiles as the state
space. In the model, at every state each player is taken to be correct about her own
strategy, and to have no belief about what strategy the other players will play, indeed
in some sense the only information each player has is about her own strategy: she
considers possible all states where she plays the same strategy.2 So given some game
G = (T,<), the model would be the relational model IG = (W,Ri, ε)i∈N , with ε the
identity function and Ri(s) = {si} × T−i.
This epistemic relation is precisely the strategy relation that we considered includ-
ing in the semantics of a language in the previous section, to interpret the modality
[is].
In the context of such a modelM, it is certainly clear that players can legitimately
make a large number of individual public announcements, since they do indeed cor-
rectly believe what strategy they will play. Thus each player i can ‘honestly’ announce,
at u, any individual public announcement ϕ such that ξi(u) ∈ ξi(JϕKM).
Notice then that in case the players are playing according to iterated elimination
of non-optimal strategies then they can each simply announce this, and we will have
a model in which the players each believe they will all play according to the iterated
elimination of non-optimal strategies. But the much more interesting line pursued
in [Benthem, 2007b] involves studying repeated announcements that the players are
rational.3
It is important to note that the particular interpretation we are considering here
is not necessarily that intended by [Benthem, 2007b]. It is not entirely clear from that
paper what interpretation should be given to the announcements; they are studied rather
in the spirit of connecting different research fields, and illustrating the dynamic nature
of contemporary mathematical and philosophical logic.
Furthermore, let us note that it is unclear what situation this model is intended to
represent, since it seems that players should have some belief about the strategy of the
other players before deciding on their own strategy. Yet in this model the players have
a determinate belief about what they will do – each has decided her own strategy – ap-
parently without any information about what the other players will do. Thus it would
2Since that fact is itself commonly believed, the model does not really represent total ignorance on
the part of the players; for example each player believes that the other players are correct about what
they will play, and so on.
3Two versions of rationality are considered in [Benthem, 2007b]: “weak rationality” and “strong
rationality”, corresponding to avoiding strictly dominated strategies and avoiding never-best responses
respectively. The definability of the resulting outcomes in an inflationary fixpoint calculus is considered,
and observations about monotonicity are given more formal force by observing a common syntactic form
in terms of “existential positive” formulae.
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be difficult to wrap an intuitive interpretation around the mathematical description pro-
posed.
As we have suggested already, the models that we will be interested in represent
our interpretation of the one-shot interaction situation. We therefore define the initial
model of a game IG of a game G as consisting of one state for each strategy profile,
with complete uncertainty for all players concerning the states
Definition 3.5. If G = (T,<), then the initial model of G is IG = (T,Ni, ξ)i∈N , with
Ni = {T} for each player i ∈ N .
(Notice that this initial model’s neighbourhoods are trivially monotonic for each
player, and of course each public announcement cannot break the monotonicity. So the
syntactic analysis from the previous Section would apply here unproblematically.)
These models are very simple: a far cry from the ‘(assumption-)complete’ or ‘uni-
versal’ models mentioned in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, we think they are faithful to the
one-shot situation as it is described: players are presented with (or perhaps ‘confronted
with’) the game situation, and the situation is assumed to be common knowledge. So
it is not the case that the players do not know anything; in particular they know the
game, and the epistemic situation of themselves and the other players. Ideally a full
informational account of game theory might start with some much more general initial
situation and describe dynamically the process of acquisition of the game situation as
it is described by our initial models. However, we think that our models are intuitively
plausible and that they do justice to the one-shot interpretation of strategic games as
we have described it.
Notice in particular that in these models players do not have any beliefs regarding
their own strategy. This is in contrast to the situation as it is described in [Benthem,
2007b]. In our attempt to model a deliberative process, we have players choosing their
strategies after reasoning about each other. So rationally they eliminate choices until
they are unable to continue to do so, and then make a choice. They might make this
choice realising that they and the others have several possible rational choices.
The process of elimination itself we describe as a private but common process,
since the idea behind it is that all players must suppose that the other players are per-
forming the same process, so that the model is updated in the same way. Thus reason-
ing is done privately, since this is still meant to represent the one-shot situation, but
commonly, since all players are in some sense in the same situation.
Therefore we suggest that epistemic models in which players have settled on their
strategies, after this process of rational, private but common, deliberation, should be ar-
rived at via those two processes: First, the private but common deliberation, described
by the public announcements. Then a decision by each player, to choose one of the
strategies she has left. Now these decisions also have a ‘private but common’ char-
acter to them: the detail of them is private, but the players are commonly aware that
each other player is making some decision. The players all making a decision, and
being aware that the others have all made their decision, is given by taking a model
M = (W,Ni, ξ)i∈N and returning the updated modelMD.
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Definition 3.6. MD = (W,NiD, ξ)i∈N :
NiD(u) = {E ⊆ W | ∃A ∈ Ni(u) : A ∩ ξ−1i (ξi(u)) ⊆ E}.
What this operation does is to ensure that each player is correct about their own
strategy choice, and that fact becomes commonly believed among the players. In the
case of a relational model, it can be written as follows:
RiD(u) = Ri(u) ∩ ξ−1i (ξi(u)).
Now, as in the case of public announcements, we can talk about the new model in the
old model. That is: we can give ‘reduction axioms’ for a modality 〈D〉 that allow us to
provide a truth-preserving translation between LN,O,κ,! and LN,O,κ.
Proposition 3.7. The following reduction axiom is valid:
〈D〉♦iϕ ≡
∧
i∈N
( ∧
si∈Ti
(
si → ♦i(si ∧ 〈D〉ϕ)
))
Furthermore, because this operation also only alters the information of players in a
model, all the reduction axioms for 〈¡〉, other than that for ♦i, remain valid when we
replace 〈¡〉 by 〈D〉.
We can use non-eliminative announcements, followed by each player making their
decision, to generate a model that is somewhat like that given in Theorem 1.2. That
Theorem stated the existence of a model in which players have common true belief in
rationality just if they all play strategies that survive the iterated elimination of non-
optimal strategies.
So take some game G, and its initial model, as defined above IG = (T,Ni, ε)i∈N .
Then, in [Benthem, 2007b], we can repeatedly announce eliminatively that each player
plays optimally, or, equivalently, that she plays rationally. This will yield a model in
which players have common belief of rationality. In this model, the ‘rationality’ ri of
each player i is the same thing as i playing according to the iterated elimination of
non-optimal strategies. In order to obtain a model in which players are, in addition,
correct about their strategies, and in which this fact is (commonly) believed, we apply
the D operator that we introduced above:
IG ! ,> . . . ! ,>︸ ︷︷ ︸
αG times
D = IG !r . . . !r︸ ︷︷ ︸
αG times
D
However, this model is in other ways different from the model constructed in Theorem
1.5, since there are no states in this model where the players do not play rationally,
whereas for most games there are in states in the model given by that construction, in
which players do not play rationally. (By ‘most games’, we mean all those in which
the optimality operator in question is non-tautological, in the sense that it eliminated
at least one strategy of at least one player.)
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To get closer to that model, we could instead apply non-eliminative public an-
nouncements. Fact 3.6 shows that in this case we must use announcements of ratio-
nality and not just optimality.
Fact 3.6. Non-eliminatively announcing rationality more than once has no more effect
than doing so only once:
M¡ ,> =M¡ ,>¡ ,>
So we could get closer to seeing how the model from Theorem 1.5 might come
about by considering the following process:
IG ¡r . . . ¡r︸ ︷︷ ︸
αG times
D
However, this model is also different from that given in Theorem 1.5, since in the
states where players do not play rationally, at any stage of the process, they acquire
inconsistent beliefs, i.e. in those states, each player’s neighbourhood will contain the
empty set ∅. However, in those states that are left in the outcome, we do indeed have
common belief that players are rational, and are correct about their own strategies. It is
possible to define another non-eliminative announcement that does not have this effect.
We could specify another ad-hoc operation and give a reduction axiom for it, but we
can also define a DEL action model to achieve the same effect.
So, as we will now see, there is an action model that can be used to generate, given
an initial model IG for the game G, as above, a model similar to that in Theorem 1.2.
That model was an S5 (partitional) model, and in it common belief of rationality was
Ar: r
N
¬r
N
Figure 3.4: An action model that gives a dynamic counterpart to Theorem 1.2. Here
there are two events, one with the precondition r, the other with the precondition ¬r;
and all players can tell which event is occurring.
equivalent to the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies. In order to generate it,
we simply give, as depicted in figure an action model that is the disjoint union of two
different public announcements.
The action depicted in Figure 3.4 is just an announcement ‘whether’ the players
are rational. That is, at states where the players are rational, it functions just like an
announcement that they are rational; at states where not all players are rational, it is an
announcement that not all players are rational.
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We can see the action working on an initial model of some game G, which we
draw in Figure 3.5. There we draw the (relational model of the) two-player game as
a square. The optimality operators for each player are marked along the side, and
the accessibility relation (which is the same for each player) is given by a dashed line
indicating the partition induced by it (since the models are all S5). The model on the
far left is the initial model IG, and we successively apply the action model Ar from
Figure 3.4, to generate new models, with new accessibility relations. That model at the
T
OiT
OiOT
T
O
j
T
O
j
O
T
⊗Ar ⊗Ar
Figure 3.5: The announcement from Figure 3.4 being applied to an initial model. We
depict a two-player game model by arranging the states into rows and columns accord-
ing to the strategy choices of a row and a column player. Each application ofAr refines
the players’ information (they have the same information) which is a partition denoted
by the dashed lines.
far right represents the situation where the players have been successively ‘informed’
whether or not they are all playing rationally. Subsequently, the players choose their
strategy, i.e. we apply D to the model, as in Figure 3.6. (For illustration we suppose
that each player has only three strategies.) Here where the two partitions are different
we draw the column player’s partition dashed as before, and the row player’s partition
as dotted lines.
Notice that this is not the same model as that given in Theorem 1.2, since here the
players have more information than in that model. In that model, there were only two
elements in each player’s partition, which were the event that players play according
to O∞, and the event that they do not. This model is relatively simple to generate
however; it is not clear what action would be iterated, in step with the algorithm of
elimination, in order to generate a model like that in Theorem 1.2.
Let us now turn to the case of transfinite announcements. In the rest of this Section,
we show that there is a single statement that, when ‘conditionally’ announced (so in
‘+ϕ’ sense) α times, generates a model where, like that in Theorem 1.5, for all β < α,
β-level belief in rationality is equivalent to 1 +β rounds of elimination of non-optimal
strategies.
We will illustrate this in the 2-player case; the statement however is already a little
more complicated than just ‘both players are rational’. Let us build it up step by step.
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D
Figure 3.6: The situation once each player has chosen a strategy. Here the two players
get different information, since each is aware of his own choice but ignorant of the
opponent’s.
First, consider the following formula scheme, where j is the player who is not i:
ϕSi := (♦i j Si ∧,i,j Si)→,jSi
What this says, if you are player i, can be paraphrased as: ‘If you think it’s plausible
that your opponent is rational and believes that you will play according to Si, and
you’re playing optimally against that eventuality, then you are right to do so.’
Now what we want is to announce that this holds no matter what the strategy set
Si, and for both players. So let ϕcr :=
∧
i∈N
∧
Si⊆Ti . This sentence is certainly not as
straightforward as just announcing the rationality of both players, but Proposition 3.8
states that the model generated by α rounds of ‘conditionally’ announcing it, according
to Definition 3.3, starting from the initial model of some game G, yields a model
satisfying the condition of Theorem 1.5: that O1+αG = ξ(Jr ∧αrK).
Proposition 3.8. LetM denote (IG +α ϕcr)D. Then ∀β ≤ α we have the following
equivalence:
ξ(Jr ∧βKM) = O1+βG .
3.3 Belief revision and lexicographic rationality
In this Section we define a richer kind of belief model than that used so far, which can
be used for reasoning about conditional beliefs, and allows for what [Benthem, 2007a]
calls “soft information” flow. Partly this is groundwork for the next Chapter, where we
will want models in which players can learn things, in the course of playing a game that
contradict things they believed to be true, and so revise their information. However, we
also show that conditional belief models are important for understanding the dynamic
process of reasoning involved in the iterated application of non-monotonic optimality
operators, like the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
We will suggest that, during the decision phase, a player will choose precisely those
strategies from the original game that are rational given his information in whatever
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model has been arrived at by deliberation until the decision phase. So the kind of belief
model that we end up with should be what we call a ‘rational equilibrium of beliefs’,
in which players recognise the possibilities that are rationally open to themselves and
to each other, and, crucially, recognise the stability of the configuration of beliefs.
It happens that in the case of monotonic operators, the stability we are talking
about is present in the resulting model. So in order to be clearer about what we mean,
let us consider now a particular non-monotonic optimality notion: weak dominance
(admissibility). An example should clarify what we mean, and serve to point the way
towards the solution. In the game depicted in Figure 3.7, weak dominance would
L R
U 0, 0 1, 0
D 1, 0 0, 1
Figure 3.7: A strategic game where hard announcements of admissibility yield an un-
stable belief model.
eliminate first of all L for the column player b, because it is weakly dominated by R.
Once L has been eliminated, D is then (strictly) dominated by U for the row player
a, yielding the unique outcome (U,R). The crucial point about this simple example
though is that b’s reason for not playing L is removed by one of its consequences. That
is, there is a sort of non-monotonicity in the reasoning. What that means is that, with
respect to the restriction {(U,R)}, it is rational for player b to play L, since given that
player a will (apparently) choose U , player b believes she is choosing between two
equal alternatives.
The idea that now introduce of a rational equilibrium of beliefs is that the beliefs of
the players concerning the strategies that might be played are self-enforcing; that if a
player j believes that another player i’s strategy si will not be played, then it is because
the configuration of beliefs means that si would not be rational for i to play.
Definition 3.7. There is rational equilibrium at u in the relational model (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N
iff :
∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Ti
(
si ∈ Oi(Ri(u))⇒ ∀j ∈ N − {i}, (W,Ri, ξ), u  ♦jsi
)
.
We do not claim that Definition 3.7 is the final word on what a rational equilibrium
in a relational model should be. Most notably, an obvious objection is that it might be
better to stipulate that if j thinks i won’t play si then it is because j thinks si would
not be rational for i. However, we stick to the simple definition for present purposes
since in all the examples we consider all beliefs are anyway common beliefs. A more
in-depth study of these questions would not be difficult but might detract away from
the our main point here.4
4Furthermore, note that an analogous definition could be given for the case of neighbourhood models.
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Where G is the game in Figure 3.7, in the model IG!rD arrived at by in effect
announcing (eliminatively) that the players do not play weakly dominated strategies,
there is one unique state left, that where players play (U,R). But this is not in rational
equilibrium, for precisely the reason we gave above: b’s reason for not playing L has
been eliminated. I.e., it would be rational for b to play L, but a believes that b will not
play L.
The way to overcome this problem is to remark that b can entertain the possibility
that she might be mistaken in her belief. That is, since given her beliefs L andR appear
equal, she should fall back on the possibility that she might be wrong: that a could,
contrary to her information, play D.
So it looks like the solution might be to use non-eliminative announcements in
combination with the universal modality, as a stricter form of the belief operator (that
we might be tempted to call ‘knowledge’, since it exhausts every possibility in the
model). Then we would say that a player plays rationally just if she plays optimally
with respect to her beliefs and that amongst those rational options she only picks
options that are optimal with respect to the rest of the model.
L R
W 1, 0 −1, 0
M 0, 1 1, 0
D 0, 0 0, 1
Figure 3.8: A strategic game that motivates using a finer-grained view of beliefs.
However, as the game in Figure 3.8 illustrates, we need a more fine-grained ap-
proach than that. In that example, (W,L) is the unique outcome of iterated admissi-
bility. Notice now that the ‘information’ that this is the outcome does not leave the
column player b with any reason to play according to the outcome, i.e. she might just
as well decide to play R: this would still be rational. So among the options that she has
that are optimal against W (both of them: L and R), we should then look at the options
she has that are optimal with respect to all the possibilities in the model, i.e. against
{W,M,D}. But in that case, R still has not become irrational for her! It is supported
by the possibility that player a will choose D. Thus once again we do not have a
rational equilibrium in the relevant model.
So we need a finer-grained approach: we want to say that player b considers it most
likely that player a will play W ; but believes that that if he doesn’t then it’s most likely
that he will play M ; and finally, considers the least likely option to be that he will play
D.
This leads us to use the idea of a plausibility ordering over the states of the model,
that we will now use to define beliefs including conditional beliefs. We therefore define
plausibility models, which are still state-space based models (though along the lines we
saw in Chapter 2, it would be possible to consider also type-space based models).
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Definition 3.8. A total plausibility ordering is a total transitive reflexive relation,
i.e. 4i is a total plausibility ordering iff :
• ∀u, v ∈ W , either u 4i v or v 4i u.
• ∀u, v, w ∈ W , if u 4i v and v 4i w, then u 4i w.
• ∀u ∈ W , u 4i u.
Definition 3.9. Plausibility models are of the form (W,4i, ξ)i∈N , where W is a finite
set of ‘states’, ξ is as before a function assigning to each state an outcome of the game,
and each 4i⊆ W ×W is a plausibility ordering.
(We restrict our attention here to finite models just to avoid questions of well-
foundedness of the relation that would be entirely peripheral to our main concerns.)
We follow [Board, 2002; Benthem, 2007a; Baltag and Smets, 2006] in adopting
plausibility orderings to represent conditional beliefs. So we henceforth consider lan-
guages with conditional belief operators:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | i(ϕ|ϕ) | . . .
The conditional belief operatori(ϕ|ψ) is supposed to mean something like ‘i believes
conditionally on ψ that ϕ’. More precisely, it will mean that in all i’s most plausible
ψ-states, ϕ holds. On a plausibility model M = (W,4i, ξ)i∈N , we interpret it as
follows:
M, u  i(ϕ|ψ) iff MIN4i(JψKM) ⊆ JϕKM.
Logics like this conditional belief logic are studied in [Segerberg, 1995; Board, 2002],
cf. [Lewis, 1973].
Sometimes, when it leads to more elegant notation (notably in Chapter 4), we will
write ϕi ψ for i(ψ|ϕ). We retrieve the unconditional belief operator iϕ by simply
defining it as an abbreviation of i(ϕ|>).
In fact, plausibility models can be thought of as enrichments of positively and neg-
atively introspective relational models. Unpacking the definition, we see that the un-
conditional belief modality has the following semantics:
M, u  iϕ iff {v ∈ W | ∀w ∈ W, v 4i w} ⊆ JϕKM.
We can talk about common belief ∗; (we could also introduce ‘common condi-
tional belief’ ∗(ϕ|ψ), but we will have no need for it). For every conditional belief
model (W,4i, ξ)i∈N there is a relational model (W,Ri, ξ)i∈N defined by setting
Ri(u) = MIN4i(W ),
and this relational model will be equivalent to the conditional belief model for the
language without the conditional belief modality.
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It is not hard to see that beliefs in this relational model will be introspective and
consistent, and equivalent to those of the conditional belief model. What is more,
it is possible to show that the languages considered in the previous section cannot
distinguish between on the one hand the class of relational models in which D, 4 and
5 hold, and on the other the class of plausibility models. That is: they have the same
logic, as far as unconditional beliefs go.
So what exactly are these unconditional beliefs? Let us mention briefly the con-
nection between conditional belief models and conditional probability systems. If, for
each player i, we are given a conditional probability system a` la Renyi [1955], or a
lexicographic probability system [Blume et al., 1991], over a set of states W we can
define subjective conditional probabilities Probi(F |E) even for events of zero prob-
ability. When W is finite and the system is discrete (i.e., Probi(F |E) is defined for
all non-empty events E), we can use this to define conditional belief operators for
arbitrary events, by putting: u 4i v iff Probi({u}|{u, v}) 6= 0. This will yield the
following definition of the conditional belief operator:
Ji(ϕ|ψ)K = {s ∈ S : Probi(JϕK|JψK) = 1}.
In the context of plausibility models, we will also be interested to define a notion
of knowledge, the product of hard information. Let us therefore introduce a knowledge
operator Ki into the language. We take the following axioms to be minimal require-
ments for a knowledge operator:
• Kiϕ→ ϕ;
• Kiϕ→ iϕ.
These axioms should be valid if we accept that necessary conditions for you to know a
proposition are firstly that it is true, and secondly that you believe it. (Of course, in any
reasonable account of knowledge there will be more than just these minimal necessary
conditions.) Then one way to ensure that these axioms hold would be to define each
player i’s knowledge modality Ki as the universal modality A. In that case, there will
be no difference between the knowledge of player i and of player j, and so common
knowledge, which we will write as K∗ (the natural analogue to common belief) would
be definable immediately also as A. We do not find this approach to be objectionable,
especially in lieu of our strict interpretation of knowledge. However, we will note that
there is another way, already present in [Board, 2002], of defining knowledge, in such
a way that there can be propositions ϕ such that Kiϕ ∧ ¬Kjϕ holds at some state. We
will use this definition in Chapter 4.
Given a relation 4i⊆ W ×W , write W ui for the set of states that are 4i-accessible
from u, or from which u is 4i-accessible:
W ui = {v ∈ W | u 4i v or v 4i u}.
Definition 3.10. We say that the relation 4i is locally total if and only if:
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• ∀u ∈ W, ∀v ∈ W ui , W vi = W ui .
Definition 3.10 can be paraphrased as saying that 4i is totally local just if the
restriction of 4i to each W ui is total.
Definition 3.11. 1. A plausibility model in which the plausibility orderings are to-
tal is a pure plausibility model.
2. A plausibility model in which the plausibility orderings are locally total is called
an impure plausibility model.
In Board’s [2002] terminology, W ui is the set of states that are ‘conceivable’ for i
at u. It is a partition of the state space W and can be used to define the knowledge op-
erator. We will assume the following definition of knowledge, that in pure plausibility
models coincides with the definition of A the global modality:
M, u  Kiϕ iff W ui ⊆ JϕKM.
i(ϕ|ψ) does not mean that after learning that ψ, i will believe ϕ; rather it means
that after learning ψ, i will believe that ϕ was the case before the learning. This is
a subtle but important point: the conditional belief operators do not directly capture
the dynamics of belief, but rather as van Benthem [2007a] puts it, they ‘pre-encode’ it.
(We refer to [Benthem, 2007a; Baltag and Smets, 2008b] for more discussion.)
As explained in [Board, 2002, Section 3], we can use a binary plausibility ordering
for each player, rather than a ternary ordering, indexed also by the actual state, (if and)
only if we are willing to accept these strong introspection principles:
1. i(ϕ|ψ)→ i(i(ϕ|ψ)|χ)
2. ¬i (ϕ|ψ)→ i(¬i (ϕ|ψ)|χ)
These two principles correspond respectively to a strong form of positive introspection
and a strong form of negative introspection. The first entails 4, and the second 5, where
we define the unconditional belief modality i as above.
Although we accept that the resulting KD45 logic for the basic belief modality is
potentially objectionable enough, and that the full introspection considered here might
be considered worse, nonetheless this again is tangential to our main concerns, so for
reasons of elegance (of notation if nothing else) we prefer to present the semantics with
binary relations, and so assume full introspection of the players. (Recall from Chapter
1 that in type-space models, players are assumed to be fully introspective.)
The examples illustrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, and our discussion of them, point
to a more fine-grained definition of rationality. Rather than only looking at what her
unconditional beliefs are, a player should also take into account those situations that
she would fall back on, if informed that her actual beliefs are false. Suppose that i
cannot ‘break a tie’ between two strategies si and s′i with respect to the game deter-
mined by her actual beliefs: by the 4i-minimal states. Then i should, rationally, also
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play optimally with respect to the ‘next level’ of beliefs. Let us formalise this notion
of ‘lexicographic rationality’ (so called because players look first at their most likely
states; then at the next most likely and so on).
We will need to define MIN4i(u)
n as follows:
MIN4i(u)
0 = {MIN4i(W ui )}
MIN4i(u)
m+1 = MIN4i(u)
m ∪ {MIN4i(W ui − MIN4i(u)m)}
That is, we first take the most plausible states; then we in effect ‘break’ the link to the
most plausible states and look at the resulting states; and so on. As we continue along
this process, it produces a set of nested sets (events); that is what Fact 3.7 states.
Fact 3.7. For any m,m′ ∈ N, we have:
1. For all X, Y ∈ MIN4i(u)m, X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X .
2. If m′ > m then MIN4i(u)
m ⊆ MIN4i(u)m.
Then each MIN4i(u)
m is rather like a set of ‘belief spheres’, to use terminology
from Lewis [1973], which he introduced in the context of semantics for counterfac-
tuals, that are very close to the plausibility ordering semantics we are considering for
belief revision.
Furthermore, since we are considering finite models5 this process will stop at some
finite stage mui ∈ N, i.e. with MIN4i(u)mui = MIN4i(u)mui +1.
Now player i being lexicographically rational at u is going to mean i playing opti-
mally with respect to the restrictions defined by all of the elements of MIN4i(u)
mui .
Definition 3.12. The event that i is lexicographically rational is the following one:
lri := {u ∈ W | ∀X ∈ MIN4i(u)m
u
i , ξi(u) ∈ Oi(ξ(X))}.
Prima facie this definition looks arbitrary, and for some optimality notions it might
seem problematic. Let us first of all note that for monotonic optimality operators lex-
icographic rationality and rationality tout court (i.e. the notion of rationality that we
have worked with up until now) are the same.
Fact 3.8. If Oi is monotonic, then on any plausibility model,
ri = lri.
We should also look at a concrete example of an optimality operator in order to mo-
tivate this definition of lexicographic rationality. The only persistently non-monotonic
5The extension to the infinite case would be unproblematic: one would simply take the union at limit
stages.
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optimality operator that we have seen is admissibility (avoidance of weakly domi-
nated strategies). Let us recall the definition of weak dominance (cf. Section 1.1).
wdi(si, s
′
i, S−i) means that si is weakly dominated by s
′
i with respect to S−i:
wdi(si, s
′
i, S−i) iff ∀s−i ∈ S−i, (s′i, s−i) ≥i (si, s−i)
and ∃s−i ∈ S−i, (s′i, s−i) >i (si, s−i).
Then the (contracting, global version of the) operator nwdi(S) is defined as
nwdi(S) = {si ∈ Si | ∀s′i ∈ Ti, ¬wdi(si, s′i, S−i)}.
Notice that our definition of lexicographic rationality is sensible in this context because
of Fact 3.9.
Fact 3.9. If wdi(si, s′i, A−i) and wdi(s′i, si, B−i) then A−i 6⊆ B−i.
Now, if Fact 3.9 did not hold, or if a players’ plausibility ordering did not induce
nested sets (Fact 3.7), then things would be problematic, because a player could then
have two sets A−i, B−i ∈ MIN4i(u)mui where si is dominated by some strategy s′i with
respect toA−i, with s′i in turn being dominated by si with respect toB−i. However, this
situation cannot arise, and so our definition of lexicographic rationality is safe. Indeed,
Fact 3.9 expresses an additional condition, on top of that given in Definition 1.14, that
we might want to impose on optimality operators.
To get a little more concrete, let us see how lexicographic rationality can be used
to define a sensible rational equilibrium of beliefs that can be reached even in the
case of non-monotonic optimality operators. This time though we are not interested
in hard public announcements of rationality or anything else, but in so-called ‘soft’
announcements, of lexicographic rationality.
Where a hard public announcement models the passage of hard information, soft
public announcements model the flow of soft information, and so is about changes of
belief, where belief is modelled by a plausibility ordering as in the models we have just
described.
The terminology of soft announcements is from [Benthem, 2007a], where a number
of such operators are studied and axiomatised. One of those operators, that we will
focus on, is called ‘lexicographic update’. The idea of this epistemic action is that it
is a soft announcement of some sentence ϕ, that has the effect that all those who hear
it make all of the states where ϕ holds more plausible than those where ϕ does not
hold, and otherwise leave the ordering the same. We refer to [Benthem, 2007a] for
more discussion of this operation and justifications of it as a rational way of changing
beliefs.
To close this Chapter, we will sketch how such soft announcements of lexico-
graphic rationality can be used to generate a model that does explain, in our view
better than the in the hard case, why players only choose strategies that survive iter-
ated admissibility.
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Just as in Definition 3.7, we want to say when a certain strategy would be rational
for a player to play at a certain state. This time the definition of what would be rational
is a little more involved, so we introduce some intermediary notation for this purpose.
Definition 3.13. The event that i’s strategy si ∈ Ti would be lexicographically ratio-
nal for i, written lri(si), is as follows:
lri(si) := {u ∈ W | ∀X ∈ MIN4i(u)m
u
i , si ∈ Oi(ξ(X))}.
Now we can define an analogue to Definition 3.7, this time for plausibility models.
Definition 3.14. There is rational equilibrium at u in the plausibility modelM just
if:
∀i ∈ N, ∀si ∈ Ti
(
lri(si) ⊆
⋂
j∈N−{i}
J♦jsiKM).
Definition 3.14 is susceptible to the same charges as Definition 3.7. Furthermore,
the reader might prefer a strictly stronger condition, that takes into account not only
players’ unconditional beliefs, but also their conditional beliefs about other players’
strategies. Again, we do not insist that the detail of Definition 3.14 is necessarily
correct; the idea underlying it is the most important thing in order to make this largely
conceptual point.
We do not discuss the syntactic aspects of lexicographic rationality, so let us give a
purely semantic description of what is involved in arriving at a rational equilibrium of
beliefs even in the non-monotonic case.
Start with the initial model I′G of some game G:
Definition 3.15. Given some gameG = (T,≥), let I′G be the (pure) plausibility model
(T,4i= T × T, id) in which the states are the strategy profiles of G, and all players
have the same plausibility ordering 4= W ×W , so there are no non-trivial beliefs in
this model.
Again: as in the case of IG, the initial model I′G is intended to represent the epis-
temic situation of the players as soon as they have been presented with the game. So
the game is common knowledge, but other than that the players have no information,
soft or hard.
Now if we iteratively softly announce lexicographic rationality, then we will end
up with a model very much like that depicted in Figure 3.5 above, except that the ‘par-
titions’ there should be nested.6 It is easiest to draw the plausibility ordering 4i at
u in terms of the induced ‘sphere system’ MIN4i(u), and that is what we do in Fig-
ure 3.9 in order to represent the model that is generated by soft announcements of
lexicographic rationality. In this way we generate a model in which the only rational
strategies that can be chosen are those that survive the iterated elimination of weakly
6Iterations of different kinds of soft announcements are studied, and some interesting properties
concerning cycles and fixpoints are found, in [Baltag and Smets, 2009].
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Figure 3.9: Soft announcements of lexicographic rationality. The picture here is like
Figure 3.5, except that a belief ordering, rather than a partition, of the state space is
being formed.
dominated strategies. The model really does represent a rational equilibrium of be-
liefs: no player will be tempted, as we saw would be the case with the previous ‘hard
information’ analysis, to not play according to the predictions of the equilibrium, since
there is always a reason for acting in accordance with it.
We have not stated any significant results in this Section, which has primarily con-
sisted of definitions and remarks about them. One aim of these definitions has been to
motivate the use of plausibility models, and so conditional beliefs, in the analysis of
deductive reasoning in games, in order to understand the dynamics of non-monotonic
optimality operators on strategic games. We will actually put some of these definitions
to more substantial use in the next Chapter when we apply a similar kind of logical
analysis to extensive games.
Summary
In this Chapter we have looked at the dynamics of information, including some appli-
cations to themes from the previous two Chapters. We presented dynamic epistemic
logic (DEL), along with some minor new results concerning neighbourhood models.
We used DEL to analyse game reduction processes themselves, rather than just looking
at the results of those processes. We tried to tell a coherent story about that process, and
showed also how models like those from the Theorems from Chapter 1 could be built
by repeating some action, corresponding to the process of deliberation that players go
through in the one-shot interaction scenarios we are considering.
This is a formalisation of the private but common process that underlies deductive
reasoning about games. We also introduced the notion of a ‘rational equilibrium of be-
liefs’: the idea is that although we are not in what game-theorists might call equilibrium
(according to some steady-state interpretation), there still should be an equilibrium of a
kind, and this led us to suggest the significance of conditional beliefs in understanding
non-monotonic solution concepts.
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Introducing conditional beliefs also meant that we have already laid some of the
technical foundations for the next chapter, where we will make extensive use of the
plausibility models defined here.

Chapter 4
Extensive Games
“Aumann has proved that common knowledge of substantive
rationality implies the backward induction solution.
Stalnaker has proved that it does not.”
– Joseph Y. Halpern [Halpern, 2001]
The only games we considered in the preceding chapters were strategic games. What
about applying our logical analysis to extensive games?
Extensive games represent decision processes that are extended over time, and so
players do not always make their choices in complete ignorance about what choices
other players make.
We start by looking at games of so-called ‘perfect information’ (PI), in which ev-
ery move by every player is commonly and synchronously observed. In such games
backward induction, the “oldest idea in game theory” [Aumann, 1995, p. 635], yields a
natural solution concept, subgame-perfect equilibrium. There has been a great deal of
debate concerning just what would be a sound epistemic foundation for it. One of the
aims of this chapter is to offer a perspective on that debate that is provided by epistemic
or doxastic logic. We use a logical language for conditional belief in order to express
some of the key notions that we will use, including a dynamic, forward-looking form
of rationality. We model the actual playing of the game within our logical language
using public announcement modalities: when a node p in the tree is reached, the in-
tuitive description of a PI game means that we can legitimately say this is a common
collective learning that p has been reached. We then prove Theorem 4.1 that gives
epistemic conditions, in terms of dynamic rationality and common conditional belief,
for backward induction.
Backward induction in so-called ‘generic’ PI games has the pleasant feature that
it yields a unique outcome. So purely by reasoning about the game, from the Deduc-
tive interpretation that we have in mind in this Thesis, players can arrive at a unique
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outcome. Subgame-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which de-
pends upon a steady-state interpretation. Nonetheless in generic games the backward
induction algorithm allows that the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium be derivable
by each player in isolation (as we might say, repeating a phrase from Chapter 3: ‘pri-
vately but commonly’) reasoning about the game situation.
We try to take an approach to the questions that underlie the problem of backward
induction that is as generic as possible, and as untainted by ambiguously-interpretable
game-theoretical notions. So in particular, we do not (explicitly) make extensive-form
strategies into the objects of players’ beliefs. Indeed, in the formal language that we
introduce for reasoning about models for games in extensive form, we will not include
terms for strategies, but for outcomes or (equivalently) for nodes in the game tree.
We look briefly at games with imperfect information, and illustrate how DEL action
models (introduced in Section 3.1) could be used to simulate the play of an extensive
game of imperfect information (where PI games were simulatable just with public
announcements). We will also look at a limitation of that DEL-based analysis: that is
not, as it stands, fit to analyse the interesting phenomenon of strategic communication.
Selten, who introduced the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium, later [1975] in-
troduced a further refinement of it, which he called ‘perfect equilibrium’1, and which
is often now called ‘trembling-hand equilibrium’ (e.g. in [Osborne and Rubinstein,
1994]). Epistemically speaking, this concept requires a great deal from the steady-
state interpretation of game theory. Not only must players be correct about each other’s
strategies, but what is more they must in effect share a conditional probability system
specifying with what probabilities each event pertains should various other events (in-
cluding those they actually believe to hold) not in fact hold. We offer a simplified ver-
sion of trembling-hand equilibrium, ‘even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium’, that
supposes only that players are correct about each other’s strategies, and share a very
natural belief revision policy.
Background literature
The issues that we deal with in this Chapter originate in the work of Aumann [1995],
Stalnaker [1994; 1996; 1998] and Reny [1992], and have been investigated by a num-
ber of authors: [Binmore, 1987; 1996; Bicchieri, 1989; Battigalli, 1997; Battigalli
and Siniscalchi, 1999; 2002; Bonanno, 1991; Brandenburger, 2007; Halpern, 2001;
Samet, 1996; Clausing, 2003] is not an exhaustive list, and there are many illuminating
discussions to be found in the literature. Many of the different solutions proposed in
those works are related in different ways to our own.
The arbitrary announcement modality [!]ϕ is introduced and studied in [Balbiani et
al., 2008].
1He has previously used the term ‘perfect equilibrium’ for what is now known as ‘subgame-perfect
equilibrium’, and so remarks that “In retrospect the earlier use of the word ‘perfect’ was premature”
(op.cit.).
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Organisation of the Chapter
In Section 4.1, we introduce our notation for extensive games, and define many of the
important concepts like strategies, backward induction, conditional belief models for
extensive games, etc.
In Section 4.2, we will go on to present conditions that ensure that players will play
according to the backward induction outcome.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we look at extensive games with imperfect information.
We also look at Selten’s ‘perfect equilibrium’ or ‘trembling-hand equilibrium’, which
was introduced for extensive games, but is most commonly defined for strategic-form
games (for example in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994]). We therefore move back to a
strategic game perspective to develop ‘even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium’. We
close the Chapter by raising the question how to analyse strategic communication using
our formal epistemological methodology.
4.1 Games with perfect information
Extensive games differ from the ‘strategic’ or ‘normal-form’ games that we have so far
considered in that they are supposed to represent an extended process of play, in which
players take it in turns to make moves, rather than choosing a single strategy and sitting
back and waiting. Let us consider why it is normal that we should add something to the
ideas from the previous chapters before using them to reason about games in extensive
form, given that these represent a process that is extended in time. It is possible to
define strategies for extensive games, that can be used to define a strategic game that is
in some sense equivalent to the extensive game. That is, one could simply translate an
extensive game into its normal form (see the definition in Section 4.1 below), and then
apply an existing analysis, in terms of public announcements (Chapter 3) or in terms
of common belief of rationality (Chapter 1), to the resulting game. However, this will
not be very revealing in the sense that it will not yield any insight in or understanding
of the subtleties of the information dynamics of extensive games.
As a number of commentators have observed (for example [Stalnaker, 1996; Bruin,
2004]), treating extensive games as if they were strategic games in this way means ig-
noring the crucial feature of extensive games. After all, an extensive game is supposed
to represent a multi-party sequence of decision processes extended over a temporal in-
terval, i.e. one player makes his move after another player has made hers. In order to
do justice to this natural interpretation, we need to allow for players’ beliefs to change
as the game is played out. That is, we have a “many-moment interpretation”, and not
a “one-shot interpretation” of strategic games in mind (cf. [Bruin, 2004, Chapter 4]).
Furthermore, it is not just that players should be able to (monotonically) increase
their beliefs, but actually to revise them. If for example, in a game of chess, player 1
believes that player 2 will advance his queen’s pawn but he instead castles, we certainly
do not want player 1 to maintain her previous belief concerning player 2’s move. For
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players to be able coherently to revise their beliefs as the game goes on, we will in this
Chapter again use conditional belief models.
Even if we do have a “many-moment” interpretation in mind for the particularities
of extensive games, still this is independent of the Deductive interpretation of games,
which we want to maintain in analysing extensive games of perfect information. So the
main question is (still) what the players can deduce from some basic common principle
of rationality.
An extensive game is based around a (finite) game tree, which consists of a relation
 over a finite set Z of nodes;
Definition 4.1. For it to be a tree, has to be reflexive transitive and antisymmetric2,
and for each p ∈ Z , restricted to the set {q | q  p}, the relation is total: i.e. for
each q, q′ ∈ Z , if q  p and q′  p, then either q  q′ or q′  q.
For p, q ∈ Z , p  q means that q can be reached by descending3 branches of the
tree from p. we write p 7→ q′ to mean that q′ is an immediate successor of p (i.e. that
p q′ and for no other q 6= p and q 6= q′ is it the case that p q  q′.
We in general also lift these relations to functions, though we use the convention
that←[ (p) to denote the unique node q such that q 7→ p (rather than the singleton set
containing it, as the usual lifting of relations to functions would have it).
In a tree there is a single ‘root’ node, one that has no predecessor. We generally
denote this node by r. Each non-terminal node of the tree is assigned to a particular
player, via a function ρ : Z → N . The player ρ(p) is the player who’s turn it is at p.
We think of her as being in the situation of having to choose some q ←[ p.
The terminal nodes, or ‘leaves’, of a game tree are called outcomes: once every
player has made her choice, at every node that is reached, then we are in the same
situation as in the case of a strategic game when all players have chosen their strategy.
Thus in a game each player will have preferences over these outcomes.
Formally we define the leaves of a tree as follows:
Definition 4.2. The leaves (or outcomes) of a tree (Z,), are written O(), where:
O() = {p ∈ Z | ∀q ∈ Z, ¬(p q)}.
It will be convenient at times to talk about the ‘edges’ of the tree, i.e. the actions
that players take at different nodes in order to move between them. Formally speaking,
these are the pairs (p, q) ∈7→. We use a labelling function to label the actions with
names. Given some set L of labels, a labelling function ` associates with each node,
other than the root, a label. The idea is then that `(p) is the name for the action that
just occurred at p. We can in the standard way lift this function to a set, and so we can
write `(7→ (p)) to mean the set of labels of actions available at the node p.
2We have already seen those first two properties of relations; the last means that if p q then either
p = q or ¬(q  p).
3Game-theorists usually draw trees going downwards.
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In some definitions of extensive games, edges are taken to be primitive, and points
(or ‘histories’) are defined in terms of them. We prefer to take points as primitive (and
indeed later in Section 4.2 will think of trees as sets of sets of outcomes).
In this Section and the next, we are interested in extensive games of so-called ‘per-
fect information’. What that qualifier means is that when a node p in the game tree
is reached, all players correctly believe that p has been reached. In fact, here when
we come to the epistemic analysis of games, we will allow ourselves to say that play-
ers ‘know’ where they are in the tree, since the actual play of the game, as it occurs,
really is taken to be an observable; recall the quotation from the Introduction, that
we endorse: “only observables are knowable [. . . ] and only moves are observables”
[Brandenburger, 2007].
There is no need to add any informational structure to the tree itself then, until we
later define extensive games with imperfect information.
Definition 4.3. Extensive games of perfect information (sometimes ‘PI games’, or
even just ‘games’) for the players N are those structures of the form
(Z,, ρ,≤i)i∈N ,
where for each i ∈ N , ≤i is a total linear order over the outcomes O(). If ≤i is
strict, i.e. if each player has a preference between every outcome, then we call the
game generic.
Another piece of notation will be useful: given some player i, we denote by ρi(Z)
the set of nodes in Z where i plays, i.e.:
ρi(Z) = {p ∈ Z | ρ(Z) = i}.
Note that we do not explicitly include the labelling function ` in the definition of a
game of perfect information. Still it will be useful for us to talk about the actions
(edges), and so sometimes we assume that there is some labelling function associated
with a given game. This choice is made simply because we do not actually need to
include a labelling function. (When, in Section 4.3, we consider games of imperfect
information, we will include a labelling function in the definition.)
A strategy for player i in a game of perfect information has to tell i what to do no
matter what happens.
Definition 4.4. A strategy si is a function from ρi(Z) to Z such that ρi(p)←[ p.
A strategy profile is then, as in the case of strategic games, a profile (si | i ∈ N)
of strategies, one for each player. Notice that a strategy profile s is fully deterministic,
in the sense that it will determine a unique outcome, that we write o(s): o(s) is the
unique element of O such that there is some k ∈ N with sk(r) = o(s) (where r is the
root of the game tree).
In fact though, strategies are more than just fully deterministic plans: they go be-
yond what is actually needed by a player. For instance, consider the one-player game
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Figure 4.1: A game illustrating that strategies are more than plans
illustrated in Figure 4.1 (where, as in the case of strategic games, we represent the
ordinal preferences in the game with numbers). The game situation could represent
the following situation. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the player, i, cares a
great deal about money, and so prefers, other things being equal, a situation where he
has more money to a situation where he has less money. Then suppose the situation is
the following: player i is going to be offered two units of money, and then one unit of
money, and can either accept (play the left-hand node), or refuse (play the right-hand
node). Accepting or declining in the first round has no effect on the game other than
that the player will receive less money. Then this situation is represented by the game
in Figure 4.1: if player i accepts twice, that is the best situation, followed by the situa-
tion in which he accepts first and then declines, following by the situation in which he
declines first then accepts, and the worst situation (for i) is that where he declines the
money both times, for then he has got no money out of the interaction.
Now, the obvious way for player i to play this game (which is really just a decision
problem, since there are no other players in it) is to accept both times. So we might like
to say that his strategy si is to play ‘accept’ and then ‘accept’ again. But having a com-
plete strategy, according to the definition above (standard from game theory) means
also having a sort of ‘counterfactual’ plan: i’s strategy must also assign a successor to
the node arrived at by playing right, i.e. the node that would be arrived at if i were to
decline the money, even if i’s strategy says he should accept the two units of money
offered in the first round.
Now that we have defined strategies in extensive games, in such a way that a strat-
egy profile uniquely determines an outcome, there is an obvious translation from exten-
sive games to strategic (‘normal form’) games. Given an extensive game, the strategic
game induced by it has as (normal-form) strategies the (extensive-form) strategies from
Γ, and the preferences in the strategic game are just the preferences over the outcomes
determined by the given (extensive-form) strategy profile.
Definition 4.5. The normal form of an extensive game Γ = (Z,, ρ,≤i)i∈N is
(Ti,≤′i)i∈N , where
Ti = {si ∈ Zρi(Z) | si(p)←[ Z},
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and
s ≤′ s′ iff o(s) ≤i o(s′).
The next solution concept that we will introduce is an explicitly extensive-form
notion. However, note that it is also known, in the case of generic perfect information
games that we will consider, to be equivalent to iterated admissibility. The epistemic
condition for backward induction that we propose in Section 4.2 is also phrased in
terms of conditional beliefs. We suggested that the logic of conditional beliefs is what
best explicates the stability of the ‘rational equilibrium of beliefs’ achieved with respect
to iterated admissibility, and there is some similarity between what we suggest here
and that approach. Still, there will still be a uniquely extensive-form flavour to the
condition.
Before defining subgame-perfect equilibrium, we need to define the notion of a
subgame: The term ‘subgame’ is used, for extensive-form games, with a different
meaning from that intended in the case of normal-form games. If p is a node in the
perfect-information game Γ, then the (extensive-form) subgame generated by p is just
the restriction of Γ to the nodes reachable by descending in the tree from p (so includ-
ing p itself).
Definition 4.6. If
Γ = (Z,, ρ,≤i)i∈N ,
then the subgame generated by p is the following game:
Γp = ( (p),   (p), ρ ,≤i  )i∈N ,
where F X , read ‘the restriction of F to X’ is the unique function/relation with do-
main restricted to X that agrees, everywhere on X , with F .
Subgame-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, that we talked
about informally in the Introduction. Let us define Nash equilibrium properly now.
Definition 4.7. A strategy profile s in the N -player strategic game (Ti,≥i)i∈N is a
Nash equilibrium just if for all players i, si is a best response, among Ti, to s−i. That
is:
∀i ∈ N ∀s′i ∈ Ti, s ≥i (s′i, s−i).
Recall that this is indeed an ‘equilibrium’ notion, so accords with the steady-state
interpretation of games, in the sense that the epistemic justification for playing accord-
ing to s is that the players believe that the others will play according to s, and therefore
have no reason to switch and play another strategy s′i 6= si. Of course, a player i might
be indifferent between two such strategies, in which case she might not play according
to a given Nash equilibrium, but it is always rational for her to play according to the
equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.1 (cf. [Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995, Preliminary Observation]). If
all the players are rational and have a correct belief about the other players’ strategy
choices, then they play a Nash equilibrium.
Given some language that can define Nash equilibrium (cf. [Benthem et al., 2006])
as some sentence NASH, as well as rationality and belief, Proposition 4.1 is equivalent
to the validity of the following sentence:
s→ ((s ∧ r)→ NASH).
The idea of a subgame-perfect equilibrium is just that is a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame of the game:
Definition 4.8. Given some extensive game Γ = (Z,, ρ,≤i), the strategy profile s
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium iff in each subgame Γp generated by every node p of
Γ, the strategy profile s( (p)) of that subgame is a Nash equilibrium.
There is always at least one subgame-perfect equilibrium, and in the case of generic
games, there is a unique strategy profile that is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Clearly
any subgame-perfect equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium, since the whole game is
a subgame of itself (generated by its root node). To see that it is a strict ‘refinement’
of the notion of Nash equilibrium, and to understand the intuitive justification of the
definition, we give in Figure 4.2 an example of a game with a Nash equilibrium that
is not subgame-perfect. We indicate a particular strategy profile in a picture of a game
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Figure 4.2: A game with a Nash equilibrium that is not subgame-perfect
by writing the relevant name ` ∈ L of the choices the strategy says to use (one for
each non-terminal node) as (`). The strategy profile indicated in Figure 4.2, in which
I plays left, and II in fact plays left and according to her strategy would play left if
II were to play right, is a Nash equilibrium. Deviating for player II means either
choosing the right-hand node in the game as it is actually played, and thereby getting
a less preferred outcome (1 < 3), or switching the hypothetical play to play right. This
would guarantee that II obtains 2 rather than 0, if I were also to deviate, but we are
keeping I’s strategy fixed (as the definition of Nash equilibrium requires), and so this
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other deviation of II has no effect. Notice also that player I has an incentive not to
deviate, since the only way to deviate for I would be to choose the right instead of
the left node. But I plays the right node, then, since II plays the left node either way
(according to the strategy profile being considered), I would then get a less preferred
outcome (0 < 1).
It is perhaps easier to verify that in the normal form of the game in Figure 4.2, that
we give in Figure 4.3, the relevant outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
nf ns mf ms
k 0, 0 0, 0 2, 2 2, 2
l 1, 3 3, 1 1, 3 3, 1
Figure 4.3: The normal form of the game from Figure 4.2
The motivation behind subgame-perfect equilibrium should also be clear from this
example as well. Although II’s choice in the right-hand node does not affect the actual
outcome, still it plays a role in the situation: it can be thought of as a ‘threat’, that player
II would play to the 0, 0 outcome if given the chance. Of course, when seen as such,
it is not a credible threat: if actually confronted with the choice between 0, 0 and 2, 2,
player II would be going against her own preferences if she were to choose 0. To put
it in other terms: in the relevant subgame (in which I would have played right), II
would not be playing a best response by sticking to the strategy that tells her to play
left.
In the next Section, we will work towards establishing conditions on beliefs and
rationality that entail that the players play a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In generic games, like that in Figure 4.2, subgame-perfect equilibrium always
yields a unique strategy. For the rest of this Section, and indeed until Section 4.3,
unless we specify otherwise we assume the game to be generic. Now, that unique strat-
egy can be computed via a simple algorithm, a process known as ‘backward induction’,
so-called because it works ‘backwards’, going ‘up’ the tree (i.e. from the leaves to the
root).
The algorithm works by tagging edges in the game tree, ending up with a unique
edge (p, q) tagged for each p ∈ Z . This tagging then yields the subgame-perfect
equilibrium strategy.
The tag is built up step-by-step; we initially set the tag (the set of tagged edges) as
∅. Take a game (Z,, ρ,≤i)i∈N . Start at the end of the tree, at the leaves, and look,
for each leaf p, at its predecessor, the unique q′ such that p 7→ q′. Then pick the unique
leaf q, for each q′, that is maximal with respect to≤ρ(q′), and tag (p, q), i.e. add (p, q) to
the tag set. (This unique leaf is guaranteed to exist because the game is generic.) Why
do we pick the maximal leaf for player ρ(q′)? Because, as in Chapter 1, the hypothesis
we are working with is that the players are rational, and a rational player is one who
chooses her most preferred option. And since it is by definition ρ(q′) who plays at q′,
then we assume that the ≤ρ(q′)-maximal would be reached if q′ were reached.
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More formally:
BI0 = {(← [ (q), q) ∈ O() | ∀p←[7→ q, p ≤ρ(←[(q)) q}.
That is the initial step of the ‘inductive’ process. Part of our inductive hypothesis
(which clearly holds at the BI0 level, and can be verified to hold after this succes-
sor inductive step) will be that for every (q, q′) ∈ BI, there is a unique path q =
q0BImq1BIm . . . BImqm ∈ O(). We write −→BI(q) to mean the unique qm ∈ O() that
is reachable by a tagged path from q. For the inductive step then, we now look, instead
of at the leaves, at those nodes p such that
1. there is no tagged edge (p, q) ∈ BIk, but
2. for every q ←[ p, there is an edge (q′, q) ∈ BIk.
We write Xk for the set of non-terminal nodes p ∈ Z − O() satisfying these con-
ditions 1. and 2. If Xk is not empty, then we proceed to define BIk+1. Since Xk 6= ∅,
there are some p’s satisfying 1. and 2. above. On each of these we perform a similar
algorithmic procedure to that carried out on the leaves in order to define BI0, that is,
for each node p, we find the unique successor q ← [ p of it that leads, by following the
BIk relation to the ≥( ρ(p))-maximal outcome among all outcomes that are reachable
by going to any successor q′ ← [ p and then following the BIk relation. That is, for each
p, if i is the player choosing at p then we pick (on i’s behalf, so to speak) the unique
q such that for any q′ ←[ p, −→BIk(q) ≥i −→BIk(q′). The corresponding edge for each such
node that we pick is then added to BIk, forming BIk+1:
BIk+1 = BIk ∪ {(p, q) ∈ Xk ×Z | p 7→ q and ∀q′ ←[ p, q′ ≤ρ(p) q}.
Because we are working backwards through the tree, if Xk = ∅, then it is because
condition 1. fails, in which case if we have performed in total k of these successor
steps, then we have defined BIk, which is the subgame-perfect strategy profile:
Fact 4.1. If Xk = ∅ then for every p ∈ Z − O(), there is some q ←[ p such
that (p, q) ∈ BIk. I.e. BIk is a strategy profile. Furthermore, by construction BIk is
subgame-perfect.
Since the game is finite, this process will terminate at some stage k (i.e. for some
k ∈ N, Xk = ∅). We write BI for the resulting tagged set of edges, which is the
subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy profile. o(BI), the outcome reached by following
this strategy profile, is called the ‘backward induction outcome’.
This algorithm, like the iterated elimination of non-optimal strategies in a normal-
form game, can also be thought of as being some ‘private but common’ process: work-
ing just from a basic notion of rationality, all players can perform the algorithm, and
are legitimated in doing so on the basis that the other players are performing it.
The backward induction algorithm has been analysed in terms of public announce-
ments in [Benthem, 2007b], where it is shown that, again, repeated announcements
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of rationality, suitably defined for a model of the game tree, will ‘prune’ the model
(the tree), and yield the backward induction outcome. That work is an interesting tan-
gent to the main currents of debate in the epistemic game theory literature, which have
centred around a controversy as to what the correct epistemic conditions for backward
induction (subgame-perfect equilibrium) really are.
In generic games, the backward induction outcome is uniquely determined by iter-
ated admissibility. That is: take the normal form of an extensive game, and iteratively
eliminate all weakly dominated strategies. Then a region of the normal-form game
will be left, that does not necessarily determine a unique strategy profile, but all of the
strategy profiles that are left will determine the same outcome, and that outcome will
be the backward induction outcome (cf. [Duggan, 2003]).
So one way to give the epistemic conditions that explain the backward induction
outcome would be to give conditions that explain iterated admissibility. However, as
we have seen that is not entirely straightforward, and furthermore does not in our view
get to the heart of the matter. Recall that when until we got the analysis right, the
reasoning behind iterated admissibility undermined itself (cf. Section 3.3). As we will
see in the next Section, there is a similar sort of non-monotonicity in the reasoning
behind backward induction: the reasoning appears, on first view, to undermine itself.
Therefore, just as we argued that conditional beliefs are important in explaining why
players play according to iterated admissibility, so we will use conditional beliefs in
analysing backward induction.
In the next Section, we give conditions in terms of conditional beliefs, and a con-
cept of rationality that is specific to extensive-form games, that guarantee that players
play according to the backward induction outcome. Furthermore, when the players’
conditional beliefs are interpreted as being about their strategies, then we can read the
conditions we give as entailing that the strategy profile chosen is the subgame-perfect
equilibrium profile.
4.2 Conditions for backward induction
In this Section we enter the debate about what the epistemic conditions for back-
ward induction really are. First we mention some early results about the epistemic
foundation for backward induction, and see the paradox involved in the reasoning be-
hind backward induction. Then we will present conditional logic models for extensive
games introduce a formal language for reasoning about them, and see how public an-
nouncements can be used to model moves in games (of perfect information). We will
then formulate epistemic conditions that are sufficient for backward induction, and
that we believe are truly an explanation of the issues involved in backward induction.
One advantage of our approach is that we do not include explicitly in our formalism
the conceptually problematic notion of strategy, with its counterfactual connotations.
Instead, strategies will be a derived notion.
Our main contribution in this Section is to give conditions that are sufficient for
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backward induction, and that we claim do justice to the conceptual issues involved.
Aumann [Aumann, 1995] has proved within the context of a partition-space model
that common knowledge of ‘rationality’, entails the backward induction outcome, and
that such a model will always exist. There rationality means something very strong,
what is known as ‘substantive rationality’, something like choosing optimally every-
where in the tree. Needless to say, there is nothing wrong with his formal argument;
but we would like to suggest, along with [Stalnaker, 1996; Samet, 1996] among others,
that conceptually speaking his whole framework does not do justice to the problem-
atic issues involving counterfactuals, or indeed take into account possible changes or
revisions of belief during the game. There is a substantial literature in which the view
we take of the deficiencies of the knowledge-based analysis is expressed [Reny, 1992;
Binmore, 1987; 1996; Bonanno, 1991; Bicchieri, 1989; Brandenburger, 2007].
The reasoning that underlies the backward induction method seems to give rise to
a paradox: in order even to start the reasoning, a player assumes that true common
belief in “rationality” holds. So in particular (so the player is supposed to reason) at all
of the last decision nodes←[ (O), i.e. those just before the leaves, there is rationality.
This entails that the obviously irrational leaves are eliminated. However, in the next
reasoning step (going backward along the tree), some of these (last) decision nodes,
some subset Y ⊆←[ (O) will be eliminated, on the same basis: that they are incom-
patible with (common true belief in) “rationality”. But then the assumption behind the
previous reasoning step is now undermined: the reasoning player can now see, that
if those decision nodes Y that are now declared “irrational” were ever to be reached,
then the only way that this could happen is if (common true belief in) “rationality”
failed. Hence, the player was wrong to assume (common belief in) “rationality” when
she was reasoning about the choices made at those last decision nodes. So, in a manner
reminiscent of iterated admissibility, the whole line of argument seems to undermine
itself.
Consider as an example the “centipede” game (cf. [Rosenthal, 1981]) given in Fig-
ure 4.4. This is a two-player game for a (Alice) and b (Bob). The reason this is called
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Figure 4.4: A “centipede” game
the “centipede” is that it can be extended indefinitely (so also one hundred times), to
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arrive at a game where the backward induction outcome yields a very low payoff for
both players as they ‘exit’ the game (a plays to o0 and indeed at all nodes the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium says that each player will always take the left-hand op-
tion), compared to the payoff they could achieve by staying in the game. The small
game in Figure 4.4 will be our running example in this Section, so let us take a few
moments to become familiar with this example, that is relatively familiar from the lit-
erature. Here the backward induction algorithm does the following: at the end player
a is choosing, and so chooses the most preferred option, i.e. o3. Therefore at p, player
b is choosing (to attribute ‘choice’ and player b’s agency to the algorithm) between o2
and −→BI0(q), i.e. between o3 and o2 and o3, and so picks o2; similarly, when choosing
between −→BI1(p), i.e. o2 and o1, at r, where ρ(r) = a, the algorithm picks o1.
We will use ‘impure’ plausibility models (Definitions 3.9 and 3.11), with an op-
erator for knowledge. However one thing we will not assume as known is the future
of the game: no outcomes that are consistent with the structure of the game are to be
excluded at the outset of the game. In fact, we make the opposite assumption: that it is
common knowledge that nobody knows the future, i.e. nobody knows that some out-
come will not be reached. This “open future” assumption seems to contradict common
knowledge of rationality; but in fact, it is consistent with it, if by rationality we only
mean “rational planning”, leaving open the possibility that players may make mistakes
or may change their minds. The players may certainly believe their rational plans will
be faithfully carried out, but they have no way to know this in advance. We think of
our “open future” assumption as being a realistic one, and moreover one that embodies
the players’ “freedom of choice”, as well as the “possibility of error”, that underlie a
correct notion of rationality.
A player’s rationality can be assessed only if she is given some options to freely
choose from. There are certainly cases in which the future can be known, e.g. when it is
determined by a known natural law. But it is an essential feature of rational players that
their own choices are not known to them to be thus determined: otherwise they would
have no real choices, and thus no rational choice. Any natural determinism is assumed
to be absorbed in the definition of the game structure, which does pose absolute limits
to choices. In a sense, this simply makes precise the meaning of our knowledge as that
which is produced by hard information, and makes a strict delimitation between the
past and the future choices, delimitation that is necessary in order to avoid the various
paradoxes and vicious circles that plague the notions of rational decision and freedom
of choice: the players may have hard information about the past and the present, but
not about their own future free choices (although they may have “soft” information,
i.e. “certain” beliefs, with probability 1, about their future choices).
Maybe the most important original feature of our analysis is the notion of “dy-
namic” rationality that we introduce, which takes into account the dynamics of beliefs,
as well as the dynamics of knowledge. On the one hand, following Stalnaker, Reny,
Battigalli and Siniscalchi and others (and in contrast with Aumann), we assess the ra-
tionality of a player’s move at a node against the beliefs held at the moment when the
node is reached.
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On the other hand, we incorporate the above-mentioned epistemic limitation to ra-
tionality: the rationality of a player’s move only makes sense when that move is not
already known (in an irrevocable manner) to her. Players cannot be held responsi-
ble for moves that they cannot choose or change any more (including their own past
moves). Since the players’ knowledge increases during a game of perfect information,
their set of available options decreases: passed nodes, or nodes that were by-passed,
cannot be the objects of choice any more. As a result, our notion of rationality is
‘future-oriented’: at any stage of the game, whether or not a player is dynamically
rational at that stage depends only on her current and future moves.
So a player can be rational now even if in the past she has made some “irrational”
moves. In effect, performing such an irrational move in a game of perfect information
is in part a public announcement that “the player is (currently) not rational” (at the
moment of moving). All the players jointly learn this fact (as a piece of hard infor-
mation), but the fact itself may no longer be true after being learnt: while previously
irrational (since about to make a ‘wrong’ move), the player may become rational af-
ter the wrong move (simply because, for all the decisions that she can still make after
that, she chooses the ‘right’ moves). So the truth-value of the sentence “player i is
(dynamically) rational” may change after a move by player i.
The way this is captured and explained in our formal setting is original and inter-
esting in itself: the meaning of our “rationality” changes in time, due to the change
of beliefs and of the known set of options. This is because the rationality of a player
is an epistemic-doxastic concept, so it is affected by any changes in the information
possessed by that player (including the changes induced by the player’s own moves).
In our setting, this is of course a natural and perfectly standard feature, an immedi-
ate consequence of the epistemic definition of rationality: epistemic sentences do not
necessarily preserve their truth value after they are announced. An instance of this phe-
nomenon is the ‘Moore sentence’ p ∧ ¬i p, which is never true after it is “learnt”.4
Our concept of dynamic rationality, developed on purely a priori grounds, is at
the heart of our resolution of the paradox of backward induction. Recall that the first
reasoning step in the argument (dealing with the last decision nodes of the game) is
no longer undermined by the result of the second reasoning step, since the notion of
“rationality” assumed in the first step is not the same as the “rationality” disproved by
the second step. The second step only shows that some counterfactual nodes cannot be
reached by rational play, and thus it implies that some player must have been irrational
(or must have had some doubts about the others’ rationality, or must have made some
error) before such an “irrational” node was reached; but this doesn’t contradict in any
way the assumption that the players will be rational at that node (and further in the
future).
Dynamics cannot really be understood without its correlative: invariance under
change. Certain truths, or beliefs, stay true when everything else changes. We have
4A sentence like this is called a ‘Moore sentences’ after G.E. Moore [1942], cf. [Segerberg, 2006;
Benthem, 2004].
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already encountered an absolute form of invariance: (irrevocable) knowledge, i.e. be-
lief that is invariant under any possible information change. Now, we need a sec-
ond, weaker form of invariance: stability. A truth, or a belief, is stable if it remains
true, or continues to be believed, after any (joint) learning of “hard” information
(via some truthful public announcement). In fact, in the case of an “ontic” (non-
doxastic) fact ϕ, Stalnaker’s favourite notion of “knowledge” of ϕ [Stalnaker, 1996;
2006] (a modal formalisation of Lehrer and Klein’s “defeasibility theory of knowl-
edge”), also called “safe belief” in [Baltag and Smets, 2008b], corresponds precisely
to stable belief in ϕ. (But note that the two notions differ when applied to a doxastic-
epistemic property, such as “rationality”.) Stability can be a property of a belief or a
common belief: a proposition ϕ is a “stable belief” if the fact that ϕ is belief is a stable
truth, i.e. ϕ continues to be believed after any (joint) learning of “hard” information.
What is required for achieving the backward induction outcome is stable belief in
dynamic rationality, either in the whole model, or at least commonly known to hold
for all players. In some contexts, we can think of this condition as expressing an
‘optimistic’ belief-revision policy about the opponents’ potential for rationality: the
players “keep hoping for rationality” with respect to everybody’s current and future
play, despite any past irrational moves. Of course, whether or not the words “hope” and
“optimism” are appropriate depends on the players’ payoffs: e.g. in common interest
games (in which all players’ payoffs are identical at all nodes), it indeed makes sense
to talk about “hoping” for opponents’ rationality; while in other games, it may be more
appropriate to talk about “persistent cautiousness” and a “pessimistic” revision policy.
We can now give an informal statement of our main result. In a context where there
is common knowledge of open future, we will have the following.
Theorem 4.1. Dynamic rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in dy-
namic rationality entails the backward induction outcome.
Plausibility models for extensive games are just like plausibility models for strate-
gic games: they are (possibly ‘impure’) plausibility models (W,4i, ξ)i∈N in which ξ
associates to each state u ∈ W an outcome (leaf) of the game. Our assumption of com-
mon knowledge of open future entails that ξ will be a surjective map, since for every
outcome of the game there must be (at least) one state where it is realised. Thus, in the
terminology of Chapter 1, we will in this Section only consider ‘full’ models; the class
of (full) models for the game Γ is denoted MΓ.
We will use a conditional belief language, with propositions for preferences (over
outcomes), and propositions for outcomes (leaves). So, where we write O to mean
O(): for every o ∈ O, there is a basic proposition o in Ψ, and for each i ∈ N and
{o, o′} ⊆ O, Ψ (the set of atomic propositions) has a proposition o <i o′. To talk
about the non-terminal nodes, we introduce the following abbreviation:
p =
∨
po
o ,
for any p ∈ Z −O.
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The language we have described does not have terms for extensive-form strategies,
which are complex objects, and we therefore treat them as such.
If a player adopts a particular strategy, our language can encode this in terms of the
player’s conditional beliefs about what she would do at each of her decision nodes. For
instance, we say that Alice “adopts the backward induction strategy” in a given state u
of a model for the Centipede Game in Figure 4.4 iff the sentences ao1 and a(o3 |
q) hold at state u. Similarly, we can express the fact that Bob adopts a particular
strategy, and by putting these together we can capture strategy profiles. A given profile
is realised in a model if the correspondent sentence is true at a state of that model.
Note that, in our setting, nothing forces the players to adopt (pure) strategies. Re-
call that strategies are (sometimes needlessly) “complete” plans of action prescribing
a unique choice (a belief that a particular move will be played) for each decision node
of the player. But the players might simply consider all their options as equi-plausible,
which essentially means that they do not have a strategy.
Examples In (any state of) modelM1 from Figure 4.5, it is common knowledge that
both players adopt their backward induction strategies. In contrast, in the modelM2
from Figure 4.6, it is common knowledge that no player has a strategy (at any node):
o3
o1 o2
o4
a, b
a, b
a, b
a, b
Figure 4.5: A plausibility model M1 for the centipede game, in which players have
‘strategies’
o3
o1 o2
o4
a, b
a, b
a, b
a, b
Figure 4.6: A plausibility modelM2 in which players don’t have strategies .
So the assumption that players have strategies is not one that we make in our models.
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To think players have strategies is to make an extremely strong assumption, and one
that as we have already seen contains some implicit counterfactual baggage, There
is no a priori reason to assume (and there are good empirical reasons to reject) that
players play according to fully-determined strategies. Our models are general enough
to dispense with this assumption; indeed, our work shows that this assumption is not
needed for proving (common belief) that the backward induction strategy is played.
We identify a player’s intentions with her beliefs about what she is going to do,
and so we represent the decision maker’s plan of action as a belief about her (future)
action. This identification is philosophically debatable, since players may be aware of
the possibility of mistakes, and so they may doubt that their intentions will be realised.
But one can also argue that, in a game-theoretical context, such distinctions will be of
very limited significance: indeed, an intention that is not believed to be enforceable is
irrelevant for strategic planning (though see [Roy, 2008] for a discussion of intentions
in game theory). The players only need to know each other’s beliefs about their future
actions and about each other’s beliefs about the others’ beliefs etc., in order to make
their own rational plans; whether or not they are being informed about each other’s
(completely unenforceable and not believed to be enforceable) “intentions” will not
make any difference. So for our purposes we can safely adopt the simplifying assump-
tion that the players believe that they will be able to carry out their plans. Given this
assumption, a player’s “intentions” can be captured by her beliefs about her (future)
actions.
In the game-theoretical literature it is in effect typically assumed that, at any given
moment, both the structure of the game and (in the case of PI games) the players’ past
moves are ‘hard’ information. So for example, once a move is played, all players know,
in an absolute, irrevocable sense, that it was played: moves are “observables.”
Moreover, past moves (as well as the structure of the game) are common knowl-
edge (in the same absolute sense of knowledge). In contrast, players only really have
belief (not knowledge) of each others’ rationality, and even a player’s beliefs about
her own future move at some node that is not yet reached, does not attain the status of
knowledge, since it has not been observed. In principle beliefs about non-observables,
including one’s own plans, could be revised. For instance, the player might make a
mistake, failing to play according to her plan. Or the others might in fact play irra-
tionally, forcing her to revise her belief about their rationality. So we stick to calling
this kind of defeasible information ‘belief’; it is based on players’ soft information.
We think of every state of a game modelMΓ ∈MΓ as an initial state (of a possible
play) of the game Γ. As the play goes on, the players’ hard and soft information, their
knowledge and beliefs, evolve. To represent this evolution, we will need to succes-
sively change our model, so that e.g. when a node p is reached, we want to obtain a
corresponding model of the subgame Γp. That is precisely, in this perfect information
setting, what is achieved by updating the model with public announcements: indeed, in
a game of perfect information, every move, say from a node q to one of its immediate
successors q′, can be “simulated” by a public announcement !q′. In this way, given a
modelM of the original game Γ, then for each subgame Γp of Γ, we obtain a model
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Mp =M!p that correctly describes the players’ knowledge and beliefs at the moment
when node p is reached during a play. Proposition 4.2 states that this is indeed a model
of the corresponding subgame Γp.
Proposition 4.2. IfM∈MΓ thenMp ∈MΓp .
Example Consider a play of the Centipede game that starts in the initial situation
described by the model M1 in Figure 4.5, and in which the real state of the world
is the one having outcome o2: so Alice first plays “right”, reaching node p, and then
Bob plays “left”, reaching the outcome o2. The modelM1 from Figure 4.5 gives us
the initial situation, the modelMp1 in Figure 4.7 describes the epistemic situation after
the first move, and then the modelMo21 in Figure 4.8 gives the epistemic situation at
the end of the play:
Figure 4.7: The modelMp1
o3 o4
o2
a, b
a, b
a, b
o2
Figure 4.8: The modelMo21
In this way, for each given initial state s (of a given play r, p, . . . , o of the game, we
obtain a sequence of evolving game models
M =Mr,Mp, . . . ,Mo ,
describing the evolving knowledge and beliefs of the players during any play. Each
model Mp accurately captures the players’ beliefs at the moment when node p is
reached. Note also that every such sequence ends with a model Mo in which the
outcome, as well as the whole history of the game, are now common knowledge.
If we want to look at every subgame (in the extensive-form sense) of a given game,
and to say that a given property holds everywhere in that game, we can use the notion of
an arbitrary public announcement. The logic of an operator [!], where [!]ϕ means ‘no
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matter what is (truthfully) publically announced, ϕ will remain true’, has been studied
in [Balbiani et al., 2008]. For our present purposes, of looking at properties that are
stable in all subgames, we can also use the abbreviation:
[!]ϕ =
∧
p∈Z
[!p]ϕ.
We now turn our attention to defining our fundamental notions of dynamic rational-
ity and rational play. First we will look at single-agent (one-step) decision situations,
and then at interactive decision situations, i.e. games. We start with this simplest possi-
ble case in order to get a clear handle on what we have seen to be conceptually murky
territory.
Given a one-step decision problem P with a set of outcomesO, the decision-maker
i selects one of the outcomes o ∈ O. The decision-maker may have various hard and
soft information about which outcomes can actually be realised and which not. This
will determine her knowledge and her beliefs. We assume that her “hard” knowledge
restricts her possible choices: she can only select outcomes that she doesn’t know to
be impossible.
What this amounts to is the following: for the decision maker i, the “true” set of
possible outcomes is {o ∈ O | ¬Ki¬o}, i.e. the set of all the “epistemically possible”
outcomes. So her selected option must satisfy: o ∈ {o ∈ O | ¬Ki¬o}. This allows us
to capture the “selection” problem using epistemic operators.
To assess whether the decision is “rational” or not, one considers the decision-
maker’s subjective preferences, modelled as a total order <i on O.
Rationality, in this case, corresponds to requiring that the selected option is not
worse than any other (epistemically) possible alternative. In other words, i’s solution
of the decision problem P is rational if she does not choose any option that is strictly
less preferable than an option she doesn’t know to be impossible. Syntactically, we
would then write something like the following formula rPi to define the rationality of
the decision-maker i in the decision problem P .
rPi =
∧
o,o′∈O
(
(o <i o
′ ∧ ¬Ki¬o′)→ ¬o
)
.
The main difference between our definition and the standard definition of rational
decision-making is the epistemic limitation of the choice set. The epistemic operators
are used here to delimit what is currently known about the availability of options: i’s
choice should only be compared against options that are not known to be unavailable.
This is an important difference, and its importance becomes clear when we generalise
our definition to extensive games, cf. the difference between ‘dynamic’ rationality and
traditional ‘substantive’ rationality, described below.
We now aim to extend the above definitions to the case of multi-agent many-stage
decisions, i.e. extensive games (of perfect information). Recall that in an extensive
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game we are given the players’ subjective preferences <i only over the leaves. How-
ever, at all the intermediate stages of the game, players have to make local choices,
not between “final” outcomes, but between “intermediary” outcomes, that is: between
other nodes of the game tree.
So, in order to assess players’ rationality, we need to extend the subjective prefer-
ence relations to all of the nodes of the game tree. Fortunately, given the above doxastic
interpretation of preferences, there is an obvious (and natural) way to define these ex-
tensions. Namely, a player considers a node p to be strictly less preferable to a node q
if she believes p to be strictly dominated by q. More precisely, if every outcome that
she believes to be achievable given that p is reached is worse than every outcome that
she believes to be achievable given that q is reached:
Definition 4.9. For each player i, we use the following abbreviation in the formal
language to talk about i’s preferences over nodes that are not outcomes.
p <i q =
∧
o,o′∈O
(
(¬i (¬o|p) ∧ ¬i (¬o′|q))→ o <i o′).
Each node p ∈ ρi(Z) can be considered as a (distinct) decision problem, in which
the decision-maker is i, the set of outcomes is the set 7→ (p) of all immediate successors
of p, and the subjective preference relation is given by the (restriction of the) extended
relation <i defined above. So we can define the rationality of a player i at a node
p ∈ ρi(Z) as rationality for the corresponding decision problem, i.e. the player’s
selection at each decision node consists only of “best answers”. Note that, as before,
the player’s choice is epistemically limited: if she has “hard knowledge” that rules out
some successors (for instance, because those nodes have already been bypassed), then
those successors are excluded from the set of possible options. The only difference is
that the “knowledge” involved is the one the player would have at that decision node,
i.e. it is conditional on that node being reached. Formally, we obtain:
Definition 4.10. In the context of some game, the dynamic rationality of player i at
node p is defined by the sentence drpi :
drpi =
∧
q,q′←[p
(
(q <i q
′ ∧ ¬Kpi ¬q′)→ ¬q
)
,
Here we writeKpi ϕ forKi(p→ ϕ), in analogy with the notationpiϕ (which, as we
mentioned in the previous Chapter, we sometimes write for Bi(ϕ|p)), since knowledge
of a conditional is the same thing as conditional knowledge (which is of course not the
case for beliefs). Definition 4.10 might appear as stated not to use the belief operator,
but remember that q <i q′ is an abbreviation (Definition 4.9) for a sentence that does
use player i’s belief operator.
Definition 4.11. Let dri be the sentence saying that each player is rational at every
node at which she plays.
dri =
∧
p∈ρi(Z)
drpi
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If dri is true, we say that player i satisfies dynamic rationality. As we’ll see,
asserting this sentence at a given moment is a way of saying that the player will play
rationally from that moment onwards, i.e. she will make the best move at any current
or future decision node.
In the following, by “dynamic rationality” we mean the formula dr
dr =
∧
i∈N
dri
saying that all players are dynamically rational.
To compare our notion with Aumann’s concept of “substantive rationality”, we
have to first adapt Aumann’s definition to a belief-revision context. This has already
been done by a number of authors e.g. Battigalli and Siniscalchi [1999; 2002], resulting
in a definition of “rationality at a node” that differs from ours only by the absence of
epistemic qualifications to the set of available options (i.e. the absence of the term
¬Kpi ¬q). The notion of substantive rationality is then obtained from this in the same
way as dynamic rationality, by quantifying over all nodes, and it is thus equivalent to
the following definition.
Definition 4.12. In the context of some game, the substantive rationality of player i is
defined by the formula sri:
sri =
∧
p∈ρi(Z)
∧
q,q′← [p(q <i q
′ ⇒ ¬q).
What is the logical connection between these two definitions of rationality?
Fact 4.2. Substantive rationality implies dynamic rationality, i.e.
sri ⇒ dri.
However, the converse is in general false. To better see the difference between sri
and dri, recall that a formula being true in a modelM ∈ MΓ means that it is true at
the first node (the root) of the game tree Γ. However, we will later have to evaluate the
formulae dri and sri at other nodes w, i.e. in other models of the form M q (models
for subgames Γq). Since the players’ knowledge and beliefs evolve during the game,
what is (not) known/believed conditional on p in modelM q differs from what was (not)
known/believed conditional on p in the original model (i.e. at the outset of the game).
In other words, the meaning of both dynamic rationality dri and substantive rationality
sri will change during a play. But they change in different ways. At the initial node r,
the two notions are equivalent. But, once a node p has been bypassed, or once the move
at p has already been played by a player i, that player is counted as rational at node p
according to our definition, while according to the usual (non-epistemically qualified)
definition the player may have been irrational at p.
In other words, the epistemic limitations we imposed on our concept of dynamic
rationality make it into a future-oriented concept. At any given moment, the rationality
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of a player depends only on her current beliefs and knowledge, and so only on the
options that she currently considers possible: past, or by-passed, options are irrelevant.
Dynamic rationality simply expresses the fact that the player’s decision in any future
contingencies is rational (given her future options and beliefs). Unlike substantive ra-
tionality, our concept has nothing to do with the past or with contingencies that are
known to be impossible: a player i may still be “rational” in our sense at a given mo-
ment/node p even when p could only have been reached if i has already made some
“irrational” move. The knowledge of some past mistake may of course affect the oth-
ers’ beliefs about this player’s rationality; but it doesn’t directly affect her rationality,
and in particular it doesn’t automatically render her irrational.
So our definition of dynamic rationality makes it different from (and arguably more
realistic than) Aumann’s and Stalnaker’s substantive rationality, but also from other
similar concepts in the literature (for example Rabinowicz’s [1998] “habitual” or “re-
silient” rationality, etc). The difference becomes more apparent if we consider the
assumption that “rationality” is common belief, in the strongest possible sense, in-
cluding common “strong” belief (in the sense of Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2002]),
common persistent belief, or even common “knowledge” in the sense of Aumann. As
persuasively argued by Stalnaker and Reny, these assumptions, if applied to the usual
notions of rationality in the literature, bear no relevance for what the players would
do (or believe) at the nodes that are incompatible with these assumptions! The reason
is that, if these counterfactual nodes were to be reached, then by that time the belief
in “rationality” would have already been publically disproved: we cannot even en-
tertain the possibilities reachable by irrational moves except by suspending our belief
(or “knowledge”) in rationality. Hence, the above assumptions cannot tell us anything
about the players’ behaviour or rationality at such counterfactual nodes, and thus they
cannot be used to argue for the plausibility of the backward induction solution (even if
they logically imply it)! In contrast, our notion of dynamic rationality is not automati-
cally disproved when we reach a node excluded by common belief in it: a player may
still be rational with respect to her current and future options and decisions even after
making an “irrational” move. Indeed, the player may have been playing irrationally
in the past, or may have had a moment of temporary irrationality, or may have made
some mistakes in carrying out her rational plan; but she may have recovered now and
may play rationally thereafter. Since our notion of rationality is future-oriented, no
information about past moves will necessarily and automatically shatter belief in ratio-
nality (although of course it may still shatter it, or at least weaken it). So it is perfectly
consistent (although maybe not always realistic) to assume that players maintain their
common belief in dynamic rationality despite all past failures of rationality. In fact, this
is our proposed solution to the BI paradox: we will show that such a “stable” common
belief in dynamic rationality (or more precisely, common knowledge of the stability of
the players’ common belief in rationality) is exactly what is needed to ensure common
belief in the backward induction outcome.
It is easy to see that Aumann’s theorem stating that common knowledge of sub-
stantive rationality implies the backward induction outcome [Aumann, 1995] can be
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strengthened to Proposition 4.3
Proposition 4.3. In any state of any plausibility model for a game of perfect infor-
mation, common knowledge of dynamic rationality implies the backward induction
outcome.
Unfortunately, common knowledge of (either dynamic or substantive) rationality
can never hold in a full model. It is incompatible with the condition of (epistemically)
open future. By requiring that players have “hard” information about the outcome
of the game, Aumann’s assumption does not allow them to reason hypothetically or
counterfactually about other possible outcomes, at least not in a consistent manner.5
This undermines the intuitive rationale behind the backward induction solution.
So we must give natural conditions that can be satisfied on game models, but that
still imply the backward induction outcome. Those are given in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. The following holds in any state u of any game modelM∈MΓ:
dr ∧K∗[!]  dr → BIΓ,
where BIΓ is the sentence o where o is the backward-induction outcome in the game Γ.
This is indeed a formal statement of the informal paraphrase we gave above: that
dynamic rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic rationality
together imply common belief in the backward-induction outcome. – The antecedent
of the formula is the conjunction dr ∧ K∗[!]  dr; the first of these terms stands for
dynamic rationality, and the second for common knowledge of stable belief in dynamic
rationality.
We will now prove Theorem 4.1. First, some definitions:
Definition 4.13. For a finite setO of outcomes and a finite set N of players, we denote
by Games(O, N) the class of all generic perfect information games having any subset
of O as their set of outcomes and having any subset of N as their set of players.
Definition 4.14. For any sentence ϕ of our language,
ϕ is valid on a game Γ if ϕ is true at every state u of every game modelM∈MΓ.
ϕ is valid over Games(O, N) if ϕ is valid on every game Γ ∈ Games(O, N).
When the game Γ is implicit from the context, we will often abbreviate BIΓp ,
i.e. the name for the formula that defines the backward induction outcome in the sub-
game of Γ that starts at the node p, to BIp.
5Indeed, if o is the backward induction outcome, then the above Proposition entails Kio for all
players i, and thus for every other outcome o′ 6= o and every proposition ϕ, we have (ϕ | o′): the
players believe everything (including inconsistencies) conditional on o′.
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Lemma 4.1. For every game Γ, if we denote the root of Γ by r,(
drrρ(r) ∧
∧
p←[r
( ∧
q← [rρ(r)([!q]BIq|q) ∧ [!p]BIp
))
→ BIΓ
is valid on Γ.
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of rationality at a node and the def-
inition of BI . Let i = ρ(r), and take any state u ∈ W satisfying the antecedent
of the claimed validity. Write Xqi (u) for MIN4i(JqK ∩ W ui ), the set of states most
plausible for u conditional on q. The assumption that i([!]BIq|q) is true at u means
that ξ(Xqi (u)) = o(BI). Since we are in a full model, u  drri implies that for the
p ←[ r with u  p, −→BI(p) is <i-maximal for i amongst all −→BI(q) with q ←[ r. But that
means that this p is the one chosen by the backward induction algorithm. Given this
backward-induction choice (p) of i at node r, and given the fact (ensured by the con-
dition [!p]BIp) that starting from node p everybody will play the backward induction
choices, we can conclude that the outcome ξ(u) belongs to the backward induction set
of outcomes for the game Γ. Hence u satisfies BIΓ. 
The main Lemma underlying our result is the following:
Lemma 4.2. (“Main Lemma”) Fix a finite set O of outcomes and a finite set N of
players. Let ϕ be any sentence such that for every game Γ ∈ Games(O, N) with root
r the following is valid on Γ:
ϕ→
(
drrρ(r) ∧
∧
q←[rqρ(r)[!q]ϕ ∧
∧
p← [r[!p]ϕ
)
Then we have that
ϕ⇒ BIΓ
is valid over Games(O, N).
Proof. We need to prove that, for every game Γ ∈ Games(O, N), the sentence ϕ ⇒
BIΓ is valid on Γ. The proof is by induction on the length of the game Γ.
For games of length 0 (only one outcome, no available moves), the claim is trivial
(since the only possible outcome is by definition the backward induction outcome).
Then let Γ be a game of length n > 0, and assume the claim is true for all games
of length < n. Let r be the root of Γ, i = ρ(r),M ∈MΓ be a model of Γ, and u be a
state inM such that u  ϕ.
Take q ←[ r. By the property assumed in the statement of this Lemma, we have
M, u  qi [!q]ϕ, and so (again letting Xqi (u) = MIN4i(JqK ∩ W ui )), then we have
M, v  [!q]ϕ for all v ∈ Xqi (u). Hence, we haveMq, v  ϕ for all v ∈ Xqi (u) ∩ JqK.
By the inductive hypothesis,Mq, v  BIq for all such v. ThereforeM, v  [!q]BIu
for all t ∈ Xqi (u), and hence thatM, u  qi [!q]BIq.
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Now let p ←[ r be such that u  p. By the property assumed in this Lemma, we
have thatM, u  [!p]ϕ. By the same argument as in the last paragraph, the inductive
hypothesis gives usM, u  [!p]BIp. Putting together with the conclusion of the last
paragraph and with the fact (following from the Lemma’s hypothesis) that ϕ⇒ drri is
valid onM, we infer thatM, u  drri ∧
∧
q← [rqi [!q]BIq ∧∧p←[r[!p]BIp. The desired
conclusion follows now from Lemma 4.1. 
Lemma 4.3. The sentence
dr ∧K∗[!]  dr
has the property assumed in the statement of Lemma 4.2.
Proof. The claim follows from the following three sub-claims.
1. Dynamic rationality is a “stable” property,
i.e. the implication dr→ [!]dr is valid.
2. The implication K∗[!]  ψ → qi [!q]K∗[!]  ψ is valid,
for all formulae ψ and all nodes q ∈ Z .
3. The implication K∗[!]  ψ → [!q]K∗[!]  ψ is valid,
for all formulae ψ and all nodes q ∈ Z .

Theorem 4.1 follows now from Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3. Another sentence
with the property in Lemma 4.2 is given in [Baltag et al., 2009], where the notion
of stability of belief is investigated further, and ‘stable true belief’ is introduced and
studied, in particular being used to formulated an alternative condition for backward
induction.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, and so is prop-
erly speaking an equilibrium notion. The epistemic ‘explanation’ that would usually
be given for it would therefore follow the steady-state interpretation of game theory,
saying that players have correct beliefs about each others’ strategies, and are rational.
However, since in generic games there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium,
there is an explanation based on deductive notions as to why players would play ac-
cording to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. We gave those in Theorem 4.1;
but we also have a stronger result.
Corollary 4.1. The following holds in any state s of any modelM∈MΓ:
K∗[!]  dr→ K∗[!] ∗ BIΓ
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.1, by applying the operatorK∗[!] to both its premise
and its conclusion, and noting that the following implication is valid:
K∗[!]  ψ → K∗[!] K∗[!]  ψ.

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Corollary 4.1 means that the same conditions as those for Theorem 4.1 entail also
that players have common knowledge of each other’s strategies as beliefs. So a purely
deductive approach leads to a situation where there is common belief among the play-
ers of their strategies.
4.3 Games with imperfect information
Trembling-hand equilibrium was also introduced by Selten [1975], as a refinement
of his earlier concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium. Intuitively, the point about
trembling-hand equilibrium is that it takes seriously the idea that players might make
mistakes, and in effect integrates this idea formally into the definition of the solution
concept. Trembling-hand equilibrium is a refinement of subgame-perfect introduction,
so a trembling-hand equilibrium is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In generic
games of perfect information, like the ones we have looked at so far, it is known that
subgame-perfect equilibria are also trembling-hand equilibria ([Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, Section 8]), meaning that on generic perfect-information games, trembling-hand
equilibrium is equivalent to subgame-perfect equilibrium.
However, in a wider class of games, the equivalence does not hold. Trembling-hand
equilibrium was originally formulated for games of so-called ‘imperfect information’.
Games of imperfect information, defined below (see Definition 4.15) are those in which
players do not always collectively publically observe each other’s moves; so they make
choices not from (the point of view of) a node in the tree, but from a so-called ‘informa-
tion set’, that is something like a relational model on the tree. In any case, the natural
extension of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for extensive-form games, ar-
rived at by a slight re-definition of the notion of a subgame. And according to this
definition, trembling-hand equilibrium is a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equi-
librium with respect to extensive games of imperfect information, meaning that there
are extensive games of imperfect information with subgame-perfect equilibria that are
not trembling-hand equilibria.
Indeed, Selten [1975] motivated trembling-hand equilibrium using an example of
an extensive game (with imperfect information), known as ‘Selten’s Horse’, in which
there is a strategy that is a subgame-perfect equilibrium but intuitively should not be
played, by the same sort of reasoning that led to the notion of subgame-perfect equi-
librium.
From our dynamic epistemic logic perspective, the information flow in games of
imperfect information can be modelled by considering not public announcements, but
more complex epistemic actions. So while any action that is a move in a game of
perfect information can be thought of as a public announcement, an action in a game
of imperfect information is a private announcement: some players learn what has hap-
pened, the other players learn that those players have learnt what has happened, without
themselves learning what move happened. We will explain how this works below. As
we saw in Section 3.1, DEL provides the facility for many more kinds of epistemic
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action than just private announcements, and extensive games of imperfect information,
as they are currently defined, only exploit relatively primitive forms of uncertainty.
We will remark that an obvious variation of the definition of subgame-perfect equi-
librium, already indicated in [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994], takes care of the par-
ticular ‘Horse’ example that Selten used to motivate his concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium. That leads us to remark that that solution concept, which is a refinement
of the traditional subgame-perfect equilibrium, can be grounded in terms of dynamic
epistemic logic.
Trembling-hand equilibrium is defined in terms of limits of a sequence of totally
mixed strategy profiles, and so is only defined in terms of games of cardinal prefer-
ences. We introduce a further refinement of trembling-hand equilibrium, that we call
‘even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium’. It boils down to saying that all players are
equally (infinitesimally) likely to deviate. We then look at how to define a version of it
that applies also to games with ordinal preferences, giving a definition of the solution
concept in terms of its epistemic conditions, that can be see as a combination of our
notion of lexicographic rationality along with a specific belief revision policy.
Recall that a game of perfect information was a tuple of the form
(Z,, ρ,≤i)i∈N .
In games of imperfect information, we add a component to capture the fact that some
moves might not be observed by all players. This is defined by introducing an indistin-
guishability relation Ii for each player. Now, the only time it matters whether i knows
where she is in the game is when it is i’s turn. Therefore the relation runs over ρi(Z).
Thus, for each i ∈ N , we let Ii be an equivalence relation (an S5 relation) on the set
ρi(Z). We also write Ii to mean the induced partition:
{X ⊆ ρi(Z) | ∀x, y ∈ X, xIiy, and ∀x ∈ X ∀z /∈ X, ¬(xIi(y))}
The elements of Ii are called i’s ‘information sets’. We use the usual lifting of relations
to functions, so that for any node p ∈ ρi(Z), we write Ii(p) to mean the (unique)
information set I ∈ Ii such that p ∈ I . We need to place one restriction on this
information partition: if i is expected not to be able to distinguish between p and q,
then because i has to make a choice at whichever node is reached, i must have the
‘same’ options available at p and q (since as always the game is assumed to be known
to i). This is motivated by the following line of argument: suppose that at p, i can
choose between two options, L and R, but at q has only one option. Then if i is at p,
she can reason as follows: There are two options, whereas at q there would only be
one option. Therefore we are not at q. We must stipulate just that if i cannot tell the
difference between p and q, then p and q must have the same number of successors:
pIiq ⇒ #(7→ (p)) = #( 7→ (q)).
However, in games of imperfect information, we will actually include the action labels
L in the definition of a game, because we want also to be able to talk about a player be-
ing faced with the ‘same’ choices at two different nodes, and not just the same number
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of choices. Then where ` is such a labelling function, the condition that we will im-
pose on the relation Ii for each player i ∈ N is the following condition, that is strictly
stronger that the previous condition in terms of cardinality.
pIiq ⇒ `( 7→ (p)) = `( 7→ (q)).
That is: the actions available to i, in any two nodes p and q that are indistinguishable
for i, are the same, because otherwise i would be able to distinguish between p and q.
Note that now we will need to impose the condition on naming functions that no two
successors are assigned the same name, i.e.
p 7→ q & p 7→ q′ ⇒ `(q) 6= `(q′)
Definition 4.15. A game (in extensive form) with imperfect information is a tuple
(Z, `,, ρ, Ii,≤i)i∈N ,
where the components are as described above.
There is another standard condition that it makes sense to impose on player i’s
information relation/partition Ii, and that is a condition of perfect recall. In these
games, the idea is that players do not forget information, so that if player i knew at
some stage that node p was reached, and p is incompatible with q being reached, then
she will not think that q has been reached. Later in this Chapter we show how to
extend the information partition on an extensive game to the full game tree, in a way
that will require this condition of perfect recall. In perfect recall games, players do
not ‘forget’ their information sets, and also do not forget their own moves. So define
Xi(p) recursively by the distance of p from the root r. If p = r then set: Xi(p) = {∅}.
Otherwise, suppose that for the predecessor q of p (i.e. p 7→ q), Xi(q) is defined. What
we want is to have Xi record any moves that i has just made, and any information
partition she finds herself in. So if ρ(p) = i, let Y = {Ii(p)}, otherwise Y = ∅;
Y gives the information partition that i finds herself in, if any. and if ρ(p) = i then
Z = {`(p)}, otherwise Z = ∅; Z gives the move i has just made, if any. So then let
Xi(p) = Xi(q)∪Y ∪Z, and say that an extensive game has perfect recall just if, when
qIiq′ we also have Xi(q) = Xi(q′).
In the context of a game of imperfect information, a strategy for i is a function
from i’s the elements of i’s information partition to the labels of the successors of that
element, i.e. si is a strategy if it’s of the form
si : Ii → L
Ii 7→ si(Ii) ∈ `(7→ (Ii))
Then in order to define, as in the simpler case of games of perfect information, the
outcome o(s) of a strategy profile s, let fs be the function from nodes to nodes that
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is induced in the natural way by a given strategy profile s. That is, the function that
associates, to every node p the successor q ←[ p determined by the label that in turn is
determined by the strategy profile and the information set to which p belongs. In more
formal notation:
fs Z → Z
p 7→ the q ←[ p such that `(q) = s(Iρ(p)(p))
Then we define o(s) as the unique leaf such that there is a natural number k ∈ N with
fks (r), where r is the root of the game tree.
Now we can define the normal form of an extensive game of imperfect informa-
tion in the same way as we defined the normal form in the perfect information case.
Furthermore with imperfect information it’s now also possible to give, for any normal
form game G an extensive form game Γ(G) that is equivalent to it: simply have one
information set for each player i, occurring in any order, and with each one branching
#(Ti) times.
A subgame of an extensive game with imperfect information must respect the in-
formation partition.
Definition 4.16. A subgame of
(Z, L,, ρ, Ii,≤i)i∈N
is any tuple
(Z ′, LZ ′, Z ′, ρZ ′, IiZ ′,≤i Z ′)i∈N
such that (Z ′, LZ ′) is a tree and for any p ∈ Z ′ and q ∈ Z with pIiq, we have q ∈ Z ′.
The way in which subgame-perfect equilibrium is then defined for games of im-
perfect information, for example in [Selten, 1975], is effectively: that s is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in Γ if, for every subgame Γ′ of Γ, in the normal form of Γ′, s
restricted to Γ′ is a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 4.9 depicts an extensive game with imperfect information that is used as an
example by Selten [1975] in order to motivate a refinement to his concept of subgame-
perfect equilibrium, which, as we have mentioned, he argues is too permissive. Selten
illustrates using this “Horse”6 example that there are subgame-perfect strategies that
nonetheless are not intuitively rational to play in equilibrium, where, as we would say,
all beliefs would be common beliefs. He then introduces a refinement of subgame-
perfect equilibrium, which he calls simply “perfect equilibrium”, now more commonly
known as “trembling-hand equilibrium”.
Each of the three players a, b, c has just one information partition, so we can denote
a strategy profile by a triple (`a, `b, `c), where `i denotes the label of a’s chosen action.
6Selten himself refers to the example as his “numerical example”; the more colourful and now stan-
dard moniker came later.
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Figure 4.9: Selten’s Horse
Selten points out that there are two Nash equilibria7:
s. (m, m, l)
s′. (l, m, m)
And since this game has no subgames, each of these equilibria is immediately subgame
perfect.
However, similar reasoning to that motivating the concept of subgame-perfect equi-
librium applies here, to rule out s′ as a reasonable steady state. What exactly is intu-
itively objectionable about this? The problem lies in the unrealised intention of player
b. Intuitively he is not an equilibrium choice: if b were actually allowed to exercise
his choice, while still believing in the rest of the equilibrium, then b’s choice in s′
is not rational, since it not a best response to his anticipation about what c will do:
his actual choice would (according to his equilibrium (steady-state) expectation of c’s
choice) give him 1, whereas he has an alternative that would (according to that same
expectation) yield 4.
Of course, if the game were one of perfect information, in which c were able to
distinguish between both nodes in her information set, then the node at which b makes
a decision would define a subgame. And there is a sense in which for everybody
but player c the game is a game of perfect information. A more natural analogue of
subgame-perfect equilibrium, that call ‘subtree-perfect equilibrium’ is the following:
Definition 4.17. s is subtree-perfect just for each player i, si is optimal at every infor-
mation set of i if the other players would then play according to s−i (cf. [Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994, p. 219])
7Selten shows actually that there are two kinds of mixed Nash equilibria, and considers mixed strate-
gies in extensive games. We have no need to introduce these and so talk just about pure strategies; s and
s′ are the pure equilibria among the mixed ones.
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We can use the epistemic actions of DEL in order to ground the solution concept of
subtree-perfection. However, in the more general case of imperfect information, this
simple relativisation is not sufficient to capture the epistemic subtleties involved. That
is because a move like player a choosing R in Selten’s horse is public for a and b but
hidden from c.
To flesh out the connection, we will associate to each game Γ an action model AΓ
containing an epistemic action ep for every node p in Γ. The idea will be that when
ep is applied to an initial state model MΓ of the game Γ, that model will change in
precisely the way it should change to represent the epistemic effects of p being played.
This will sometimes not be a model of any subgame of Γ; for example in Figure 4.9,
the model specifying the epistemic situation that arises if player b has the chance to
actually make a move will not be a model of any subgame.
Thus whileMΓ represents the beliefs of the players before play has started,M⊗ep
will represent the beliefs the players would have if node p of the game were to be
reached.
The precondition for the action ep is just the disjunction of outcomes with which p
is compatible:
PRE(ep) =
∨
op
o
In order to define, given some game Γ, the uncertainty relations _i in the action
model AΓ, we essentially just need to extend the existing information partitions of the
players, which only run over their own nodes, to a partition of the entire game tree.
So in Selten’s Horse for example (Figure 4.9), what should we say about c’s beliefs
before a has played? Or indeed when b is about to play? Or when b has played? The
intuition is to extend the notion of “perfect recall”, so that for example at the node
where b makes a choice, c should not be aware of what move a has made (i.e. that b
is even about to make a move), since potentially later along the same path c will be
uncertain what a’s move was. Yet clearly if she could recall b making a choice, then
she would be able to work out what a’s move was, and so (by perfect recall) would not
be uncertain as to what node she was in at her information set. Similarly, she could
work out that since if b had had the opportunity to move then she (c) would have been
aware of it, then if a plays down she would realise that had happened too.
We will define a unique extension of the given uncertainty in this way. Note that
a number of alternative versions are available, which for games with more nodes and
more uncertainties would give differing models, and a coherent story could be given
for all of them. An imperfect information game, with only information sets for i of
nodes at which i plays, is supposed to be a sufficient basis for epistemic analysis, and
for reasoning about the players’ moves in the game. Therefore all of these different
ways of extending the uncertainty should yield, given the same game, action models
that, while different, are the same in all significant respects when it comes to reasoning
about the players’ moves in the game. So our canonical choice should be without loss
of generality.
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Consider the game in Figure 4.10. Suppose there that player 1 plays left. Does
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Figure 4.10: An extensive game where the players’ information set does not always
determine what each knows when
player 3 think player 1 has moved, but is unsure what move he has made? Our point
here is simply that the game does not specify this, since for existing analyses it is
unimportant. Of course, if an outcome is reached, we might want to say that all players
are informed of it, so for example player 2’s uncertainty would be resolved. Again,
this is not in the model, and so it cannot matter for the game-theoretical analysis what
choice we make, but we will be telling a slightly different ‘story’ of what (social-
)epistemic situation an extensive game represents.
The choice we make is to “maximise past uncertainty.” That is, we assume that
while the player does not ‘forget’ anything, she does not ‘learn’ anything either, until
the game explicitly states that she does. So given an information set Ii for player i, we
move backwards one step from this information set, to the set ←[ (Ii) (= {p ∈ Z |
∃q ∈ Ii : p 7→ q}). Intuitively all of these should be indistinguishable for i (note
that ←[ (Ii) can be a singleton even if Ii is not). We want to keep tracing back and
identifying all of the nodes we pass, for i, until we reach nodes that i can distinguish.
And, since we are in a game with perfect recall, we can say this only happens when i
has just played.
More formally, let Zi(I) = {p ∈← [ (I) | ¬∃q 7→ p : q ∈ ρi(Z)}. Then since our
trees are finite, there is some miI such that⋃
l<miI
Z li(I) =
⋃
l<miI+1
Z li(I).
Then for each p ∈ ⋃l<miI Z li(I), we define the relation ep _i eq iff q ∈ ⋃l<miI Z li(I).
In this way we can work through the entire tree and define, for each node p, and
each player i, for which nodes q we should have ep _i eq. This defines an action
model AΓ that, along the lines of the BM thesis, represents all of the different actions
that are possible in the game Γ, so that given some modelM representing the players’
initial beliefs before the game (i.e. at p, the root node), the new modelM⊗AΓ is a
model in which every possible action in the game has occurred. That means that if the
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actual state is u, then the state (u, ep) inM⊗AΓ represents the epistemic situation of
the players after they have moved to p.
We interpret this as backing up our claim that extensive games, even of imperfect
information, do not have many informational subtleties to them: we have shown that
it is straightforward to represent the information flow within an extensive game via a
DEL action model. In particular, there are richer actions, as well as soft information,
none of which are currently used in extensive games.
We should turn now to defining trembling-hand equilibrium, which we define with
respect to strategic games. The definition of trembling-hand equilibrium for extensive-
form games is equivalent to saying that a strategy profile is a trembling-hand equilib-
rium in the so-called “agent normal form” of the game [Selten, 1975]. In the agent
normal form of Γ, one includes one player for each information set in Γ. The idea is
that players’ mistakes should be viewed as independent: if you tremble now it does
not mean that you will tremble later. Therefore in a sense you are a different ‘agent’
at the different nodes. Still, each of these agents is in a certain sense still the same
player: they all have the same ‘exogenous objectives’: the same preferences over the
outcomes.
Trembling-hand equilibrium is defined in terms of totally mixed strategy profiles.
Definition 4.18. A mixed strategy σi of player i is totally mixed just if for every si ∈
Ti, σi(si) 6= 0.
Clearly then, we will be concerned here with games with cardinal preferences, and
it is not unproblematic to extend the definition to the infinite case, so we can consider
only finite games. A totally mixed strategy profile is just a profile of totally mixed
strategies.
Definition 4.19. A strategy profile σ is a trembling-hand equilibrium just if there
exists a sequence (σm)m∈N of totally mixed strategy profiles that converges to σ, and
such that for each player i, σi is a best response against all σm−i, i.e.:
∀σ′i ∈ ∆Ti, µi(σi, σm−i) ≥ µi(σ′i, σm−i)
Halpern [2008] has provided an elegant characterisation of a number of refinements
of Nash equilibrium, including trembling-hand equilibrium, in terms of non-standard
probabilities.8 Our main concern is not to give an exposition of trembling-hand equi-
librium, but rather to present a refinement of it that makes sense from the point of view
of games with ordinal preferences, and which is at least a little bit closer to the de-
ductive interpretation. So we will only quickly present Halpern’s characterisation of
trembling-hand equilibrium; we refer to [Halpern, 2008] for more detail. let ε be an
infinitesimal, i.e. an entity smaller than any real number yet greater than zero. If we
allow ε into our definition of a mixed strategy, we get non-standard mixed strategies.
So for example, over Ti = {W,M,D}, the following would be a non-standard mixed
8See [Keisler, 2000] for an introductory textbook on non-standard analysis.
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strategy: {(W, 0.3 + ε), (M, 0.6− 3ε+ ε2), (D, 0.1 + 2ε− ε2)}. Given a non-standard
(mixed) strategy σεi , we say that the strategy σi differs infinitesimally from σ
ε
i just if,
should ε be evaluated as 0, then the two would agree on the probability of all pure
strategies si ∈ Ti. Then essentially what Halpern shows is the following:
Theorem 4.2 (Cf. [Halpern, 2008, Theorem 1.4]). σ is a trembling-hand equilibrium
just if there is a totally mixed (possibly nonstandard) strategy profile σε such that for
each player i, σεi differs infinitesimally from σi, and σi is a best response against σ
ε
−i.
We can think of the nonstandard strategy profile as giving, in some sense, the con-
ditional beliefs of the players: in an equilibrium σ, the players do all believe that they
play according to σ, but in case of ties, they will also consider the ‘fallback’ possibili-
ties, in the order of importance that is determined by the non-standard strategy profile.
We would like to simplify this concept. Our simplification makes it non-numerical
and so applicable to games with ordinal utilities, and at the same time more intuitively
accessible, so that we are able to give an epistemic foundation for it, along the lines of
the simple epistemic characterisation of Nash equilibrium that we saw above.
Rather than allowing an arbitrary nonstandard probability distribution, we could
suppose instead that all trembles (deviations) are equally likely. There are two ways to
cash this out. The first is to suppose that for any strategy s′j not played in equilibrium,
s′j occurs with the infinitesimal probability ε. This entails that players with more strate-
gies are (infinitesimally) more likely to tremble. The second is to suppose that each
player has an equal (‘infinitesimal’) probability ε of deviating from the equilibrium
strategy profile σ, all such trembles of that player are then equally likely. We choose
the first option, but will see that the two do not lead to the same set of best responses,
Let us then define even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium in the framework of
Halpern’s [2008] characterisation of trembling-hand equilibrium. Again assume a fi-
nite game, and write #i for #(Ti)− 1, the number of strategies i could play other than
whatever equilibrium strategy she actually does play. We will eventually be interested
in games with ordinal preferences, so let σ be a pure strategy profile.
Then we define a specific nonstandard totally mixed strategy profile σe, by setting,
for all i ∈ N , σ∗i as the following nonstandard totally mixed strategy:
σ∗(si) =
{
1−#i.ε if si = σi
ε otherwise
Clearly each σ∗i is a non-standard probability distribution over Ti, i.e. a non-standard
mixed strategy for i; furthermore σ∗i is totally mixed, and differs only infinitesimally
from σi.
Definition 4.20. σ is an even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium just if for each
player i ∈ N , σi is a best response to σ∗−i.
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The second strategy profile, that we could have used to define even-handed trem-
bling hand equilibrium, is very similar: for all i ∈ N ,
σx(si) =
{
1− ε if si = σi
ε
#i
otherwise
As the game in Figure 4.11 demonstrates, these two totally mixed non-standard strategy
profiles σ∗ and σx do not yield the same best responses, and so the definition of even-
handed trembling-hand equilibrium would not be the same if we used σx in place of
σ∗. In Figure 4.11, we show the strategic game as an equivalent game of imperfect
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Figure 4.11: A game that shows the difference between σ∗ and σx
information. We only give the payoffs for player a, who is choosing between L and R;
we assume that the payoffs for the other players are such that whether or not a plays L
or R, they play their left-most strategy in equilibrium.
Both L and R are Nash equilibria for player a, since they are both best responses to
player a’s unconditional beliefs in equilibrium. Let σ−a denote the opponents’ (b and
c’s) strategy profile where they both play their left-most option. Then notice that R is
not a best response to σ∗−a, since
µi(L, σ
∗
−a) = (1− 2.ε)(1− ε) + 2.ε(1− ε)
> ε(1− 2.ε) + (1− 2.ε)(1− ε)
= µi(R, σ
∗
−a).
Therefore R is not an even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium. However, it is a best-
response to σx−a, since
µi(L, σ
x
−a) = (1− ε)(1− ε) + 2.
ε
2
(1− ε)
= ε(1− ε) + (1− ε)(1− ε)
= µi(R, σ
x
−a).
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Those subtleties lie only in the outlying regions of our main focus here however.
What we are really interested in is taking the fundamental notion behind trembling-
hand equilibrium and finding a non-numerical analogue to it.
What we therefore do in what remains of this Chapter is the following: we will
describe a plausibility ordering over the states of a model, that captures the intuition
behind trembling-hand equilibrium, though it is closer to even-handed trembling-hand
equilibrium. This ordering essentially states that players think it most plausible that
they will play according to the equilibrium prediction, but that if they do not then one
deviation from that prediction is the most likely; otherwise two deviations, and so on.
We now assume we are working with anN -player ordinal-preference game (T,<).
Given two (pure) strategy profiles σ and σ′, define δ(σ, σ′) as the number of strategies
on which σ and σ′ disagree. That is:
δ(σ, σ∗) = #{i ∈ N | σi 6= σ∗i }.
This ‘distance’ function can be used to place a constraint on plausibility orderings.
Recall that if players play a Nash equilibrium then they believe that the equilibrium
strategy is being played. The constraint we introduce generalises that idea, so it is
parametrised by a particular (pure) strategy profile σ, and we will call the constraint
respecting δσ. It says roughly that for any σ′, σ′′ with δ(σ, σ′) < δ(σ, σ′′), the ordering
has at least one state u where σ′ is played, and such that there is no state as plausible
as u at which σ′′ is played. That is:
∀w ∈ W, ∀σ′, σ′′ ∈ T, δ(σ, σ′) < δ(σ, σ′′) ⇒
∃u ∈ Wwi : ξ(u) = σ′ and ∀v ∈ Wwi , ξ(v) = σ′′ ⇒ u ≺i v
Suppose we have a model where all players’ preferences respect δσ. Then what are
the consequences of the players being lexicographically rational? (Where we take
rationality to be with respect to avoiding weakly dominated strategies.) Fact 4.3 says
that the induced solution concept is a refinement of Nash equilibrium.
Fact 4.3. If ∀i ∈ N , 4i respects δσ, then at all states where players are and play σ, σ
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Respecting δσ entails being ‘centred’ on σ, so that ξ(MIN4i(W )) = σ. And
since being lexicographically rational entails being rational tout court, which entails
playing a best response to your (unconditional) beliefs, then σ is a Nash equilibrium.

Let us define a strategy profile σ in a game of ordinal preferences as an even-handed
trembling-hand equilibrium just when it is playable under lexicographic rationality in
some model where players’ plausibilities respect δσ. Then we have defined a solution
concept in terms of a plausibility ordering. To see it another way, and to revert to
the belief revision terminology that underlies the justification for using plausibility
orderings to represent (rational) beliefs: we have defined a solution concept in terms
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of a belief revision policy. The conditional beliefs ‘pre-encode’ [Benthem, 2007a] a
player’s tendency to change her beliefs.
Different belief revision policies, in concert with our notion of lexicographic ratio-
nality, will induce other solution concepts.
In this discussion of extensive-form games and trembling-hand equilibrium we
moved to the strategic form of the game. Our reduction of strategies in extensive-form
games, to beliefs, in concert with other aspects of our analysis of perfect-information
games, unfortunately means that we cannot extend it in an elegant way to extensive
games with imperfect information. Let us take a moment to mention one fascinat-
ing example of extensive-form games that we would hope would be tractable in some
kind of dynamic epistemic framework, but for which we currently have no adequate
proposal.
That example is what is called ‘strategic communication’, and the key example
game is known in the literature as ‘battle of the sexes with an outside option’ [Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994, Figure 110.1]. This example is built by adding to the game
known as battle of the sexes, which is a two-player coordination game (depicted in
Figure 4.12 below, cf. Figure 2 from the Introduction) between Alice and Bob in which
Alice prefers one of the options on which they could coordinate, and Bob the other.
Here we give the game with cardinal preferences that stand for ordinal preferences;
here and in what follows only the order matters. Clearly our Deductive approach does
l k
l 1, 3 0, 0
k 0, 0 3, 1
Figure 4.12: Battle of the sexes
not help us to reduce this game in any way as it is entirely symmetric. The game
can be represented in its extensive form with imperfect information, as in Figure 4.13.
Now though, suppose that Alice has an ‘outside option’, something that for her falls
in between the two possibilities for coordination with Bob. If she chooses to take the
option, then play stops, but if she doesn’t take the option, then both engage in the
existing coordination game. This extended game, with the outside option for Alice, is
depicted in Figure 4.14. (Notice that it does not matter what value we put here for X!)
The point about this outside option is that, by an argument known as forward induction,
it enables Alice to ensure that she gets her preferred option without her actually having
to use the outside option. That is because Bob can reason in the following way: If Alice
doesn’t take her outside option then, if she is rational, it must be that she believes that
I will opt for my least preferred option in the coordination, i.e. her most preferred
option. This sort of reasoning is unfortunately not amenable to the kind of analysis
that we proposed as a ground for backward induction, because it involves reasoning
about counterfactual situations that have been eliminated. If Bob does not choose
N , then we would treat this as a public announcement that ¬N , and so eliminate it
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Figure 4.14: Battle of the sexes with an outside option
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from all consideration, so that our resulting model would be exactly identical with
a model of the smaller game in Figures 4.12 and 4.13. Battle of the sexes with an
outside option involves what is known as ‘strategic communication’, and this crucially
involves remembering the context, where the game came from, and so is not directly
amenable to the sort of public announcement approach that was so fruitful in the case of
games with perfect information. We did extend the idea of modelling moves as public
announcements to games with imperfect information, by looking at DEL models for
actions. However, that extension also suffers from the same issue of eliminating from
consideration nodes (and so outcomes) that are not reached.
We could study instead the strategic form of the game, as depicted in Figure 4.15.
Then it can be seen that iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies mean
l k
N 2, X 2, X
l 1, 3 0, 0
k 0, 0 3, 1
Figure 4.15: Battle of the sexes with an outside option, in normal form
indeed that the only outcome available is 3, 1, as predicted by the forward induction
reasoning (cf. [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 110]. However, just as we argued that
there is some insight to be gained from studying backward induction on the tree itself,
rather than in the strategic form of the game, so we would like to suggest that to bet-
ter understand strategic communication, from the point of view of dynamic epistemic
logic, would mean providing an analysis in terms of the extensive form itself.
We suggest that these two last topics we have looked at, studying solution concepts
in terms of lexicographic rationality combined with some belief revision policy, and an
analysis of strategic communication within a dynamic epistemic logic framework, are
eminently worth of further study.
Summary
In this Chapter we used some of the logical tools from earlier Chapters in order to
study extensive or ‘dynamic’ games. Our principal contribution involved giving con-
ditions, in terms of ‘stable belief’, for backward induction in generic games of perfect
information. This condition can be thought of as a kind of ‘belief revision policy’: try
at all costs to hold on to the belief that players will play rationally in the future.
We also considered, for the first time in this work, some solution concepts that are
plausible only for a steady-state interpretation of game theory. We showed how to give
conditions for such solution concepts in terms of a belief revision policy in concert with
lexicographic rationality. We did this by giving a particular example a solution concept,
that we called “even-handed trembling-hand equilibrium.” Although this is closely
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related to trembling-hand equilibrium (otherwise known as ‘perfect’ equilibrium), of
which it is a refinement, it is to our knowledge a new concept. Finally, we illustrated a
limitation to the DEL analysis we proposed, by pointing out that it does not yet yield
any insight or understanding of the phenomenon of strategic communication.
Summary
“What does it mean to end anything?
[long pause]
“So what is ending?”
– Jiddu Krishnamurti, 1981
All we permit ourselves in this Summary is a brief recapitulation of each Chapter, fol-
lowed by a briefer discussion of a set of issues, and questions that have been explicitly
left unresolved.
Looking back
The main contribution of Chapter 1 was to generalise results relating levels of mutual
in rationality with numbers of rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies. There
were three directions of generalisation:
1. The first was an extension to infinite games, and so to arbitrary (including trans-
finite) levels of mutual belief in rationality. (We justified this by pointing out that
for any arbitrary ordinal α there are games that require α rounds of elimination
of not strictly dominated strategies before no more strategies can be eliminated.)
2. Another involved looking at just how much logic is required to get some known
results. It turned out that the answer is ‘not very much’, in the sense that we can
drop an important axiom about being able to put pieces of information together
(saying that if a player believes ϕ and ψ then she believes their conjunction
ϕ ∧ ψ) and still get the main result. Similarly, when players are able to put the
information together but do not have any kind of introspection concerning their
beliefs, the main result still holds.
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3. The other generalisation involved considering abstract notions of optimality, so
that rather than talk about specific ways of saying when a strategy is ‘better’
than another, our results hold for all properties that respect a certain property of
‘monotonicity’.
In Chapter 2 we turned our attention to formal languages. We catalogued a va-
riety of languages, and looked at the definability of the key notions of rationality and
common belief. We then looked at type-space models, and showed how they connect
with the state-space models we had used so far, and which are more familiar from the
modal logic literature. The rest of the Chapter was devoted to studying the notion of
assumption-completeness. We proved that an infinitary modal language is assumption-
complete, and left an open conjecture concerning a language lying between modal and
first-order. We take that conjecture to be of independent interest outside of game theory
or interactive epistemology, due to the connection between assumption-completeness
and Russell’s paradox. This technical open question aside, Chapter 2 also left almost
untouched conceptual questions concerning the notion of assumption-completeness:
most notably, to what extent does it respond to the intuitions expressed behind it, of
the ‘availability’ of a language to a player in a model?
In Chapter 3 we looked at some aspects of logical dynamics as applied to strategic
games. We proposed an interpretation of public announcement actions (cf. [Benthem,
2007b]) as steps in some collective reasoning process. Our aim here was twofold:
firstly to look at where models like those used in some of the proofs in Chapter 1
come from; And secondly, to tell some kind of coherent story about this process of
common reasoning. Both aims led us to introduce variants of public announcements
of rationality. The second also involved introducing, informally, the notions of ‘stable
equilibrium of beliefs’, and to treat the case of non-monotonic optimality operators
like weak dominance, ‘lexicographic rationality’. We showed how ‘soft announce-
ments’ [Benthem, 2007a] of rationality in this framework give some kind of coherent
epistemic analysis of rounds of iteration of eliminating weakly dominated strategies.
The first two directions of generalisation in Chapter 1 both entailed considering
neighbourhood semantics, in contrast to the relational semantics traditionally used by
modal logicians and game-theorists. In Chapter 3, we also generalised some known
results about dynamic epistemic logic to the case of neighbourhood models, in partic-
ular giving a reduction axiom for the basic DEL action modality [Baltag et al., 1999]
in a language with monotonic modal operators.
Finally in Chapter 4 we studied some epistemic aspects of extensive games. The
main contribution there was to give conditions for backwards induction, in terms of
stable belief and dynamic (forward-looking) rationality. We looked at how dynamic
epistemic logic might be used to analyse extensive-form games with imperfect in-
formation. We introduced a solution concept that is a refinement of trembling-hand
equilibrium (named ‘even-handed’), that we motivated on epistemic grounds. We sug-
gested that both of these solution concepts – backward induction and even-handed
trembling hand – could be understood in terms of a belief revision policy combined
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with lexicographic rationality. We also showed a limitation in extending the analysis
we proposed of backward induction to the interesting problem of an epistemic analysis
of strategic communication.
Looking forward
One of the issues raised by our use of neighbourhood semantics is that of the infor-
mation-processing capacities of players: in neighbourhood models one does not as-
sume that players are able to put information together to the same extent that it is as-
sumed in relational models. We found, in Theorem 1.4, a condition that is just enough
to get a certain result about reasoning in the context of a game. Other kinds of in-
teractive reasoning must operate on the basis of other principles which are essentially
axioms of some logical system.
This line of thought is in the vein of abstracting away from non-cooperative game
theory, which has provided a nice focus for us, but, as we mentioned in the Introduc-
tion, does not have a monopoly on interactive reasoning. In that same vein, we left
unanswered the question what assumption-completeness means in interactive episte-
mology generally, irrespective of any game-theoretical application.
And although our account of ‘private but common’ reasoning (Chapter 3) makes
sense in the context of a game, since it just duplicates a given game-theoretical al-
gorithm, if it is to have solid conceptual currency then it should also find some other
correlate outside of game theory. This will involve using richer action models from
dynamic epistemic logic than the very simple examples we used.
Questions of an increasingly more technical nature that we have raised are:
1. Can dynamic epistemic logic provide an account of strategic communication?
(Chapter 4)
2. To what extent can we claim that there is an equivalence between
(a) 1 + α rounds of elimination of non-optimal strategies, and
(b) rationality and α-level mutual belief in rationality?
(Chapters 1 and 3)
3. Is the modal language with the binder (equivalently: the bounded fragment of
first-order logic) assumption-complete? (Chapter 2)
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Samenvatting
De titel van dit proefschrift zegt niet zo veel over de inhoud. We onderzoeken niet
precies hoe er met informatie wordt “gespeeld”, maar veeleer hoe de informatie die
spelers bezitten de uitkomst van het spel bepaalt: hoe ze spelen, met informatie. Zo
bekijken we bijvoorbeeld stellingen van de vorm ‘als de spelers dit soort informatie
hebben, dan maken ze dat soort keuzes’.
De inhoud van dit proefschrift beslaat een serie bijdragen aan de literatuur over
epistemische speltheorie. We onderzoeken de verbanden tussen geloof en rationele
keuze in een interactieve, meerspeler context. Onze nadruk, zoals gebruikelijk on-
der epistemische speltheoretici, ligt op de zogenaamde nietcooperatieve speltheorie,
waarin bindende contracten die spelers onderling kunnen aangaan expliciet gemod-
elleerd worden. We proberen zo veel mogelijk de gehele interactiesituatie in onze
spelen te modelleren. We proberen zo veel mogelijk te vermijden aan te nemen dat
de spelers exogene informatie hebben over wat andere spelers van plan zijn, bijvoor-
beeld gebaseerd op eerdere observaties. We noemen dit de ‘one shot’ interpretatie. Dit
betekend dat het type informatie dat wij beschouwen altijd gaat over de ‘rationaliteit’
van de spelers, of over informatie over dit soort informatie.
Hoofdstuk 1 dient niet alleen ter introductie van enkele wiskundige modellen die
we gebruiken in dit proefschrift, maar bevat ook enkele kleine bijdragen aan een sim-
pele doch fundamentele stelling van de epistemische speltheorie, die de ‘hoeveelheid
wederzijdse geloof’ relateert aan het aantal ronden van interactie van niet optimale
strategien. Met wat sociologisch vernis zou je kunnen zeggen dat deze stelling een di-
recte correlatie bevestigt tussen aan de ene kant de mate waarin een groep spelers over
‘dezelfde’ informatie beschikt, en anderzijds de mate waarin het gedrag van die spelers
wordt gecordineerd doordat zij de voorkeuren van de anderen overwegen. Zulk vernis
zul je in het proefschrift verder niet aantreffen, het is moeilijk deze zaken bondig in
lekentermen samen te vatten. De introductie schetst wel de basale logica van het bewijs
van de stelling. Onze eigen kleine bijdragen in hoofdstuk 1 noemen we daar ‘general-
isaties’. Zo bekijken we hoe de logica uit te breiden is naar het oneindige geval. Dit
blijkt ietwat subtiel, en we beargumenteren dat we de zogenaamde ‘neighbourhood’ (of
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de sterk gerelateerde z.g.n. ‘topologische’) modellen voor geloof moeten gebruiken in
plaats van de ‘relationele’ modellen die gebruikelijk zijn in de epistemische logica.
Voor diegenen die bekend zijn met epistemische logica: er zijn hints van een verband
met de problemen van logische alwetendheid. In neighbourhood modellen kun je niet
zonder meer afleiden uit kennis van ϕ en het feit dat ϕ ψ impliceert dat je dan ψ weet.
In hoofdstuk 2 maken we het onderscheid, belangrijk in de logica, tussen syn-
tax (taal) en semantiek (modellen), en bespreken de bijbehorende onderwerpen, zoals
definieerbaarheid. De technische bijdrage van dat hoofdstuk ligt in het beantwoorden
van een fundamentele vraag over het bestaan van een geloofsmodel dat in bepaalde zin
‘compleet’ is.
In hoofdstuk 3 spelen we met enkele ideen over de dynamiek van informatie, en
bekijken waar epistemische condities vandaan komen. We introduceren gereedschap-
pen uit de ‘dynamisch epistemische logica’, en passen die aan voor gebruik in de neigh-
bourhood modellen die we veelvuldig gebruiken in dit proefschrift. We tonen ook het
belang aan, voor het begrip van bepaalde speltheoretische voorspellingen, van herzien-
baar geloof: dat wil zeggen, het modelleren van situaties waarin een speler iets eerst
kan geloven, en later kan leren dat ditgene niet waar is.
In hoofdstuk 4 bekijken we een specifieke speltheoretische situatie waarin de aan-
namen van de spelers zelf onwaar kunnen zijn in deze zin, en ze verrast kunnen wor-
den door de klaarblijkelijke irrationaliteit van andere spelers. Om deze reden geven
we aandacht aan spellen met verscheidene temporele stadia (zogenaamde ‘extensive
games’). We gebruiken de behandelde gereedschappen uit hoofdstuk 3 om epistemis-
che modellen van zulke situaties te maken, waarin spelers dingen kunnen geloven die
later onwaar blijken. (Voor de speltheoreticus: we geven een epistemisch raamwerk in
termen van het begrip ‘stabiel geloof in dynamische rationaliteit’, voor achterwaartse
inductie.)
Abstract
“They can take one small matrix,
And really do great tricks,
All in the name of sociology”
– Tom Lehrer [1997]
The title of this dissertation is not very informative as to its contents. We do not look
exactly at how information is ‘played with’, but rather at how information the players
have affects the play of the game: at how they play, with information. So for example
some of the theorems we discuss are of the form, ‘if the players have such-and-such
information, then they will make such-and-such choices’.
The contents of this dissertation therefore constitute a series of contributions to the
literature on epistemic game theory. So we study the connections between beliefs and
rational choice in an interactive, multi-agent setting. We focus, as has been focussed
the attention of epistemic game theorists, only on so-called ‘non-cooperative’ game
theory, i.e. in which any binding contracts the players can make between themselves
must be explicitly modelled in the game. Indeed, as much as is possible we try to let
each game be the whole story about the interaction situation, so we generally avoid
assuming that players have exogenous information concerning what other players will
do, based for example on past observation. We call this the ‘one-shot’ interpretation.
It means that the kind of information we consider is always about the ‘rationality’ of
the players, or information about information of this kind.
In Chapter 1, which also serves to introduce some of the mathematical models that
we use in the dissertation, we add a few minor touches to a basic but fundamental
theorem in epistemic game theory, which relates the ‘level’ of ‘mutual belief’ to the
number of rounds of iteration of non-optimal strategies. To put a sociological gloss
on that theorem, we could see it as affirming a direct correlation between in the one
hand the extent to which a group of players have the ‘same’ information and in the
other the extent to which those players’ behaviour is co-ordinated by consideration of
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the preferences of others. However, you will not find such gloss on the material in
the dissertation, and it’s difficult to sum up the issues concisely in non-specialist terms,
though the Introduction does briefly sketch part of the basic logic of the argument prov-
ing the theorem. The ‘minor touches’ that form our own contribution in Chapter 1 are
called there ‘generalisations’, and one of those is to look at how the logic extends to
the infinitary case, where it turns out that there are some subtleties that, we argue, call
for so-called ‘neighbourhood’, or the closely-related ‘topological’, models for beliefs,
rather than the ‘relational’ models commonly found in epistemic logic. For those fa-
miliar with formal epistemology: there are hints of a connection with issues of logical
omniscience, as neighbourhood models do not licence the inference that because you
know ϕ and that ϕ implies ψ, then you know ψ.
In Chapter 2 we make the distinction, important in logic, between syntax (lan-
guage) and semantics (models), and discuss some issues that arise, like definability.
The technical contribution of that Chapter is to address a foundational question con-
cerning the existence of belief model that is in a certain sense ‘complete’.
In Chapter 3 we play with some ideas about dynamics of information, looking
at how epistemic conditions might come about. We introduce tools from ‘dynamic
epistemic logic’, that we adapt to the neighbourhood model framework that we often
use throughout the dissertation. We also show the importance, for understanding some
game-theoretical predictions, of revisable beliefs: that is, of modelling situations in
which a player might believe something and later learn that it is not true.
In Chapter 4, we look at a particular game-theoretical situation in which the play-
ers’ assumptions can be violated in this way, in which they can be surprised by the
apparent irrationality of a player. So we turn our attention to games with distinct tem-
poral stages (so-called ‘extensive games’). We use tools explained in Chapter 3 in
order to build epistemic models of these situations, in which players can have beliefs
and later find out that they are wrong. (For the game-theorist: we provide an epistemic
foundation, in terms of a notion of ‘stable belief in dynamic rationality’, for backward
induction.)
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